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ABSTRACT
GETTING THE BEST OF US
Vivienne Born
Beth Simmons
Populist backlash has emerged as an alarming trend shaping immigration policy across the
developed world in recent years. At the same time, a less-sensationalized pattern has
appeared in the form of policies designed to attract the highly skilled. In the face of so
much anti-immigration sentiment, how can we understand this push for global talent? One
possibility is that these seemingly divergent agenda are but two sides of the same coin.
Policymakers and members of the business community point to labor shortages and a
global war for talent as justifications for skill-selective policies. Yet some in the academic
community contest that the evidence for these concerns is lacking. This gives rise to a twopronged question. Is there really a competition between states? And how can we
understand the role of corporations in advancing the international mobility of the highly
skilled? This dissertation offers a theory of the multinational corporation (MNC) as the
instrument of international policy diffusion. It explores the preferences and incentives that
shape the behaviors of individuals, policymakers and firms and demonstrates that there is
a window of political space within which firms have an opportunity to advance a skillselective compromise. To test this theory, two original datasets are introduced, the first
tracking policies targeting highly skilled migrants from 1980-2017 and the second following
the expansion of MNC subsidiary locations over time. Using spatial regression analysis and
case study evidence, this project finds considerable support for the idea that MNCs act as
agents of international policy diffusion with regard to skill-selective immigration policies.
The major contribution of this dissertation is its contention that the geographic structure
of the multinational firm alters the firm’s strategic incentives and political activity, making
it organizationally unique from the single-nation firm and connecting MNC incentives with
policy diffusion.
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Chapter 1: Introducing the Global War for Talent

Chapter 1

Introducing the Global War for Talent
In March 2008, the founder of Microsoft Corporation, Bill Gates, told the House
Committee on Science and Technology that “Congress’ failure to pass high-skilled
immigration reform has exacerbated an already grave situation” (H110-84 2008, p. 19).
The grave situation of which Gates spoke was the shortage of qualified technology workers
in the U.S. labor market and the limited, oversubscribed quota of skilled visas available to
employers to bridge the gap. Gates also regretfully informed the committee members of
the consequences of their legislative inaction, explaining that “many U.S. firms, including
Microsoft, have been forced to locate staff in countries that welcome skilled foreign
workers” (H110-84 2008, p. 119).
With these words, Gates sent a clear message. Unless the U.S. Congress took action
to liberalize skilled immigration policies, it should expect the country’s most successful and
rapidly expanding companies to relocate some of their core capabilities offshore. In other
words, Gates used his 2008 testimony before Congress to lay out the logic of the global
war for talent. Credit for the idea cannot be given to Gates, however, for this same dynamic
had been invoked before. The report from the Independent Commission on Migration to
Germany, led by Rita Süssmuth, called attention in 2001 to a “Wettbewerb um die besten
Köpfe”—a battle for the best brains (p. 26). In 2005, political scientist Devesh Kapur and
economist John McHale published a book called Give Us Your Best and Brightest: The
1
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Global Hunt for Talent and its Impact on the Developing World. A spokesman for the
Sarkozy administration complained in 2006 that “the most qualified immigrants, the most
dynamic and competent ones, head to the American continent, while immigrants with
little or no skills come to Europe” (UPI). In 2008, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) put out a comparative study of immigration
policies in its member states titled The Global Competition for Talent: Mobility of the
Highly Skilled.
These examples show that by 2008, global business leaders, policymakers, and
researchers had reached a consensus on the global labor market for skilled workers: For
whatever reason, skilled labor had become scarce, and new approaches to immigration
policy should be used to address the problem. Furthermore, the data show that
governments have been acting on these views—according to a survey of policy objectives
conducted by the UN Population Division, the percent of governments with policies aimed
at raising high-skill immigration “increased from 22 per cent in 2005 to 39 per cent in 2011”
(2013, p. 40). While the conventional wisdom in the study of immigration policy holds
that policy change is a battle played out between domestic interest groups, the
competition-for-talent consensus demands an evaluation of the role played by international
politics.

Understanding Immigration Policy
Political economy explanations of immigration policy have focused on the economic
2
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interests of political actors and how successfully these actors coordinate their actions and
communicate with policymakers. Based purely on economic positioning, this literature says
that individuals should form immigration policy preferences in accordance with their own
vulnerability to job market competition. In practice, this has often meant dividing people
according to their relative levels of education—native workers with low levels of education
are more likely to be directly impacted by low-skilled immigrants, who comprise the bulk
of contemporary immigration flows. Therefore, we should not be surprised when opinion
polls consistently show that respondents with lower levels of education are less sympathetic
to liberal immigration policies. Table 1.1 illustrates the consistency and regularity of this
finding, using Pew survey data to show the perceived economic threat of immigration by
the education level of the respondent for eight European countries. As the Pew report
notes, the difference shown between the two groups is significant in every case (Silver
2018).
On this other side of this basic story of economic motives, employers ought to see
immigration as an easy way to boost the labor supply and cut wage-related costs. The
infamous U.S. Bracero program, which enabled agricultural employers to import Mexican
workers on short-term labor contracts, was the direct result of growers’ demands, arising
from the fear that the Second World War would cripple their labor supply (see Tichenor
2002).
Unions have occasionally also been seen as representative of anti-immigration
3
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Table 1.1: Education Level and Perceived Threat of
Economic Competition from Immigrants
% who agree that “Immigrants are a burden on our economy because they
take our jobs”
Country

Less Education

More Education

Denmark

32%

17%

+

15

16%

+

21

12%

+

11

24%

+

24

16%

+

19

11%

+

22

France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

37%
23%
48%
35%
33%
18%

+

10%

28%

Difference

+

5%

8

23

Source: Adapted from a table in a 2018 Pew Research Center Report entitled
“Immigration concerns fall in Western Europe, but most see need for newcomers
to integrate into society,” by Laura Silver. Data in this report pulled from a Pew
survey of eight Western European countries conducted October 30-December 20
2017.

sentiments, either in place of or in addition to similarly skilled individuals. Most studies
that incorporate unions expect them to oppose immigration in an attempt to preserve their
2

bargaining power by limiting employer access to non-union labor . It was in part the power
of organized union opposition to employers’ tactics of recruiting Chinese labor to bring
wages down in late 19th-century Australia that led to the creation of the White Australia
policy (see Castles, Vasta & Ozkul 2004). It is not hard to locate empirical examples that

2

Though increasingly, studies of contemporary union political activity have seen a strategy shift
wherein some unions choose to support immigrant rights rather than seeking to restrict immigrant
access (see Krings 2009, for example).
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support predictions founded on economic rationalism; clearly, economic interests must be
a part of explaining changes to immigration policy.
Most work that draws upon these economic interest-based expectations handles
outcome uncertainty arising from opposing interest groups by utilizing the logic of
collective action (e.g. Freeman 1995) or by leveraging differences in institutional design3
(e.g. Cerna 2009; Menz 2011), but while these approaches can often tell us something
about the general orientation of immigration policy, they are ill-suited to explaining
change. Furthermore, there are countless instances in which immigration policy change
can be more effectively explained by social or normative factors than by economic motives.
For example, the movement in many countries away from racially selective policies during
the post-World War Two period is hard to connect to an organized group of employers or
unions, but it is situated in the context of a global swell of repudiation for institutionalized
4

racial discrimination .

3

By looking at variation in institutional structure, the varieties of capitalism literature offers some
helpful generalizations based on how the structure of political and economic institutions impacts
the relative allocation of interest-group political power, but this approach has struggled to define
power independently from policy outcomes and cannot be applied when there is no institutional
variation.
4
Scholars differ on the relative importance of contemporaneous developments in the domestic versus
international arenas. In the United States, the momentum created by the Civil Rights Movement
and the assassination of the most prominent critic of the national origins quotas—John F.
Kennedy—are central to explaining the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act
(LeMay 1987). At the same time, however, the gruesome legacy of the Holocaust, the widespread
movements toward decolonization, and the inclusion of the newly independent states emerging from
this process in international institutions like the United Nations, are also credited with creating
pressure for change among domestic governments (see Triadafilopoulos 2013).
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Can the spread of skill-selective policies and the global war for talent be explained
by the standard political economy approach or the model of international normative
diffusion? Freeman and Hill make the case that “highly skilled immigration policy in the
U.S. is a wholly self-contained national affair,” pointing to the complex interactions
between political interest groups that take place around the policymaking process (2006,
p. 7). At the same time, however, Peters’ (2017) examination of low-skilled immigration
policy in the face of globalization is a testament to the impact that global economics can
have on the interests and capabilities of domestic political participants, suggesting that
even national affairs may not be “wholly self-contained” (Freeman and Hill 2006, p. 7).
Skill-selective immigration policies are usually justified in terms of the contributions the
highly skilled are expected to make to the domestic economy, but the rapid spread of
skilled immigration policies across states with distinct immigration regimes and the
rhetorical focus on an international competition undermine a purely domestic, political
economic answer.

Previewing the Argument
The central argument of this dissertation is that multinational information
technology firms act as agents of diffusion for high-skilled immigration policies5. Rather

5

Throughout this project, the terms high-skilled immigration policy, skilled immigration policy,
and skill-selective immigration policy are used interchangeably. All three terms refer to policies that
aim to filter prospective migrants in terms of their economic, educational, or occupational
achievement.
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than rejecting political economy explanations about the role of the firm in shaping
immigration policy, this project uses conflicting interest-group preferences to establish a
more nuanced set of expectations around firm behavior. Firms are by design strategic
organizations. Just as we assume that firms engage strategically with market competitors,
making decisions based on the expected decisions of other firms, we should also anticipate
that firms will be strategic with political competitors, making decisions based on the
expected decisions of other interest groups. This project thus embraces the view that actors
with economic motives strategically endeavor to utilize—or at least avoid being harmed
by—opposition interests, even those driven by non-economic factors.
In the case of immigration, existing work tells us that individual preferences on
immigration policy are only partially driven by perceptions of economic threat. Individuals
also express cultural anxieties and racially motivated hostility. But there is no reason to
suppose that this reality invalidates the economic motives of profit-driven actors or that
firms remain somehow unaware of the non-economic components of societal views. This
means that we should expect firms to pursue their own economic interests, such as
immigration liberalization, while strategically accounting for the non-economic motives
driving their opponents to support restriction. In practice, this dissertation contends that
a subset of multinational firms accomplishes this strategic balancing by pushing for policies
that selectively liberalize admission, using public bias in favor of the highly skilled to gain
policy concessions for skilled immigrants. If we relax the assumption of economic
7
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rationalism at the individual level and allow for the possibility that normative or
prejudicial individual attitudes have the power to influence policy outcomes, political
economy explanations can still tell us something about how economic actors respond in
this environment.
Furthermore, the argument presented here distinguishes between multinational and
single-country firms6, highlighting the cross-border network structure and polity-diversified
interests of multinationals to show how they can draw upon change in one state to mobilize
support for change in another. Thus, this theory requires a reevaluation of process of policy
diffusion, which is traditionally expected to take place through interstate observation or
interaction. In the case of high-skilled immigration policy, subsidiaries that inherit their
preferences for skill-selective immigration from their parent companies cite successful
reform efforts in sibling-subsidiary and headquarters locations to support the influence
campaigns they direct at their own host governments. The logic they employ, of course, is
that the state and all the employers that drive its economy are caught up in a growing,
global competition for talent. As multinational firms continue to expand their operations
to new states, the geographic spread of their political influence will expand as well, creating
a pattern of policy diffusion that travels along the paths created by corporate hierarchy.

6

This distinction is not meant to imply that single-country firms are universally uninterested in
advocating for liberal immigration policy. Rather, the contrast is used to show that only
multinational firms can operate as the conduit between influence campaigns across states. Once a
campaign to respond competitively to policy change abroad has begun, some domestic firms will
naturally join in.
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Outlining the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. This chapter, Chapter 1,
introduces the central research question that motivates the project, and previews the
argument and contributions. The recent trend toward skill-selective immigration is a
noteworthy departure from the design of immigration policies of the past. To help
familiarize the reader with this progression, Chapter 2 provides a historical examination
of how selection has figured into immigration policies over the course of the last century.
It posits that the organization of the international system into discrete, sovereign states
had the effect of dividing the global population in terms of national membership, a
naturally discriminatory instrument. Within this context, Chapter 2 then explores the
evolution of immigration selection systems, showing how once-ubiquitous ethnically
selective policies emerged in different states and eventually gave way to economic and
familial strategies of selection. It illustrates how skill-selective policies have grown out of
this lineage but shows also how their bracketed application separates them from their
legislative ancestors. This policy transformation is referred to as the skill-selective turn.
The puzzle implicit in this shift creates the empirical motivation for the rest of the
dissertation.
Chapter 3 contains a detailed theoretical treatment of the argument previewed
above. Building from a political economy framework, it lays out the immigration
preferences of firms and their opposition and introduces a model of the accountability
9
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constraints faced by policymakers. Using this to establish the political environment in
which firms operate on the issue of immigration, Chapter 3 then analyzes the expected
behavioral responses of strategic firms, describing their political activity at home and how
these actions get translated into corporate influence abroad. Chapter 3 also distills this
argument into a set of observable implications that form the basis for hypothesis testing.
The central hypothesis is that countries that host subsidiaries of the same multinational
firms—cohosts—will demonstrate policy interdependence in the liberalization of skillselective immigration policies in accordance with the strength of their cohosting
relationship. Secondary hypotheses suggest that this relationship is conditioned by
government partisan ideology and electoral institutions. Finally, this Chapter produces a
set of three diagnostic criteria to be evaluated qualitatively, using process-tracing.
The fourth chapter introduces the two original datasets that comprise the empirical
contribution of this project and enable testing of the hypotheses generated in Chapter 3.
First, Chapter 4 gives a descriptive break down of skill-selective immigration policies,
demonstrating how the purported purpose of selection has been implemented in terms of
policy design. This sets the stage for the introduction of a new dataset of changes to skillselective immigration policies. Chapter 4 discusses the challenges inherent in the collection
of comparative policy data and describes some of the coding choices that determine the
structure of the new dataset (for instance, to divide policies along dimensions somewhat
akin to their intensive and extensive margins). The next part of Chapter 4 provides an
10

Chapter 1: Introducing the Global War for Talent
analogous discussion of a second original dataset, which catalogues the locational attributes
of a select group of multinational firms and their subsidiaries. The remainder of Chapter
4 describes the logic behind the statistical modeling strategy utilized for hypothesis testing
in Chapters 5 and 6—spatial regression.
Chapter 5 presents the central statistical results of the dissertation. The results
shown in Chapter 5 provide strong statistical support for the central hypothesis. Because
this hypothesis predicts policy interdependence, the independent variable is a spatially
weighted transformation of the dependent variable, which is operationalized as liberal
changes to skill-selective immigration policy. The spatial weights communicate the
strength of the cohosting relationships between states, meaning that the independent
variable becomes a measure of the political coalition that could potentially translate policy
changes abroad into policy influence at home. The emphasis on this variable as a measure
of potential should be noted. The results shown in Chapter 5 also support the secondary
hypothesis regarding the conditioning effect of government partisan ideology, but the
hypothesis predicting a similar role for electoral institutions is not supported. Chapter 5
takes several steps to show that the results are not dependent on modeling choices,
including incorporating a battery of economic and institutional controls and introducing a
temporal simple moving average.
Additional robustness checks are addressed in Chapter 6. While the primary
purpose of the tests in Chapter 5 is to demonstrate that the statistical finding of
11
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interdependence is not spurious, the attention in Chapter 6 is shifted to the possibility
that it may be explained by something else. Chapter 6 begins with an outlier analysis that
finds no evidence the results are being driven by a single country or a few high-leverage
observations. It also examines two alternative explanations, utilizing measures of
international connectivity other than cohosting (specifically, geographic distance and
bilateral trade ties) to look for evidence that interdependence travels through an
alternative channel. Each of these alternatives finds weak support on its own, but neither
is robust to the inclusion of the cohosting measure. Finally, Chapter 6 approaches the
separate dimensions of immigration policy coded by the dataset introduced in Chapter 4.
The importance of the descriptive, criteria-based dimension of policy over the more
arbitrary, red-tape style dimension may be indicative of an important distinction to draw
out in future work—the bureaucratic versus legislative source of a given policy change.
Chapter 7 adds a qualitative dimension to the analysis, using case study evidence
to provide additional support for the theory outlined in Chapter 3. The case studies in
Chapter 7 focus on the emergence of contemporary skill-selective strategies, or the skillselective turn, within the immigration regimes of four countries—the United States,
Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom. These case studies establish a foundation
of evidence for evaluating three observable implications (or diagnostic criteria) that cannot
be tested using the datasets described in Chapter 4. First, they look for evidence that
multinational information technology firms and their subsidiaries actually exert influence
12
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on policymakers on the issue of immigration policy. Second, they try to discover whether
these firms conceive of skill-selective policies as a way to avoid becoming embroiled in the
political controversy surrounding immigration more broadly. And third, they examine
whether communications from these multinational firms to policymakers employ the
rhetorical device of the international competition for talent. While these elements of the
theoretical mechanism are easiest to locate in the United States’ case (where lobbying data
is made public, for instance), all four vignettes help fill in the details of the involvement
of multinational corporate political activity in the story of skill-selective immigration
policy.
In the final chapter, Chapter 8, the quantitative and qualitative findings presented
in Chapters 5-7 are considered in terms of the political economic implications of
multinational intra-firm networks operating as transnational paths of policy influence and
the future of immigration policy. Chapter 8 also discusses some of the most interesting
research extensions that follow from the conclusions drawn in this project, including the
potential relevance of MNC networks in other policy areas.
While the political economy literature has long thought of firms as supporters of
liberal economic policies, the transnational linkages inherent in the structure of
multinational firms have not found a place in existing explanations for the diffusion of
these policies. This project takes the first step along this research agenda, using the
proliferation of skill-selective immigration policies and the placement of information
13
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technology subsidiaries to show that multinational firms can act as agents of international
policy diffusion.

Contributions and Implications
The work contained in this dissertation makes several notable contributions to the
field of political science. First and foremost, the theory presented in this dissertation
contributes to the literatures on multinational corporations and policy diffusion by locating
firms and their subsidiaries as relational actors at the center of the policy transfer process.
Thus, while high-salience policy preferences are spread from the top down within
multinational firms, their appearance in different polities is bottom-up, emerging from
businesses positioned within the domestic economy before being taken up by policymakers.
The potential relevance of this mechanism for the diffusion of a broader spectrum of
economic and social policies absolutely must be considered by scholars of globalization and
political economy going forward. While this dissertation makes the case that skill-selective
immigration policies are most important to a select group of multinational firms, other
issue areas may inspire broader and more powerful global coalitions.
Second, the theory of firm strategy on immigration policy productively marries
political economic and cultural explanations of immigration policy change. The
incorporation of non-economic individual preferences as a part of the strategic economic
calculation made by firms engaged in corporate political activity is a useful way to relax
certain assumptions about economic rationalism without sacrificing the potency of the
14

Chapter 1: Introducing the Global War for Talent
political economic model. Third, the original datasets described in Chapter 4 have the
potential to become resources for other scholars.
The immigration policy implications that follow from this project should not be
overlooked either. The increased use of skill-selective immigration policies in recent decades
has acted to bifurcate the discourse on legal immigration. While skilled migrants are not
the first immigrant group to be deemed desirable in juxtaposition with a racially or
culturally undesirable other, they are the most recent incarnation of this xenophobic
tendency. Some multinational firms have seen the creation of skilled migrant visas as a
way to elude the restrictive impulses of anti-immigrant publics, but circumventing
nativism has no long-term potential to mute it. Rather, if the most economically and
politically influential proponents of immigration have shifted their attention from broadbased reforms to a limited offshoot of high-skilled admissions, they have effectively left the
rest of the field open to its detractors.

15

Chapter 2: A Brief History of Immigrant Selection

Chapter 2

A Brief History of Immigrant Selection
The Strategy of Selection
Why Do States Select?
Many of the challenges in immigration policy today are linked, institutionally and
ideologically, to the role of the state. The project of nationalism and the emergence of the
so-called nation-state legitimized the centralization of power along the lines of a newfound
national identity, replacing the feudal hierarchy. Though this tool of nationalism has by
no means signaled the erasure of divisions within societies, it has been used by states as a
rationale for allocating a good with a distinctly equalizing flavor—universal membership.
Yet this offering from the state would be rendered worthless if it were truly universal. To
feel properly inducted into a national community, one must be able to compare one’s own
membership favorably with others’ non-membership, suggesting that while membership “is
internally inclusive, it is externally exclusive” (Brubaker 1992, p. 21)7.
The state, therefore, must retain some level of exclusivity with regard to the
membership it allocates to ensure the continued value of that membership. This is where
an important contrast must be drawn between the idea of the state and that of the
nation—while states may use the language of nationalism, of some kind of cultural or

7

Brubaker is referring specifically to citizenship here, but his observation applies just as well to the
wider, more diluted concept of membership used here that includes all sanctioned residents.
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religious identity derived from kinship and historical ties, states are not defined by these
features, but by territorial bounds (Connor 1978)8. The autonomy a state has within its
territory and its capacity to regulate borders is therefore its primary resource for allocation.
The state may control who crosses its borders, who lives and works within them, and who
is turned away at the gate. Walzer, in his exploration of state membership, notes that
“[a]dmission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the
deepest meaning of self-determination” (Walzer 1983, p. 62). A state that excludes no one
has sacrificed the self it had the authority to determine.
Because of this, even memberships conceived of along nationalistic lines take on a
crude, territorial reality, where members are those who belong within state borders and
strangers are those who don’t. But even as this distinction is recognized, the fundamental
inconstancy of an individual’s location ensures that “so long as members and strangers are,
as they are at present, two distinct groups, admissions decisions have to be made, men
and women taken in or refused” (Walzer 1983, p. 34).
A straightforward means of protecting the value of membership would be to declare
complete exclusivity and refuse entrance to every stranger. While there is some precedent
for total closure, most notably in the case of North Korea, the vast majority of countries

8

There is a rich literature on nationalism that goes well beyond the scope of this project. See works
by Karl Deutsch (1953), Walker Connor (1978), Eric Hobsbawm (1990), and Anthony Smith (1991)
for discussions of how to define nationalism and the nation. See works by Elie Kedourie (1960),
Benedict Anderson (1983), and Ernest Gellner (1983) for examples of theories explaining the
emergence of nationalism as a political phenomenon.

17

Chapter 2: A Brief History of Immigrant Selection
have found this strategy to be excessively rigid. State borders are legal instruments. They
do not effectively demarcate the end of one community and the beginning of another or
distinguish between economically independent units of space. Shutting the doors would
mean sacrificing benefits accrued not only to individuals that live along the border, but to
the country as a whole.
Beyond the potential costs of complete exclusivity, state governments have often
found themselves presented with clear benefits to the issue of new membership cards.
States with small populations and large territories may perceive their unattended lands as
targets for foreign powers. States with populations that have been decimated by wars or
whose technological advancements have increased the labor productivity of their industries
may find themselves in need of extra bodies to help their economies recover and grow.
Thus, while states will not throw open their borders for all, neither will they close them
completely.
It is therefore imperative for states to find a way to induct new members without
undermining the value of the membership they offer. If admissions can be neither fully
open nor fully closed, a state government must decide who and how many get through the
door. While absolute openness and absolute closure are both fundamentally nondiscriminatory in nature, any fractional strategy (barring a full-fledged lottery) is
inherently discriminatory, selecting some strangers as good candidates for membership
while shutting the door on others. The task of the state government then, and the principal
18
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purpose of immigration policy, is to fashion and perform this act of discrimination.

How Do States Select?
The inevitability of discrimination in the creation of immigration policy guarantees
that any outcome will provoke some amount of controversy. This is not true because people
are opposed to such discrimination, but because, as members of a state, each has his or
her own ideas about what that membership means and who deserves to procure it. A few
diverse forms of selection have found varying levels of support across countries and the
popularity of each has fluctuated over time. When forms of selection have become widely
unpopular, the issue of immigration has risen to the top of national debate, placing
immense pressure on governments to find a new strategy. The immigration policies
designed by governments are therefore constructed not only to ensure that the state gains
access to the benefits associated with new members, but also to reflect the priorities of the
existing membership.
Perhaps the most common theme vocalized by existing members of states is that
they desire consistency in the identity of the state society. That is, while it is undeniable
that granting a person entry has the legal impact of transforming them from stranger to
member, existing members may continue to perceive this newly card-carrying individual
as a stranger. The sooner the new member is able to shed his or her aura of strangeness,
the more comfortable existing membership feels. Indeed, most state strategies of immigrant
selection are at least partially determined by this phenomenon. For example, states that
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promote their stories of nationhood based on ties of kinship or ethnicity have often chosen
to pursue immigration policies that select new members on the basis of ethnic origin and
have defended these strategies as necessary to maintain the stability of the domestic
environment. Sir Alexander Downer, the Australian Immigration Minister from 1958-1963,
once proclaimed “[w]e seek to create a homogeneous nation. Can anyone reasonably object
to that? Is not this the elementary right of every government, to decide the composition
of the nation?” (as cited in Walzer 1983, p. 46).
Another strategy states often pursue is the selection of family members. In their
1953 report, “Whom Shall We Welcome?” the U.S. President’s Commission on Immigration
and Naturalization wrote that family reunion should be a central pillar of U.S. immigration
policy because “a great part of our moral and spiritual fiber grows out of the sacred place
of the family in American life” (p. 119). While offering admission to family members does
not explicitly require that new members look like the old, it does require that a new
member share a bond of kinship with at least one existing member, increasing the shortterm likelihood that the goal of consistency will be achieved. Furthermore, the purpose of
preserving the family unit is to take advantage of ready-made social and economic ties.
With the mutual support families provide, each new member should be empowered (in
theory) to adapt more expeditiously to the norms of membership.
Finally, the identity-focused priorities of current members cannot fully constrain
governments from seeking the advantages that new members symbolize. The most
20
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prevalent strategy employed for this purpose is to select new members based on economic
criteria and skills. Joppke argues that “selection according to skills or economic need … is
the only domain in which state interests reign supreme … the state may consider the
individual only for what she does, not for what she is” (2005, p. 2). The absoluteness of
the state’s interests here is not quite so stark as Joppke suggests—it has often been argued
that new members who meet with economic success are more likely to be socially successful
as well, making them more palatable candidates by societal as well as state standards.
In the search for a way to effectively discriminate between potential new members
of states, these three strategies—selection based on ethnicity, family, and economic
criteria—represent the most established and widespread answers governments have seized
upon. Before World War Two, ethnic selection dominated the immigration policy scene
around the world, but in the years after the war most countries shift their approach,
dividing membership access between familial and economic categories. The remainder of
this chapter briefly explores the emergence and use of each of these three strategies9 and
highlights a recent split between the economic criteria more popular in the early to mid20th century and the high-skill focus that appears in newer policies.

9

This chapter does not devote time to the important and complex problems of humanitarian
migration, because “[s]electing according to human need is not selecting at all” (Joppke 2005, p. 2).
That said, all forms of immigration are connected in the mind of the existing state membership, so
it should not be ignored that the 1951 Geneva Convention marks the introduction of the concept
of asylum and the internationally imposed responsibility of the liberal state to consider the plight
of the individual, at least to the point of granting him or her a legal hearing (Hollifield 2004).
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Ethnic Selection
“To say that states have a right to act in certain areas is not to say that
anything they do in those areas is right.”
Michael Walzer 1983, pp. 39-40
While each country has its own unique history of and relationship with
immigration, the trends that can be charted across international borders are just as
interesting. In describing the late-19th and early-20th centuries, Joppke points to “strikingly
similar restrictive policies in all new settler10 (and, to a certain degree, other immigrantreceiving) states” (2005, p. 34). He refers in particular to the use of ethnic selection as the
primary strategy for structuring immigration policy and allocating membership. In this
section, a few of these similarities (as well as the variation within them) are highlighted to
th

illustrate the dominance of ethnic selection at the start of the 20 century and to set the
scene for the changes that followed.
In 1882, the United States Congress passed “the first federal law to forbid
immigrants on the basis of race” (Benton-Cohen 2018, p. 16). Up until that point,
immigration had been handled in an ad-hoc fashion by individual states11, so the change

10

In immigration scholarship, the phrase “settler states” usually refers to the Anglophone colonies
including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and sometimes South Africa. Despite
having been subject to a different European colonizer, the colonial background and policy
similarities of some Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Mexico, arguably suggest that
this settler category should be expanded to include them.
11
California in particular had been active in its attempts to discourage Chinese immigration,
passing an entry tax as early as 1852.
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represents the moment in which the U.S. government began actively to participate in the
task of fashioning the discriminatory criteria of U.S. membership. The 1882 act that
signaled this shift is known as the Chinese Exclusion Act, and its primary purpose was to
forbid the immigration of Chinese laborers. Other settler states followed this example. The
Chinese Immigration Act was passed in Canada in 1885, levying a head tax on all Chinese
immigrants that grew progressively steeper in revisions over the following years
(Ghezelbash 2017). In 1901, a newly independent Australia officially passed its infamous
White Australia policy, designed specifically to exclude Asian migrants. The rhetoric and
backlash surrounding these policies has become known as the Yellow Peril—the anxiety
stoked by popular stereotypes of Asian migrants as mentally inferior, uncivilized, and
morally base. By contrast, in the words of Clifford Sifton, the Interior Minister of Canada
at the time, “[t]he American settlers did not need sifting; they were of the finest quality
and the most desirable settlers” (as cited in Hawkins 1991, p. 5).
Policies in settler states were not limited to Asian discrimination, however. As the
norm of ethnic selection spread, the policies became more comprehensive. The Dillingham
Commission, appointed in 1907 to study immigration to the United States, developed as
part of their final 41-volume report, Dictionary of Races or Peoples, which sought to
rigorously, and in accordance with scientific scholarship, classify the existing races of the
world and their immigration to the U.S. (Benton-Cohen 2018). The methods used by the
Dillingham Commission and the writings they produced reflect heavy influence by the
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eugenics movement, which was just beginning to gain popularity in the United States at
the turn of the century.
In part because eugenics had been built out of the Darwinian theory of evolution
as a process of natural selection, “the eugenicist language of selection and improvement
easily translated into immigration policy” (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín 2014, p. 16). Though
the principles of eugenics have been so thoroughly discredited over time that it is difficult
to conceive of the once hegemonic position they held in world politics, the early 20

th

century witnessed a profusion of international scientific conferences and world congresses
devoted to eugenic ideals. The 1921 U.S. Emergency Quota Act wrote these biases into
law by establishing the National Origins Formula, which restricted immigration by country
of origin and remained in place until 1965. Mexico, which had in prior years legislated
immigration with a strong commitment to racial tolerance, experienced anti-Chinese
backlash in the 1910s, and at 1927 Pan American Conference on Eugenics and
Homiculture, the government committed to harmonize its legislation with “the best eugenic
practices” of the time (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín 2014, p. 232).
The development of immigration policy in non-settler states followed a different,
but related pattern. To understand this history, it is helpful to distinguish between
“negative selection” and “positive selection” (Joppke 2005, p. 22-23). The cases above
illustrate instances of negative selection, in which governments single out a particular
group or set of groups and make laws against them. Negative selection specifies who is not
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allowed in. Positive selection, on the other hand, takes place when favored groups are
enumerated, specifying who should be encouraged to come in. Though it has been argued
that positive selection is morally superior to negative selection (see Carens 1992, pp. 4445, for example) this distinction is only useful insofar as we seek to understand policy
framing. Though many non-settler states produced ethnically selective immigration policies
over the course of the 20th century, they primarily employed strategies of positive selection
to do so.
Colonialist states, like settler states, employed policies of ethnic selection during
th

the first half of the 19

century. Unlike the policies in the settler states, however, they

developed a system that was a part of a larger plan to remain economically and socially
linked to the colonies they held dominion over. Over the course of the 20th century, the
United Kingdom and France “first established and then revoked regimes that had
exempted migrating natives of their former colonies from the restrictions on entry and
settlement that ‘other’ aliens already faced” (Joppke 2005, p.94).
Already at the start of the century, the British had a principle of nondiscrimination toward migrants from its various colonies and claimed that all peoples
within the British Empire were members of an imperial citizenship. This meant that
migration of colonial subjects to Britain was not considered immigration at all, but internal
migration. In other words, “British policy distinguished two types of migrants: British
subject (who could enter the United Kingdom largely freely) and aliens (who could not)”
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(Hansen 2014, p. 201). This was not a signal of a particularly progressive view toward
other races, but rather a reflection of the notion, shared by the French, of colonialism as
a “civilizing mission” (Bleich 2005, p. 178). While the two empires had differing methods
for managing their colonies—the British more often employing an arms-length form of
indirect rule through local institutions and the French preferring a more direct, structurally
assimilationist approach—the eugenicist ideas that proliferated in the settler states found
broad support in the Old World as well. A major justification of the project of empirebuilding was couched in this kind of logic, casting the violent subordination of millions of
people as moral because “less favored races needed supervision by advanced peoples in
order to proceed to higher levels of civilization” (Heussler, as cited in Bleich 2005, p. 176).
As Hollifield notes, French immigration policy during the early part of the 20th century
was “organized but uncontrolled” (Hollifield 2004, p. 188).
The British further utilized the freedom of movement as a bargaining chip with
which to secure its diplomatic and trade relations with East Asia, signing treaties with
China in 1860 (to which France was also a signatory) and Japan in 1894 that granted
permission to residents of these countries to travel to or reside in the territories of the
British Empire (Lake & Reynolds 2008). An interesting consequence of these agreements
was an increase in the active recruitment by employers in British colonies of labor from
these newly accessible East Asian countries, a trend that sparked some of the backlash
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that led to policies of Asian exclusion in the settler states12. For France and the United
Kingdom, however, the feeling of moral rectitude that went along with being of the superior
race gave them a sense of responsibility for the peoples they conquered.
Of course, these policies were not unique to the British and French. The 19th
century saw the construction of many empires, and all faced the same questions regarding
how to rule over and interact with foreign subjects. In terms of immigration policy, Japan
th

shares some similarities to France and Great Britain during the first half of the 20

century. The Japanese colonization of Korea began in 1910. During this period, Japan’s
immigration policies were quite open to Koreans as well as migrants from other territories
Japan had laid claim to (Chung 2014). Newcomers were classified as internal rather than
international migrants because of their colonial status (Kashiwazaki & Akaha 2006), a
strategy that echoes the policies of the British and French. The Japanese “repeatedly listed
their similarities with Koreans as the primary reason” they were optimistic about Korean
potential for integration, but anticipated that Koreans would require “as long as a century
of guidance” before they became cultural equals of the Japanese (Caprio 2009, pp. 7 and
17).
In a meditation on the morality of regulating migration and citizenship, Joseph

12

Indeed, these arrangements became a sticking point between the British government and the
Australian leadership at the end of the 19th century, when Australian policymakers made several
moves toward restricting Asian migration. In an attempt to soften the Australian stance, the British
government suggested that they impose a literacy test rather than using racial criteria outright.
This suggestion was accepted and literacy tests later appeared in other settler states as well.
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Carens notes that citizenship today has many of the qualities of feudal status in the
medieval world—“it is assigned at birth; for the most part it is not subject to change by
the individual’s will and efforts; and it has a major impact upon that person’s life chances”
(1992, p. 26). While Carens speaks of today’s world, the truth of his words is even more
starkly evident when applied to the first half of the 20th century. But the policies that
reinforced these hierarchies by legitimizing the differences between peoples on the basis of
race, ethnicity, and place of birth were largely abandoned in the years following the Second
World War. This was partly the result of normative change as “the foundations of scientific
racism [were] battered by hard evidence from genetics and anthropology,” and partly a
signal of a realignment of foreign policy interests as institutions like the United Nations
gave voice to peoples long ignored (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín 2014, p. 64). In both settler
and colonialist states, ethnic selection was incrementally discarded over the course of the
1950s and 60s.
Even so, it is important to note that de-ethnicization of immigration policy is not
synonymous with liberalization. In the United States, the restrictive immigration policies
that existed during the interwar period were such a divergence from the mean that the
two trends could only go hand in hand. Here, de-ethnicization meant the dismantling of
racist policies and the creation of less discriminatory laws, but for colonialist states deethnicization heralded a formal retraction of the preferential welcome once extended to
citizens of colonial empires, regardless of race. In colonialist states in particular, the wave
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of decolonization that followed the Second World War was accompanied by major conflict
and political upheaval in most newly independent states. These disturbances pushed many
people out of their homes, and the language and cultural links the long period of
colonization had created between their own countries and their colonizers drew them
toward the lands of their former conquerors. The initial policies of postcolonial states were
mostly consistent with their prewar stance—they hoped to maintain positive relationships
with their former colonies and to make use of foreign workers to fill postwar labor
shortages. One means of accomplishing this was to continue to offer freedom of movement.
However, after experiencing years of upswing in migration in the wake of decolonization,
Britain and France developed an interest in doing away with their policies of positive
ethnic selection. By the early 1970s both had erected policies of largely unbiased restriction.
In a few cases, new strategies of ethnic selection have emerged in the postwar
period, despite the widespread repudiation of this instrument of discrimination. Joppke
points to the need for a “special legitimizing effort” to justify these policies in the wake of
World War Two (2005, p. 159). In Germany and Israel, for instance, policies were
developed to attract a newly established category of migrants—the co-ethnic diaspora. The
specially designed justification for this ethnically based method of positive selection was
explained in terms of their persecution abroad, and their immigration was characterized
not as entry, but as return.
While the persecution logic in the post-World War Two context was undeniable in
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Israel’s case, giving Israel a strong humanitarian claim for an ethnic immigration policy,
their use of the idea of return was dependent on a rather long-term vision of Jewish
dispersion. This meant that no individual was actually returning to Israel, but rather that
the Jewish people as a whole were invited to return from the exile they had born since
antiquity. The very same post-World War Two context that gave strength to the validity
of the Israeli policy ensured that “the German ethnocultural idiom of nationhood ha[d] in
principle been delegitimized” (Joppke 2005, p. 171). Thus, while the Israeli policy retains
a strong, ethnically selective bias even today, the attempt to repatriate once expelled
ethnic Germans was constrained and restricted into nothing.
Under different circumstances, Japan, too, gravitated toward positive ethnic
selection in the postwar period. Directly after the Second World War, Japanese
immigration policy changed dramatically, largely owing to the U.S. occupation of the
country and its heavy-handed influence over economic and social reforms. In fact, the new
immigration policy Japan initiated in 1952 was meant to be modelled on the system used
in the U.S. However, it did not encourage permanent settlement, differentiating it notably
from U.S. immigration policy and setting the tone for Japanese immigration policy during
the second half of the 20th century. The process of decolonization and the swell of Korean
refugees created by the war on the peninsula spurred Japan to tighten the reigns on
immigrant admissions, restricting entry to ethnic Japanese (Chung 2014).
In Japan, as in Israel and Germany, the language of return rather than entry was
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used to justify the ethnically discriminatory nature of the policy. But the Japanese further
claimed a desire to maintain an ethnically homogenous population so as to preserve their
cultural heritage. Carens argues that these policies, which excepting co-ethnics, exclude
universally, are different from the examples of negative selection pursued by the settler
states in the early part of the 20th century (1992). But are they? Or are they simply more
restrictive? Over the course of the second half of the 20th century, states found that some
strategy would have to replace the systems of ethnic selection that they had dismantled
in the wake of World War Two. The two methods that have had the most longevity and
success have been centered on familial ties and economic criteria.

Family and Economic Selection
“We called for workers, but people came.”
Max Frisch 1967, p. 100
In some ways it is misleading to draw a clear distinction between strategies of
ethnic selection and those of economic and family-based selection. In the U.S. for example,
policies now recognized as quintessential examples of race-based discrimination are hard
to disentangle from economic factors such as class or education. The Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882 was not a barrier to all Chinese migrants, but to Chinese laborers. Chinese
merchants were still permitted to enter the United States even as Chinese laborers were
shut out (Guendelsberger 1988). The founder of the Dillingham Commission, that body
that inspired the National Quotas Formula, argued that the Gentleman’s Agreement (a
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policy to restrict the entry of Japanese migrants) was not based on racial discrimination,
but simply a tactic to avoid large-scale immigration. He explained (however convincingly)
that “educated Japanese and educated Americans mingle each with the other on terms of
absolute equality” (Jenks, as cited in Benton-Cohen 2018 p. 48).
Family restrictions have historically been tied up with race as well. In the mid-19th
century, U.S. courts viewed family unification for immigrants as a “natural right,” ruling
against local legislation that sought to restrict it (Guendelsberger 1988, p. 7). However,
the popular backlash against the Chinese as the century wore on and the rising levels of
immigration overall resulted in a ruling by the Supreme Court granting Congress the
authority to abridge the right to family reunification where they determined it to be in
the national interest (Guendelsberger 1988). This allowed Congress to restrict or prevent
family reunification on a discriminatory basis, and they proceeded to do so.
In addition to these cases where we see compound strategies of selection, there are
also examples in which policy has been developed with an ostensibly economic or familial
rationale but was actually intended to target the restriction of some ethnic groups over
others. A collection of such examples can be found by examining the instrument of the
literacy test, which was adopted first in the British Colony of Natal—now part of South
Africa—and then in New Zealand, Australia, the United States, and Canada (in this order)
over the course of the next 22 years (Ghezelbash 2017). While the rhetoric in favor of such
tests pointed to the importance of education and the degree of civilization required to self32

Chapter 2: A Brief History of Immigrant Selection
govern, the literacy test adopted in Natal had been inspired by a device employed in
Mississippi starting in 1890 to disenfranchise black voters (Lake & Reynolds 2008).
The logic for literacy tests became no less racially motivated as they began to
spread. In 1896, Australia (still officially a British colony at the time) sought to enact an
immigration policy that would explicitly distinguish between white and non-white peoples.
As discussed in the section on ethnic selection above, the British saw this as potentially
offensive to their trade partners and other colonies (namely India) and tried to temper the
language of the Australian legislation. At the suggestion of a Japanese minister, who
wished to distinguish the educated Japanese from other non-white races, the British pushed
the Australians to consider a literacy test “as the perfect method to implement racial
discrimination without appearing to do so” (Lake & Reynolds 2008, p. 145). In fact, the
British Secretary of State for the Colonies at the time, Joseph Chamberlain, made this
argument at a meeting of British colonial leaders in 1897, speaking not only to the
Australians, but also to the premiers of Canada, New Zealand, and Natal, among others.
He argued that the literacy test would “avoid hurting the feelings of Her Majesty’s subjects,
while at the same time it would amply protect the Australian Colonies against the invasion
of the class to which they justly object” (Chamberlain, as cited in Ghezelbash 2017, p.
248).
Another famous example in which the selection mechanism of a major policy change
was written to hide a racially motivated intent appears in the design of the U.S.
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Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, more commonly known as the Hart-Celler Act.
It is undeniably true that the central purpose of the legislation was to do away with the
National Origins Formula, and it did succeed in this goal. However, to gain enough support
in Congress, the writers of the legislation had to make certain compromises. The language
of the original bill allotted some 50% of admissions to those applying on the basis of
economic criteria—skilled or unskilled individuals who could help fill a labor shortage.
Groups like the American Legion and the Daughters of the American Revolution,
who were opposed to the removal of national origins quotas, could see that a direct bid to
uphold what was increasingly recognized as a racist policy would be ill-advised, particularly
in a country mobilized by the Civil Rights Movement. Along with labor union leaders,
who worried about an increased supply of skilled tradesmen, they managed to find support
in the House Judiciary Committee in the form of Representative Michael Faegin (D-OH)
(Briggs 2003; Kammer 2015). Instead of directly fighting the removal of national origins
quotas, they focused on shifting the priority of the policy’s selection mechanism toward
family migrants. The logic was that the restrictions of the past could be used to ensure
consistency in the future. If most of the immigrants residing in the United States at the
time were of European origin, then most of the relatives of the U.S. immigrant population
should logically come from Europe, allowing “essentially the same racial and ethnic
priorities that the national origins system had fostered, even if this mechanism itself was
abolished” (Briggs 2003, p. 128). With help from Faegin, these groups succeeded in
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redirecting the focus of the legislation so that 74% of visas were granted based on family
ties. This turned out to be a major miscalculation. The ensuing years brought a radical
change in the racial make-up of immigrant inflows into the United States. But this outcome
was inconsistent with the intent. It is worth noting that this watershed moment in the
history of U.S. immigration policy is partly the result of a campaign to subvert change.
Whatever the initial intentions, the policies that grew out of these foundations
continued to build upon the devices of economic and familial criteria. As with the HartCeller Act in the United States, most settler states incorporated both methods, recognizing
on the one hand the importance to their growing economies of access to foreign labor and
maintaining on the other hand the long-held view of immigrants as settlers (Green & Green
1999). The points system famously pioneered by Canada in 1967 and taken up by Australia
in 1979 and New Zealand in 1991 purported to select immigrants based on a more holistic
view. Points were awarded to prospective migrants using both economic as well as familial
criteria as well as other things, like age and knowledge of the English language. A migrant
was granted admission upon meeting a prespecified threshold of points13.
An interesting contrast emerged in Europe during the postwar period, however.
During this time, several states made attempts to separate the immigrant as an economic
unit from the immigrant as a social unit by introducing policies that are now collectively

13

While each points system has its own quirks, in general migrants admitted using these criteria
are still divided into economic and family streams. In all three of these cases, the family stream was
given priority over the economic stream.
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referred to as guest worker programs. The main purpose for forcibly dividing the economic
and social components of immigration has been to prevent permanence, ensuring that a
migrant recruited as a laborer will not establish his family and build a life in his new home.
Like other postwar countries that found themselves in need of labor as their economies
began to recover, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, turned to foreign labor. However,
unlike their settler-state and postcolonial counterparts, these countries recruited foreign
labor

14

using the “rotation model,” in which workers would be housed in dormitory or

barracks-style facilities for the duration of their several-yearlong contract and would then
be asked to return to their home country as new workers were brought in to replace them
(D’Amato 2014, p. 310).
The guest worker programs were intended to bring immigration policy in line with
the needs of a growing economy, but a fundamental issue with the guest worker system
was the lingering disconnect between what the state wanted and how employers preferred
to operate. As Martin points out, “rotating guest workers through permanent jobs is often
not in the interest of the employers” (2014, p. 228). The rotation model failed to take into
account the added costs employers would be required to bear every time their reliable,
skilled workers were rotated out for brand new, unskilled ones. Pressure from employers
led to spotty enforcement of the rotation requirements and a number of relaxations of the

14

Primarily from Southern and Eastern Europe (including Turkey), but also in some cases from
North Africa and, in the case of East Germany, which made a point of recruiting solely from other
communist countries, Vietnam.
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restrictions against family reunion. By the time the economies of Western Europe were hit
with the economic reverberations of the oil crises in the 1970s, the labor market flexibility
they had sought to create by stripping guest workers of rights and privileges did not
materialize.
While the failure of the guest worker programs caused them to fall out of favor in
Europe, even more extensive examples of states utilizing migrants for economic purposes
while preventing family reunification and integration can be found today. Boucher and
Gest categorize a number of different states’ immigration policies as kafala (in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, for example) and what they refer to as quasi-kafala (in China and Singapore,
for example) systems (2018). Beyond being inherently temporary arrangements designed
to prevent the integration of migrant workers, these systems are also associated with denial
of worker protections under labor laws. Combined with this, kafala systems usually grant
employers full authority over the laborers they sponsor, creating conditions under which
worker exploitation is common. In contrast to the operation of guest worker programs in
Europe in the postwar period, the states that currently operate kafala systems show few
signs relaxing the restrictions placed on their migrant workers, suggesting that natural
dissolutions of these programs by means of increasingly integrated immigrant populations
is unlikely.
Still, as immigration policies after the Second World War have evolved, the
immigration regimes of liberal states have increasingly resembled a union of economic and
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family selection. While we often think of migrants in primarily economic terms, according
to Castles:
Family reunion—spouses, children, and other relatives coming to join
existing primary migrants—is actually the largest single entry category for
immigrants in many countries … Similarly, marriage migration, which is
very significant for Asian countries with demographic and economic
imbalances like Japan, S. Korea, and Taiwan, is generally the result of
demographic and social factors, and is unlikely to be affected much by
short-term economic trends. (Castles 2011, p. 320)
But the U.S. experience after the passage of the Hart-Celler Act in 1965 did not
go unnoticed; the legislation, which offered expansive admissions permissions on the basis
of family ties, resulted in a long-term shift in the demographics of U.S. immigration. Most
notably, it vastly increased the share that first Latin American, and then Asian immigrants
represented within overall migrant inflows. Because of this, family immigration policies
both in the U.S. and abroad have been subjected to serious scrutiny and debate.
Chief among the issues animated by family migration are the major differences
across cultures regarding the structure and obligations of the family unit. For instance, a
policy may be written to limit the number of family members a single migrant can sponsor
by specifying that only immediate family members qualify for sponsorship. But who is
considered to be an immediate family member? In accordance with Western priorities and
Western economic and legal responsibilities, strongest rights have always been given to
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spouses15 and dependents. Historically, spousal rights have gone to men but not women.
During the earlier part of the 20th century in the U.S. and the U.K., a woman who married
a foreigner lost her citizenship due to the expectation that she would join her husband in
his country of origin (Demleitner 2003).
Fortunately, this imbalance has been corrected in both places to ensure equal
spousal rights for women, but other ambiguities continue to arise. Canada has struggled
to manage its family migration stream in part because migrant groups from different
countries disagree on this point of immediacy (Hawkins 1991). While the West favors the
nuclear family arrangement, this standard is not a cultural constant. Even within the
West, the dominance of this social, familial paradigm emerged only in the mid-20th century.
The use of family ties as an instrument for determining admission has thus meant
that governments liberalize or restrict in part by redefining the meaning of a close relative.
On several occasions, policymakers in the United States have sought to remove the
preference category allowing for the sponsorship of adult siblings in an attempt to restrict
immigration overall (Tichenor 2002). Beyond this, thornier issues have also sparked
debate. For instance, polygamous marriages, which are common in some regions of the
world, are not recognized under the laws of most Western states, meaning that multiple
spouses cannot be sponsored for entry (Demleitner 2003).

15

This has historically given same-sex couples, who are denied the right to marry in much of the
world, no recourse for reunion. This may be changing, however, as a few dozen mostly-Western
states have introduced marriage equality in recent years.
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The willingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to subordinate a non-discriminatory
right to family reunification to Congress’ right to legislate immigration in the late 19th
century was a harbinger of the many restrictive policies that followed. In 2003, the
European Council issued a directive on family unification seeking to harmonize
immigration legislation across the European Union to “create sociocultural stability
facilitating the integration of third-country nationals” and “promote economic and social
cohesion” (Council Directive on Families). Despite this stated purpose, the directive left a
number of decisions up to the states. For instance, states that grant marriage licenses
domestically at the age of 18 were given leeway to refuse spousal reunification if one
member of the migrant spousal pair happened to be younger than 21. As Demleitner writes,
“Such restrictions indicate that states consider immigration benefits, even for spouses, not
a right” equal to those afforded their own citizens, “but rather a benefit that can be granted
and restricted at their discretion” (2003, p. 284).
While economic and familial means of immigrant selection have largely prevailed
over overt ethnic selection in the postwar period, neither of these strategies has emerged
as dominant and neither has been embraced wholeheartedly by governments as the
foundation around which the rest of immigration policy should be designed. This is
primarily the result of discomfort among the existing membership of states—democratic
societies have time and again communicated to their representatives that the current
system of selection is undesirable. It is for this reason that immigration policy today is a
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process of half-measures, and that the current economic criteria look increasingly like some
of the class-based bids for indirect racism (a la literacy tests) characteristic of the turn of
the last century.

The Politics of Selection
For many, immigration has become such a fraught political issue that the central
theoretical purpose of immigration policy gets lost. Returning to the concept of residency
status as a form of membership makes it easier to see why exclusion remains an important
instrument of the state. The politics that surround exclusion draw out some of the
awkward inconsistencies of democratic societies. In places where the rights of individuals
have been elevated and institutionalized, governments have instituted systems of partial
membership for migrants, limiting their residency, work, and family unification rights.
Citizenries of proclaimed social welfare states, which were designed in part to protect
people against the vulnerabilities of unequal birth, demand entry restrictions for those
most subject to these vulnerabilities, simply because they began their lives beyond state
borders. These seeming hypocrisies are actually illustrations of a dynamic that is central
to understanding the political economy of immigration—that of the trade-off.
One of the most compelling ways to understand the development of U.S.
immigration policy in the postwar era is in terms of cross-cutting coalitions that form
around different dimensions of immigration. While parties tend to be fairly united on issues
of immigrant rights, Tichenor maps out how both the left and the right are divided on the
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issue of immigrant admissions (2002). For example, while the left wing of the U.S. political
spectrum generally supports granting existing immigrants expansive rights, a portion of
left leaders feel that this is only possible if admissions overall are low—otherwise
immigrants have the potential to crowd out resources and opportunities for other minority
groups. On the other side, while right-wing leaders are largely united on the restriction of
immigrant rights, a pro-business and thus pro-immigrant admission coalition within the
political right has a tendency to clash with closed-door advocates. Because of these
cleavages, a left-right coalition favoring liberalized immigrant admissions must make
compromises on immigrant rights in order to reach common ground. The rights-admissions
trade-off Tichenor explores illustrates how individual rights and group interests come into
conflict, even (or perhaps especially) in liberal states.
Another way of thinking about the trade-offs policymakers face when legislating
immigration is in terms of the backlash argument. This idea suggests that policymakers in
democracies must limit progressive, liberal change in order to avoid destabilizing support
for democratic institutions as a whole. In other words, democratic states’ illiberal policies,
though seemingly a threat to liberalism, might be necessary if society’s objection to
immigration is so strong that it is willing to dismantle liberal principles just to reign it in
(Carens 1992). Practically speaking, the implication that emerges from both of these tradeoff models is that policymakers who wish to make progress on immigration policy will be
compelled to make compromises. Policy compromise itself is not a bad thing (most would
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agree that it’s preferable to unilateral decision making, for instance), but it can be used to
perpetuate bad things.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Carens has observed that today’s system of
citizenship shares certain features in common with the feudal systems of medieval Europe.
In its assignment of rights and opportunities according to something as arbitrary as the
location of a person’s birth, it limits the outcomes of entire societies (1992). Furthermore,
the consequences of inequalities produced by citizenship cannot be undone simply by
promising to ignore a person’s ethnicity or place of origin. As politicians all over the world
th

found at the end of the 19 century, a literacy test constituted an effective substitute for
outright racial discrimination. While concerned publics of settler states were distressed by
the immigration of people of other races, they were most distressed by a particular subset
of this group—the poor and uneducated.
In this way, we can draw out an important continuity and a corresponding
divergence in the use of selection mechanisms in the history of immigration policy.
Throughout the entirety of the period examined here, the class of the immigrant has been
an important determinant of the kind of welcome he or she could expect to receive in the
new country. But it has not, until recently, been interchangeable with the idea of skill. In
a 1924 debate on an immigration bill the U.S. Senate floor, then-Senator Furnifold
Simmons (D-NC) argued in favor of devoting the proposed economic preference category
to skilled agriculturalists, reminding his colleagues “[w]e want skilled labor to do a specific
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thing, namely, to help us in the economical process of diversification and the introduction
of new methods of farming” (p. 6609). At the start of the 20th century, the categorization
of an individual as a skilled worker did not suggest that they were of the educated class;
rather, a skilled worker was of the working class.
By the end of the century, however, the same term—skilled—was being used to
describe an entirely different group of individuals. Today, policies that bestow favor on
the highly skilled use criteria that are almost exclusively directed at the professionalmanagerial class16. Possession of a tertiary degree, a salary of a certain level, or status as
a manager are just a few of the metrics states now used to determine whether a migrant
is skilled and deserving of admission. This chapter’s overview of the use of selection in
immigration policy makes it possible to think of these developments in terms of the
historical drivers of selection mechanisms—that is, the concept of skill has become tied up
with class in the same way that class was once tied up with race.
But when did selection based on skill diverge from economic selection? When did
it become a euphemism for white-collar status as opposed to a term that refers to nonroutinized, blue-collar labor? Most importantly, what developments within society and
which political coalitions have caused this system of selection to become increasingly
popular among developed states? In this project, these developments are referred to

16

This refers to people with white-collar occupations requiring tertiary degrees.
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together as the skill-selective turn in immigration policy, and they constitute an important
empirical puzzle. What explains the skill-selective turn across the developed world? The
purpose of this research project is to develop and test a theory that explains this
proliferation of skill-selective immigration policies.
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Chapter 3

Selective Immigration and the Multinational Firm
This chapter lays out a theory of how skill-selective immigration policies diffuse
across countries. Why is the trend toward skill-based selection so recent? How can we
explain the design similarities in the policies emerging all over the developed world? Whose
interests are served by this phenomenon? The answers proposed in this chapter form the
theoretical foundation of this dissertation. Although the mechanism of diffusion offered
here is located in the cross-border subsidiary networks of multinational firms, any attempt
to explain policy change requires a treatment of the domestic policymaking process. The
aim is to present a general enough explanation that it can, without too much violence, be
applied broadly to democratic systems.
This chapter begins by exploring the interests and corresponding preferences of pro
and anti-immigration factions within a polity. Specifically, broad-based opposition to
immigration is represented here by the general public, while businesses represent the proimmigration front. As the purpose of this project is to explain skill-selective immigration
policies, these groups’ preferences are considered with particular reference to immigrants
of different skill levels. The expectations derived from these discussions of preferences
become the parameters of the theories of policymaker and firm behavior. The described
interactions between policymakers and firms and within the firms themselves form the
crux of the theorized process of skill-selective immigration policy diffusion. This chapter
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offers a major contribution to the international political economy literature through its
theoretical treatment of the multinational firm. The behavior of the firm, particularly its
behavior abroad, opens up a new set of possibilities for understanding interdependence
between states. A major criticism of studies documenting policy diffusion has been that
they lack a coherent, identifiable mechanism through which we can observe the process
taking place. The firm-based pathway of diffusion introduced in this chapter has the
advantage of being theoretically founded and at least partially empirically observable.

Theory of Societal Preferences
“In almost any immigration situation, there are significant groups among the hosts
who believe that newcomers in general, or particular groups among them, would jeopardize
the established national ways” (Zolberg 2006, p. 16). This has emerged as one of the
fundamental truths of public opinion in Western-style democracies over the last century
(see Table 3.1 for a breakdown of public attitudes toward immigrants in European
countries in 2003). Under the best conditions, the issue of immigration is met with apathy
or discomfort by the general public. Under the worst conditions, reactions are openly
hostile, discriminatory, or even violent. Furthermore, negative feelings towards immigrants
such as those shown in Table 3.1 are closely linked to the policy preferences individuals
express.
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Table 3.1: Views on Immigration in
European Countries, 2003
% who
that there are too many immigrants
in (survey country).
Country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden

Agree

Disagree

84.2
85.1
59.8
43.8
74.6
84.5
87.9
98.9
82.2
84.9
70.1
75.4
53
90.1
82.5
51.4

15.8
14.9
40.2
56.1
25.3
15.5
12.1
1.1
17.8
15.1
29.8
24.6
47
9.9
17.5
48.6

Source: Eurobarometer 59.2, Q.14

Table 3.217 shows the results from a question on a 2018, cross-national attitudes
survey in which respondents were asked whether the overall level of immigration to their
country should be raised or lowered. In every instance, the vast majority of respondents
show opposition to any further liberalization of immigration. At the same time, most of
the scholarly work on contemporary immigration has concluded that immigration is good

17

Both Tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate evidence of cross-national consistency in opposition to
immigration. Surveys that provide answers to the same attitudes indicators on immigration over
time are few, but Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows results from generally comparable questions in
U.S. Gallup opinion surveys from 1965-2018.
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for economic growth, which is seen as a central ingredient in the contentment of any
governed populace (Castles & Miller, 2014). So how can we explain the pervasive pockets
of animus toward the foreign-born?
This section divides the existing theories on negative immigration attitudes into

Table 3.2: Views on Level of Immigration
by Country, 2018
In your opinion, should we allow more immigrants to
move to our country, fewer immigrants, or about the
same as we do now?
Country
Australia
Canada
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Israel
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Netherlands
Poland
Russia
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States

Fewer/Same

More

80
80
83
88
97
94
88
89
71
86
88
85
90
80
69
85
80
73

18
19
16
10
2
2
9
5
23
11
10
9
7
18
28
14
16
24

Source: Adapted from a Pew Research Center report entitled
“Many worldwide oppose more migration – both into and out
of their countries” by Phillip Connor and Jens Manuel
Krogstad. Data in this report pulled from the Spring 2018
Global Attitudes Survey, Q52.
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four broad categories, though other, less widely accepted ideas have been circulated as
well. The four addressed here include (1) employment competition theory, (2) welfare state
theory, (3) cultural threat theory, and (4) contact theory. While none of these theories is
able to create a perfect model of how individual resentment toward immigrants functions,
a review of the existing findings will help clarify an overarching theme; while it is generally
true that people have neutral to negative feelings about immigration, they can and do
distinguish between the kinds of immigrants they don’t like and the kinds they may be
willing to accept. By looking closely at how past studies have represented characteristics
of immigrant groups in experiments and surveys, it is possible to piece together a
comparison of the wanted and the unwanted.

Explaining Immigration Attitudes
The economic competition theory and the welfare state theory both emerge from
political economy models of individual attitudes, locating opinion formation within an
economic cost-benefit framework. If an individual perceives that immigrants create costs
that he or she will have to bear, the logical response is to oppose immigration. Both
theories draw on the idea of coalitions borne of economic cleavages, drawing on Rogowski’s
(1987) famous predictions about trade preferences.
To test the two theories, scholars have relied primarily on variation in the skilllevel and wealth (respectively) of survey respondents to approximate the predicted
coalitions. Some early studies find evidence consistent with the employment competition
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theory (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006), but later work has chipped away at this
conclusion, pointing out that when the skill level of the potential migrant—and not just
the respondent—is considered, low-skill natives and high-skill natives display the same
bias, signaling partiality for high-skill immigrants regardless of the employment
competition they may represent (Hainmueller & Hiscox 2007; 2010; Hainmueller, Hiscox
& Margalit 2011). Evidence for the welfare state theory has also been mixed, with some
scholars finding results consistent with the model (Facchini & Mayda 2009) and others
contesting that the real underlying dynamic is a society-wide bias in favor of the highly
skilled (Hainmueller & Hiscox 2010).
Both of these debates about whether immigration preferences can be traced to
individual economic circumstances have dragged on for the same reason—small changes in
the operationalization of core concepts seem to lead to divergent conclusions. One idea
that deserves some more exploration is that attitudes may be rooted in economic logic yet
formed based on sociotropic views rather than individual experiences. Such an explanation
would help reconcile much of what has been perceived as contradictory in the existing
literature, allowing that people “might prefer well-educated, experienced, high-status
professionals based on perceptions about their impact on the national economy or their
likely tax contribution” (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2015, p. 531).
Despite the neatness of the political economy theories, their ability to explain
public opinion on immigration has been limited. The most influential alternative to the
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economic hypotheses is the cultural threat theory, which proposes that individual attitudes
may derive from perceived threats to cultural identity or values (Brader, Valentino &
Suhay 2008). To clarify what such a perception might look like, a society in which the
majority of people speak English might perceive an influx of non-English speakers as a
potential threat to their lifestyle. Restaurant owners may feel compelled to order new,
bilingual menus. Retailers may have to hire translators to do business with local providers.
Bilingualism may become a veritable job prerequisite. And language preference is but a
single aspect of how a group defines its cultural profile—skin color and visible signs of
religious worship

18

can also be perceived as signals of cultural difference (McLaren 2003).

Thus, symbolic prejudice emerges as a result of the expectation that the out-group lives
somehow differently (Riek, Mania & Gaertner 2006)19.
The contact hypothesis cannot really be considered separately from the three
theories discussed above, because its starting point posits a circumstance in which a
dominant social group has already developed prejudicial feelings toward a minority
group20. At first, the idea was simply that intergroup relations could be improved if
individuals of different groups were made to work together to achieve a common goal
(Williams 1947). Further work stipulated that equal status, common authority, and

18

Such as attire, public prayer, or dietary restrictions, for example.
Cues from elites and the media may trigger stronger reactions (Brader, Valentino & Suhay 2008).
20
Indeed, the hypothesis was developed by American sociologists in the 1940s and 50s with the
normative goal of reducing intergroup prejudice between whites and blacks.
19
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personal relationships, would make such contact more successful (Allport 1954).
A parallel idea, inter-group conflict theory, emerged around the same time,
stipulating that contact between social groups was actually more likely to generate enmity
than amity and drawing on examples such as racism in the South to make the point. In
response to this, later studies began to differentiate between contextual measures of
contact, such as living in areas with higher proportions of minorities, and behavioral
measures of contact, such as engaging in regular social interaction with members of
minority groups (Stein, Post & Rinden 2000). Contextual measures of contact have
occasionally led to findings suggesting that contact increases prejudice (Hood & Morris
1997). But even this distinction cannot fully capture differentiated effects. Looking at
individual attitudes in the U.S., Hood and Morris (1997) show that while living in close
proximity to large Asian populations does not seem to negatively impact individual
preferences for immigration, living in close proximity to Hispanic populations does. This,
again, may suggest that the real driver of attitudes is something akin to perceived cultural
threat, and that contact can only mediate that effect.

Eluding Stigma
Leaving aside some of the major unresolved questions in the literature on
immigration attitude formation, there is at least one conclusion that has found support
from all camps. Proponents of both the economic as well as the cultural theories agree that
different migrants are met with different responses. Scholars looking into the employment
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competition and welfare state theories have repeatedly concluded that people prefer highskill migrants. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015), using a survey experiment in which
participants rank profiles of potential migrants, expand on this finding, showing that
higher levels of education, better paid jobs and work experience all contribute to an
individual migrant’s attractiveness to members of a host society. The results in Table 3.3
from a 2018 global attitudes survey reveal that even respondents who articulate explicit
opposition to immigration express support for policies that focus on the highly skilled.
Those exploring cultural threat theory and the contact hypothesis have found that
ethnicity and visibility of outgroup traits seem to influence reactions too. Brader, Valentino
and Suhay (2008) demonstrate that even when people expect different migrant ethnic
groups to impose the same overall costs on society, racial cues trigger emotional reactions
that produce discriminatory immigration preferences. In a variation on the economic
theories, Helbling & Kriesi (2014) use a survey experiment to differentiate between
economic threat and what they call feelings of deservingness. They find that participants
who think immigrants are lazy are more likely to punish low-skill immigrants than highskill immigrants for this perception. Together, the findings from these studies serve as a
powerful reminder that people do not assess migrant characteristics independently of their
views on immigration overall. Rather, they use signals like “low- skill” or “Latino” to
construct an image of a person based on beliefs they already hold about different kinds of
people. These beliefs are often discriminatory and racially biased but incorporate a range
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Table 3.3: Support for Skilled Immigration
Among Anti-Immigration Respondents
Among those who say their country admits too
many immigrants:
% who
encouraging high skilled people to immigrate
and work in (survey country).
Country
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
Canada
Australia
Greece
France
Spain
Netherlands
Israel
Italy

Support

Oppose

82%
76%
63%
62%
62%
57%
55%
51%
43%
41%
36%

17%
19%
36%
37%
34%
39%
44%
46%
54%
51%
50%

Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey. Q53c. “Majority
of U.S. Public Supports High-Skilled Immigration.” Pew
Research Center.

of non-race-based attributes as well.
Most examinations of public opinion on immigration seek to explain the causes of
attitude formation. Partisan affiliation is therefore largely treated as a correlate of the
preexisting differences between individuals that generate policy preferences. However, if
the purpose is not to explain the formation of attitudes but to make generalizations about
the distribution of attitudes that may help illuminate the impact of public opinion on the
immigration policymaking process, partisan divides must be considered. Below, Figure 3.1
shows the difference in the response rates between self-identified Republicans and
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Democrats asked to weigh in on whether U.S. immigration policy should prioritize
potential migrants based on their level of education and skill or their family ties. While
respondents who identify as Democrats are evenly split on the issue, more than two thirds
of Republican respondents support skill selection rather than family reunification as the
central priority for U.S. immigration policy.
Collectively, the attitudes expressed in these studies are describing an approximate
ranking of potential migrants’ social status. Distaste for immigration is driven by distaste
for an increasing number of people with low social status, whatever low social status
happens to mean for a given society. And interestingly enough, the tendency to want the
door closed on individuals of low social status seems to hold regardless of a respondent’s

Figure 3.1: Public Priorities for U.S. Immigration Policy by Party ID
% of respondents from each party who feel that “in deciding whether people from
other countries should be allowed to legally immigrate to the United States, should
the government give higher priority to”
:

Note: Difference between proportion of Republican and Democrat respondents choosing skill is
significant at the a = .05 level. Respondents giving no response is just over 4% for each group.
Source: Data come from the American Trends Panel survey (Q ST.15) conducted in 2015 by the
Pew Research Center.
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own race and class. The assumptions made about societal preferences throughout this
project follows from these observations. The theory described in this chapter utilizes the
generalization that public opinion about immigration is negative, but that individuals of
higher social status may be exempt from some of this stigma if they can find a way to be
considered separately from the larger pool of potential migrants.

Theory of Firm Preferences
In contrast to individuals’ preferences, political economy models tend to
21

characterize employers

as broadly pro-immigration because of the expectation that they

prefer a larger supply of labor (Freeman 1995). However, employers represent a large,
diffuse group of actors. It is certainly true that some of these players have been
instrumental in the formation of past immigration policies, but many more have
demonstrated little interest in the issue. Fortunately, this variation among employers is
largely predictable, because unlike individuals, employers’ preferences usually align with
their positioning in the economy.
The H-2A visa in the United States—which is designated for temporary agricultural
workers—was created in 1986, the same year the Reagan administration passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), tightening controls on illegal immigration22.

21

Throughout this section, terms firms, employers and businesses are used interchangeably.
IRCA was comprised of a set of reforms that primarily centered around criminalizing the hiring
of undocumented workers and enforcing employer sanctions, although it also granted amnesty to a
large number of undocumented immigrants to avoid some of the anticipated fallout.
22
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As is still true today, undocumented immigration at the time served as a pipeline for
cheap, seasonal farm labor. The proposed crackdown on illegal immigration mobilized a
massive lobbying effort on the part of the American Farm Bureau Federation (Tichenor
2002). The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act likely had an impact on the supply
of low-skilled labor in the country overall, but the impacts were most concentrated for
agricultural employers, and the H-2A program that emerged in response to that impact
directly reflects the preferences of this group. As one means of recruiting labor from across
the southern border was shut down, agricultural employers were able to use their influence
with politicians to secure a new, legal approach. Not every example is quite so direct, but
it is often possible to make inferences about specific immigration programs by looking more
closely at their main beneficiaries.

Seekers of Skill
Which employers benefit from skill-selective immigration policies? Table 3.4 uses
information from a 2017 report published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to illustrate
that some occupations (those with checkmarks next to them) are likely to be filled by
immigrants at a higher rate than by native workers23. Looking through this list of
occupations, it is clear that they are not all of the same type. Thus, within the subset of

23

This does not mean that the total number of foreign-born employed in this occupation is higher
than the total number of native-born. Rather, when the two groups are compared, the percentage
of foreign-born concentrated in some occupations is larger than the percentage of native-born
workers who take the same jobs. This is consistent with the way we think about immigrant labor—
the immigrant job is often discussed in terms of work that native-born workers don’t want to do.
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employers that rely on a heavily immigrant workforce, there are a few major groups that
can be eliminated. While the agricultural lobby has on multiple occasions succeeded in
influencing immigration policy, farm workers are traditionally unskilled and are paid low

Table 3.4: Which Occupational Groups
Disproportionately Employ Migrants?

Low-Skilled Occupations

High-Skilled Occupations

Management, business, & financial operations
Management
Business & financial operations
Computer & mathematical
Architecture & engineering
Life, physical, & social science
Community & social service

P
P
P

Legal
Education, training, & library
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, & media
Healthcare practitioners & technical
Healthcare support
Protective service
Food preparation & serving related
Building and grounds cleaning & maintenance
Personal care & service
Sales & related
Office & administrative support
Farming, fishing, & forestry
Construction & extraction
Installation, maintenance, & repair
Production
Transportation & material moving

P
P
P
P

P
P
P
P

Note: Checkmarks indicate the proportion of foreign-born
workers > the proportion of native-born workers and this
difference is statistically significant.
Source: Foreign Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics—
2017, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.
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wages, so policies that select only high-skilled workers are unlikely to be much help to
agricultural employers. The same is true for several service-sector industries shown in
Table 3.4 such as food service and personal care and service, in addition to some service
industries not listed separately by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ report, like hospitality
and private household service. Employers in these industries, like those in agriculture,
while likely to prefer looser immigration policies overall, are unlikely to be avid advocates
of skill-selective policies.
Construction is another industry with a high percentage of immigrant employment,
and some of the jobs within this category do demand specific vocational skills. However,
because vocational training is not usually what is meant by highly skilled, construction
employers are unlikely to benefit from skill-selective policy liberalization unless it involves
adding these occupations to an occupational shortage list. Healthcare is similar to
construction in the sense that some of the positions most likely to be filled by immigrant
workers are not classified as high-skilled work in the general sense. Many skill-selective
permits, including the H-1Bs for example, require applicants to have a bachelor’s degree
or its equivalent. The minimum educational requirement for a registered nurse is an
associates degree, meaning that many fully qualified registered nurses do not meet the
criteria for a skill-selective permit24.

24

Instead, nurses have been the targets of two other specialized permit programs, the H-1A, which
was created in 1989 and expired in 1995, and the H-1C, which was created in 1999 and expired in

60

Chapter 3: Selective Immigration and the Multinational Firm
That said, there are other healthcare professions that require graduate degrees, and
this part of the industry is less comparable to construction and more akin to legal and
engineering professions. While potential immigrants’ positions as doctors, lawyers or
engineers certainly require degrees that would make them contenders for skill-selective
permits, these occupational groups have local licensing requirements, instituted and
maintained by influential members of the profession, that act in part as a barrier to an
expanding labor supply (Peterson, Pandya & Leblang 2014). In other words, while a
hospital may be desirous of a visa that would enable them to recruit foreign doctors, the
restrictions to employment within the occupation itself limit the benefits that a hospital,
as a potential employer, could accrue from an H-1B-style program25.
The above discussion helps divide the larger labor market into categories based on
the prevailing labor market institutions that may influence firm preferences. As can be
seen in the examples provided, variation in skill-intensity and occupational barriers to
entry cause these cleavages in employer preferences to occur at the level of the industry
(see Caviedes 2010 for further development of these sectoral differences). This suggests
that the main beneficiaries of skill-selective immigration policies will be employers in
industries that require high levels of education but exhibit low levels of professional

2009. Separating the H-1 permit into multiple categories enabled policymakers to respond to sectorspecific shortages without compromising the selectivity of the specialist visa, the H-1B.
25
Note that while Table 3.4 shows employment in the “healthcare support” category to be
disproportionately foreign-born, the “healthcare practitioners and technical” category reflects the
exclusionary impacts of occupational licensing, which give the advantage to native-born workers.
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protection (see Figure 3.2 below).
The information technology industry clearly demonstrates both of these
characteristics. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Outlook Handbook reports
that the typical entry-level educational requirement for computer programmers, network
architects, systems analysts, database administrators and security analysts is a bachelor’s

Figure 3.2: Labor Institutional Determinants of Firm Preferences
Level of Professional Protection

Skill Requirement

Low

Low

High

High

Industry: agriculture, hospitality,
food service, maintenance,
manufacturing (some)

Industry: construction,
manufacturing (some)

Outcome: employers lobby for lowskill labor permits

Outcome: labor unions resist lowskill labor permits

Industry: information technology

Industry: healthcare, law,
engineering

Outcome: employers lobby for highskill labor permits

Outcome: professional associations
use licensing to restrict
occupational access

degree. The high standards employers set for filling these positions are reflected in the
level of pay employees receive—all of these occupations recorded a median annual income
of more than $80,000 in 2017.
Yet unlike engineers, who earn similar median incomes, computer specialists are
almost never required to obtain a professional license. The absence of state or national
licensing boards in the information technology industry may be a product of the constant
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technological advancement within the field, a dynamic that often obviates practices before
they have a chance to become standardized. This creates a field of attractive, well-paid
occupations with a high-level of labor market flexibility. Because information technology
employers can hire foreign computer specialists without worrying about additional barriers
imposed by professional licensing boards and because most candidates already clear the
educational hurdle of having a bachelor’s degree, technology firms are the clearest
beneficiaries of skill-selective permits like the H-1B.

Domestic vs. Multinational
Even within the information technology industry there is likely to be some variation
in the extent to which employers demonstrate an interest in immigration policy. Peters
(2017) anticipates that firms with high production mobility are more likely to express
indifference on immigration policy issues because they can simply move their production
facilities abroad to more favorable labor markets. This makes sense when a firm’s locational
decisions are based primarily on the accessibility of a large supply of cheap labor, and
indeed, Peters’ study focusses on low-skill-intensive industrial firms (2017). But firms that
make their locational decisions in order to access multiple markets should be both
interested in preserving high levels of labor mobility and at the same time more reluctant
to exit a market they covet enough to invest in.
Therefore, within the category of the types of firms described above that employ
highly skilled labor in industries with low professional protections, multinational firms
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should be more invested in immigration policy outcomes, not less. Specifically, a
multinational firm is likely to have stronger preferences for liberal immigration policies for
five reasons. Two of these—qualification assessment and recruiting pipelines—are a part
of the cross-border hiring process——and the other three—innovation clusters, proprietary
knowledge, and client proximity—emerge from the logistics of product design and
implementation.
First, by having facilities in different countries, multinational firms overcome some
of the barriers created during the international hiring process itself. Because of the
specialized nature of the training and work, employers seeking to fill high-skill positions
need more information about prospective employees than those hiring for low-skill
positions. Aside from the standard application materials, filling a high-skill position may
necessitate an interview, a reference from someone inside the company, or a test of a
particular skillset. Modern technology makes it possible to do some of these things at a
distance, but in-person interactions are a more effective way to confirm a candidate’s
qualifications, so firms with an international presence have an advantage when it comes
to hiring abroad.
Second, beyond simply providing a physical presence internationally, a
multinational firm’s foreign subsidiaries are often integrated elements of their host
economies. Particularly when a company requires access to a skilled workforce, subsidiaries
develop relationships with regional educational institutions, establishing pipelines for
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access to qualified graduates (Aurora & Gambardella 2005). Universities and training
institutes have an interest in developing this relationship, and often put additional
resources into programs that will allow them to serve as more effective recruiting pools for
local employers, even if those employers happen to be branches of larger, foreign-owned
firms. While this overtly benefits the subsidiary, a strong connection between said
subsidiary and a trusted educational institution, especially if that institution churns out
graduates with desirable skills, can greatly reduce the information costs associated with
hiring foreign workers.
Even once the hiring is done, however, multinational technology firms stand to
benefit from high levels of international labor mobility. First, firms in the information
technology industry rely on constant innovation to maintain their relevance in the market.
But innovation is unpredictable and costly and works best when researchers with different
backgrounds and training are exposed to new ideas or environs. Though it is perhaps the
best-known innovation center in the world, Silicon Valley is hardly the only such cluster
of informational technology research and development (R&D). Multinational IT firms have
a strong incentive to engage in R&D in multiple locations throughout the world, and to
relocate researchers from successful teams to places with more lackluster track records.
This phenomenon has only grown as China and India have invested considerable resources
into building innovation-centered industrial parks (Garber 2013).
Second, many firms, particularly those whose employees operate with a high degree
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of specialized and proprietary knowledge, have an incentive to keep turnover down and to
promote from within. If a firm has locations in more than one country, this can mean an
international transfer. Multinational firms in the information technology industry in
particular rely heavily on the value of the specialized knowledge needed to build their
products and offer their services. Through these pathways as well as others, the
multinational nature of a firm creates circumstances requiring a level of international
mobility that purely domestic firms need not worry about.
Third, information technology firms in particular are likely to offer products that
combine hardware or software (sometimes of custom design) with services. Though most
individuals are most familiar with IT products in the form of personal computers, data
processing software, communications applications, and so on, a large part of the industry’s
production is intermediate. IT firms produce for client companies in their own or other
industries (Miozzo & Grimshaw 2008). Particularly in recent years, these firms commonly
take on temporary projects in foreign countries for which they need to move entire teams,
if for only a short period of time.

Naming the Beneficiaries
Based on this analysis, multinational enterprises in the information technology
industry are the greatest beneficiaries of skill-selective immigration policies. Yet it’s not
entirely clear why skill discrimination should divide pro-immigration interests in the first
place. Wouldn’t information technology firms be more successful at making their voices
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heard if they could band together with organizations like the American Farm Bureau
Federation? By widening their ask to encompass more broad-based immigration
liberalization, employer associations across industries could find common cause and speak
with a louder voice. And regardless of skill, the disharmony between government regulation
and employers’ predilection for efficiency should mean that all employers who hire from
abroad would prefer as few government restrictions on the hiring process as possible. All
of this suggests that we should see large employer coalitions with very broad immigration
platforms.
However, employers are not operating in a vacuum. They pay attention to public
opinion and they have an incentive to respond strategically. The following sections discuss
how the divergent preferences of businesses as opposed to the general public create
constraints on policymaker behavior, and how, understanding these constraints, firms are
likely to respond strategically. The theory proposed in the following sections provides a
possible explanation for why industry-specific coalitions advocating narrow policies are
more successful than economy-wide coalitions that seek broader immigration reform.

Theory of Policymaker Behavior
The importance of interest groups and public opinion in determining policy
outcomes has been the subject of extensive study in the American politics literature.
Establishing their respective impacts is beyond the purview of this project, but the finding
that policymakers are responsive to both sources of pressure is worth expanding upon,
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because it has implications for the scope and limitations of the policies that succeed in
becoming law. On one hand, the fact that diverse societal interests have a role in the
policymaking process is vital to the structure of Western democracy. At the same time,
the unwillingness of policymakers to make concessions on issues that may lose them donors
or mobilize voters against them creates a circumstance in which some matters get
progressively whittled down, narrowed to the point of being broadly unobjectionable, even
if it means they no longer address the bigger picture.

Making Choices
Models incorporating special interests along with public opinion evolved out of
public choice theory and the median voter theorem. The earliest median voter model
(Black 1958) suffered from its neglect of special interest groups but was revolutionary in
its attempt to make predictions of policy outcomes based on aggregated models of
individual preferences. Pelzman’s (1976) adaptation brought interest groups into the
model, suggesting that policymakers seek to maximize votes by trading off the utilities of
producers (special interests) and consumers (voters), who are pitted against each other in
an essentially zero-sum game. A more tempered version of this idea of a trade-off was
provided by Austen-Smith (1987), who proposed that interest groups can use campaign
contributions to sway politicians, but that this tactic only really works when the public
has a high level of ignorance about the policy and their policymaker’s position.
These models create a helpful foundation from which to generate predictions about
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policymaker behavior. The above discussions of public opinion and firm preferences form
the basis for the expectation that these two groups are generally at odds when it comes to
immigration policy reform. This section adds the assumption that most policymakers want
to avoid surrendering special interest contributions to their campaigns but require at the
same time some degree of public approval in order to get elected. Policymaker behavior in
this case will reflect an attempt to both balance and maximize these inputs. Understanding
the implications of the desire to balance does not necessitate a formal model of the potential
equilibria outcomes that result from policymakers’ decision-making process. Instead, this
section focuses on demonstrating that the actors in the model have both the incentive and
the capability to ensure that at least one equilibrium emerges.

The Policymakers’ Dilemma
The balancing act policymakers perform can be illustrated using a simple line
graph26 (see Figure 3.3 below). The line represents the spectrum, going from very liberal
to very restrictive, of possible immigration reform packages policymakers could choose to
support. While business interests may prefer more liberal policies and the general public

26

Interest groups, such as ethnic or religious groups, are excluded from this particular representation
of interests. While these groups can be and have been profoundly important in influencing changes
in immigration policy (see Tichenor 2002), the simplest way to illustrate the position of
policymakers among competing interests is by restricting the model to one group that favors
immigration and one group that opposes it. A more accurate representation would include
additional ranges of acceptable policy reform and would create multiple windows of equilibria—a
degree of complexity that is not necessary for understanding the idea behind the Policymakers’
Dilemma.
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more restrictive ones, neither group is homogenous, so each must be represented by a range
of policies on the broader spectrum that would satisfy a large enough proportion of the
group to ensure the policymaker’s minimum threshold of needed support. The more an
issue has become polarized, the further each respective group’s acceptable range will move
away from the center of the spectrum. If there is no overlapping policy space between the
business interests’ acceptable range and the general public’s acceptable range,
policymakers face a dilemma with regard to immigration reform. In this scenario,
illustrated by the top graph in Figure 3.3, the policymaker cannot visibly back any reform
package without endangering support for his or her reelection. In this case, a policymaker’s
best option may be to try and preserve the status quo, which is to say, to choose no point
on the policy reform spectrum whatsoever. They may even try to impede reform proposals
that have been instigated by other policymakers, seeking to avoid a vote that would link
their name to a policy position.
If the range of policies business interests are willing to accept overlaps with the
range of policies the general public is willing to accept, as shown in the bottom graph of
Figure 3.3, the policymaker may select any policy within the overlapping space without
policymaker trapped into inaction by the world illustrated by the top graph can find him
or herself shifted into the world illustrated by the bottom graph instead. How is this
possible? To understand this, we must remember that the policymaker is not the only
sacrificing too many votes or too much donor support. Importantly, there is a way that a
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player aware of and impacted by a no-win scenario. Interest groups, too, can see that their
representatives are conflicted and have the opportunity to make changes to their positions.

Assuming that an interest group’s stance on a policy emerges from a stable set of
preferences, that interest group will have no wish to shift or expand their range of
acceptable outcomes based on a reiteration of the same policy proposal. However, their
range would shift naturally if they were to be presented with a different policy reform.
Their best strategy for an interest group seeking change, therefore, is to alter the issue
itself, reducing the scope of its application to ensure that while it still works in their favor,
it becomes less objectionable to the opposition. When the newly narrowed reform has
become innocuous enough that the policy ranges for business interests and the general
public meet in at least one place, the policymakers’ dilemma has been solved27.

27

While it is true that this understanding of policymakers’ role in the policy formation process
essentially casts them as beholden to their constituents (an idea that requires a functioning and
regular mechanism of electoral accountability), it does not necessarily preclude opportunities for
policymaker agency. Within the framework described above, policymakers still have the ability to
use argumentation and charisma to sell policies they’d like to pass to their publics, or to promise
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This model is unusually applicable in the case of immigration policy. Immigration
policy today generates strong, polarized preferences that reduce or obviate policy reform
options that might allow policymakers to please their supporters. This creates another
level of strategy space for special interests to occupy. While narrowing the scope of the
issue is a strategy available to both sides of the debate, in this case business interests are
more likely to succeed in taking advantage of the opportunity. The reason for this can be
expressed in terms of the logic of collective action (Olsen 1965). Firms are larger and more
organized than individuals. The benefits accrued to a handful of employers who recruit
abroad are far more concentrated than the costs experienced by general public (Freeman
1995).
However, even with this information, it is not immediately clear how business
interests may go about narrowing the scope of proposed policy reforms. Different employers
will have different outcomes they wish to emphasize, so a successful use of this strategy
will involve building a coalition of employers that can agree upon the same, more limited
reform goals. Furthermore, they must then find an effective way to communicate these
newly established goals—and the advantages they represent in terms of reaching political
compromise—to policymakers. Below, the theory of firm behavior discussed the processes
and tactics firms might use to solve the policymakers’ dilemma, particularly as it arises

business interests desirable outcomes in other relevant policy areas to discourage them from
defecting if a few bills don’t go their way.
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with regard to immigration policy.

Theory of Firm Behavior
Behavior at Home
When the policy preferences of business interests and the policy preferences of the
general public do not overlap, the resulting incentive on the part of policymakers is to
keep their hands off the issue entirely. As political factions have become increasingly
polarized over immigration, it has become just such an issue. Big immigration policy
reforms are toxic for any party that claims them, meaning that most attempts to make
major changes are nonstarters. However, as discussed briefly above, one potential tactic
interest groups can pursue when opinion on a particular issue has become too polarized is
to narrow the scope of the issue itself.
Extending the strategic implications of this approach, we can imagine that
organized business interests might take it upon themselves to refocus or circumscribe the
preferences they express to policymakers in the interest of making impossible reforms
possible. If these more limited requests can be squared with public opinion, policymakers
are at least given the option of realizing them. This process is not specific to immigration
policy but can explain how narrow exemptions and loopholes appear across all kinds of
legislative issues, from the tax code to health and safety regulations to trade.
The logic of collective action helps shed light on this. A policy can be strategically
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specialized so that its adoption accrues considerable benefit to a small number of organized
actors while the costs associated with the policy are more diffuse and harder to trace. This
formula of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs is a major element in creating a collective
action problem (Olson, 1965). While a few large firms may not have much trouble
coordinating their influence in favor of a policy that reduces corporate tax burdens, the
people who bear the costs of that change belong to a much larger group, each member of
which has but a small fraction of the stake in the policy change (Freeman 1995).
Even so, it should not be assumed that large firms have complete control over
legislative action. An important function of parties in democratic systems is to create
competition in policymaking. If representatives from a particular party neglect the welfare
of their constituents too often, their constituents have the opportunity to elect someone
else. Opposing parties make an effort to differentiate their values and behaviors so that
their candidates become natural alternative options. Because of this, party members will
work to call out policy changes they see as damaging, and to find evidence and ways to
measure this damage in an attempt to reduce the barriers to collective action and mobilize
the public to reject said changes.
In 1995, Freeman argued that due to collective action problems and low voter
information on immigration issues, most Western democracies had adopted excessively
liberal immigration policies. Even if we assume that his logic held true at the time, the
increased salience of immigration as a political issue all across the Western world suggests
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that it wouldn’t today28. Interest groups and policymakers cannot simply rely on a heedless
or untroubled public in their attempt to reform immigration policies small piece by small
piece. They must also be able to support the benefits, or at least the harmlessness, of the
changes they want with argument and evidence (though the quality of these rhetorical
tools may not determine their efficacy).
To clarify this point, firms attempting to effect a policy change in a controversial
issue area within a single country must proceed according to the following three steps: (1)
they must establish their own need for the policy, preferably in a way that evokes a sense
of industry or economy-wide importance, (2) they must settle upon a narrow, scopedelimited policy proposal that follows naturally from the need they have established, and
finally (3) they must sell it to policymakers.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, large, multinational technology firms should
have a particular interest in skill-selective immigration. To firms, immigration means labor,
so the most obvious way for a firm to establish a need for immigration policy reform is to
attest to a shortage of labor. Their next step would be to put bounds on the kind of reform
they would like to see, ensuring that the scope of the policy they suggest is both consistent
with the need they have identified and limited enough to create a collective action problem
for the other side. Multinational technology firms employ primarily human capital-

28

For recent illustrations of this rise in the salience of the issue of immigration over time, see works
by Green-Pedersen and Otjes (2017), Hatton (2017), Dennison and Geddes (2018), and Grande,
Schwarzbözl and Fatke (2018).
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intensive labor, so they might choose to limit the scope of their desired liberalization on
the basis of education, or of restricting reform only to occupations within their industry.
The final step, which involves selling this policy to lawmakers, will vary depending
on the political system. In the United States, firms hire lobbyists to communicate their
preferences to policymakers for them, join industry associations that do lobbying for their
members, publish reports and studies that support their arguments, and more (see Table
3.5 for a breakdown of corporate political influence strategies). Many countries in Europe
do not formally acknowledge lobbying as a political process but have historically included
industry and labor representatives (often referred to collectively as the “social partners”)
formally in policymaking. Different systems of interest group influence are likely to result
in different patterns and degrees of regulatory capture, but every democracy has a way for
interest groups to voice their demands.

Table 3.5: Taxonomy of Political Strategies
Strategy

Tactics

Characteristics

Information Strategy

Lobbying; Commissioning
research and reports; Testifying;
Position papers

Targets political decision
makers by providing
information

Financial Incentive
Strategy

Contributions; Honoraria; Paid
travel; Revolving door

Targets political decision
makers by providing
financial incentives

Constituencybuilding Strategy

Mobilization of employers,
suppliers, customers; Advocacy
advertising; Public relations

Targets political decision
makers indirectly through
constituent support

Note: Adapted from a table in Hillman & Hitt 1999.
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Some firms boast dedicated government affairs teams29 within their organizational
structures. This purpose of this unit is to interface with government officials, professional
association representatives, members of the scientific community and sometimes also
members of the press. The individuals that comprise the team are expected to maintain
expertise on policy issues impacting the company and develop connections with those who
have the power to make policy on these issues. That said, the general consensus in the
business literature is that “[m]embers of Congress are more interested in speaking with the
company’s CEO or local store managers than with a Washington lobbyist” (Baron 2013,
p. 43). Therefore, even in companies with internal government affairs structures, top
executives continue to play a major role in politics.

Behavior Abroad
The above discussion of firm behavior should as easily describe the behavior of
domestic firms as it does the behavior of multinationals. Early theorizing on multinational
30

enterprises is linked almost exclusively to economists . Though many of these canonical
works were foundational to both the international political economy (IPE) and
international business (IB) literatures, disciplinary segregation and differences in priorities
have since caused the trajectories of the two literatures to diverge. In IPE, most work on

29

Variably referred to also as “public affairs, corporate affairs, external relations, public relations
and government relations,” (Boddewyn 1972, p. 240)
30
Much of our theoretical basis for understanding MNCs today comes out of work by influential
economists such as Stephen Hymer, Charles Kindleberger, John Dunning, Albert O. Hirschman,
and Raymond Vernon.
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MNCs has focused on foreign direct investment (FDI), the initial step that turns a domestic
firm into a multinational one. The international business literature, interestingly, has been
somewhat more expansive in its exploration of the political activities, often termed
nonmarket strategies, of multinational firms (Baron 2013).
Beyond the initial investment decision, a subset of the business literature begins
with the assumption that political action is “second nature” to a multinational firm
(Boddewyn 2007, p. 139) and proceeds by assessing the organizational structure and
hierarchy of government relations responsibilities within the firm, the public relations of
corporate social responsibility, interactions between firms and non-governmental or
intergovernmental organizations, and so on. That said, the theoretical backbone of the
MNC-host government relationship that informs both of these literatures was constructed
based on the “modern MNE” of the 1950s (Boddewyn 2007, p. 140), the concept of the
multinational firm as it was originally developed by economists at the time. This
conceptualization of such organizations, while theoretically rich and instructive, cannot
fully capture their role in the global economy 70 years down the road.
The theory advanced here, which depends in large part on expectations regarding
the behaviors of multinational firms, must draw on what we do know. For this reason,
both political science and international business scholarship create a foundation for a
theory of the MNC as a public policy influencer. This section begins by examining the
institutional tension that emerges when a government interacts with a foreign firm seeking
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to invest within its borders, a subject central to the IPE literature. The institutions of
sovereignty and democracy in particular create a nonmarket environment in which
multinational firms have an incentive to become participants in policy formation. The
discussion then turns to the organization of the government affairs responsibility within
the firm, and in particular to the internationalization of that responsibility. Insights from
the IB literature help build the case for conceptualizing decision-making in IT MNCs not
as multinational, but as transnational.
IPE scholarship does view multinational firms as a political actors, but most IPE
work focuses on the political power wielded by multinational firms through the act of
foreign direct investment (FDI), often at the moment the locational decision is made31.
Among firms interested in engaging in FDI, how do they decide where to invest? Locational
advantages of destination economies already provide a basis for answering this question,
but some work draws politics in as well, suggesting that market failures caused by taxes
and tariffs can be avoided entirely by simply moving production across a troublesome

31

The degree of attention attracted by this topic is understandable in terms of the role it plays in
the larger ontological inquiry—why do multinational firms exist? The early explanations for the
emergence of MNCs reflect the post-World War Two concentration of FDI in the developed world.
Hymer (1976) suggested that the most market-dominant firms used their advantage to spread out
to foreign markets once the home market had been saturated, while Vernon (1974) argued that FDI
is a natural extension of the principle of increasing returns to scale. As investment to the developing
world picked up steam, Dunning (1979) and others turned the discussion toward the potential
locational advantages of differing factor endowments, reserves of natural resources, and untapped
markets.
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border (Caves 1982). This observation is particularly significant for IPE scholars, who see
in this phenomenon the potential for MNCs to create a wave of global regulatory change
simply by leveraging their own mobility. Potential investors could force countries to
compete for capital, a process that would theoretically result in a global regulatory
convergence, or a race to the bottom on things like tax, labor, and environmental policies
(Grossman & Helpman 1994)32. Thus, existing IPE work suggests that it is not the
multinational structure of firms that makes them unique political actors, but their
demonstrated tendency toward mobility.
This is best exemplified by the idea of the obsolescing bargain, the canonical tension
at the root of the MNC-host government relationship, which focuses on the way power
shifts from the firm at the time of the locational decision to the government once the
investment has been made (Vernon 1971). The model assumes that governments want
foreign direct investment and are willing to promise rights and incentives to make their
country more enticing. Firms can choose to invest elsewhere if they find a better offer,
giving firms outsize bargaining power at this stage. Yet the costliness of establishing a
physical presence in a foreign country implies that the decision cannot be easily reversed
(the firm having sacrificed its easy mobility), giving the host government space to renege

32

Empirical evidence on convergence is mixed (Walter & Sen 2009). See, for instance, Vogel (1995)
for evidence in favor of a race-to-the-top argument (or, to use Vogel’s words, the “California effect”)
(p. 6).
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on earlier promises and effectively transferring power to the host government instead (a
possibility usually referred to as political risk33). Importantly, this model assumes that the
particular political power of the multinational firm vanishes once a commitment is made.
However, extensions of this idea that incorporated characteristics of the host
country’s political system drew out some noteworthy variation. Early theorizing of the
relationship between regime type and FDI predicted that autocrats, who are less
constrained by institutions, would be free to offer firms more enticements and should
therefore be more successful at attracting investment (O’Donnell 1978). But empirics have
34

not borne this out . In fact, democracies have performed better at attracting FDI. Scholars
have since demonstrated that there are concrete advantages to well-defined property rights
and contract laws (Olson 1993; Li, Owen & Mitchell 2018) executive constraints (Jensen
2008; Li, Owen & Mitchell 2018), and veto players (Henisz 2000), namely in their ability
to mitigate political risk. Once an investment has been made, democratic governments

33

Scholars became particularly interested in this phenomenon of political risk during the 1970s,
when a number of Latin American countries engaged in well-publicized nationalizations of foreign
firms. Though government expropriation is still a reality of operating in many economies, its
contemporary forms tend to be more subtle, rarely reaching the level of nationalization.
34
It is true that some well-known, empirical studies have returned results consistent with the
advantages autocrats might have (e.g. Li & Resnick 2003). However, a recent meta-analysis
conducted by Li, Owen and Mitchell (2018) shows that much of the variation in the findings on
this question of regime type and FDI stems from researchers’ choice to operationalize the dependent
variable either as a level (total FDI) or a share (FDI as a percentage of GDP). Using mediating
variable approach, they find that when looking at the level of FDI, the effects of democracy are
strong and positive, and operate through mediating variables such as property rights and political
constraints.
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cannot renege on their agreements with MNCs without being held accountable by their
own domestic institutions (Jensen 2003).
On the other hand, policymakers in these countries are constrained by voters,
allowing them less space to make the kinds of sweeping promises to MNCs that have
elsewhere raised concerns about a race to the bottom on things like environmental and
labor regulations. This means firms cannot gain as much leverage from their locational
flexibility as the obsolescing bargain predicts. Simply speaking, democratic institutions tie
the hands of the government so it can become neither the exploiter nor the exploited. Even
where governments have been able to offer investment incentives like corporate tax rates,
firm locational decisions have proved rather inelastic to these overtures (Jensen 2012),
indicating that the reduced political risk achieved by constraining a government is often
worth more to firms than a few regulatory favors.
This reveals something very interesting about democracies. It suggests that MNCs
are often willing to surrender their unique quality of mobility in order to obtain status as
a constituent. While said model of the obsolescing bargain ends at the conclusion of the
investment decision, the interactions between the firm and the government of the host
country continue. Bargaining on the value of a locational decision may be over, but the
firm has now effectively become a domestic political participant, so bargaining for the
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firm’s support has just begun35. The democratic institutions that incorporate domestic
firms and their interests in the political process give multinational firms most of the same
rights. So what makes the multinational firm interesting? Once the quality of mobility has
been surrendered, MNCs should have the same political options as domestic firms. Yet it
is this equivalency that is noteworthy. Subsidiaries of foreign firms hold an interesting
position in which they have become a part of the host economy and can claim a stake the
in the host’s political processes but remain under the ultimate control of a parent company
that belongs to an entirely different economy and polity. While the investment
commitment may limit the political leverage MNCs gain by exercising their mobility, it
also opens political access to an actor with a multinational structure.
This access matters, because a corporate hierarchy that reaches operationally
across international borders should impact firm behavior. Just as most export-oriented
firms are likely to favor lower barriers to trade, multinational firms are likely to favor
lower barriers to their continued multinational operations. This is not an abstraction of

35

In his 1970 book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Albert O. Hirschman characterizes the relationship
between customers and management as a constant choice between exit and voice. If management
fails to deliver satisfactory products or services, customers can stop patronizing the firm or they
can directly communicate their dissatisfaction. Though Hirschmann did not link this to the
relationship between firms and states, it helps distinguish between a decision made at a determinate
point in time—the choice of entry—and the decision being made continuously—the choice of exit
or voice. The vast majority of firm-government interactions happen after the initial investment has
been made, at which point firms are no longer deciding between potential destinations, but between
exit and voice, to borrow Hirschman’s terms (1970).
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the idea that MNCs function differently than domestic firms, but rather an expansion of
that claim.
However, knowing that the structure of MNCs creates a set of incentives that
distinguish them politically from domestic firms does not tell us specifically what kind of
behavior to expect. IPE scholars have spent relatively little time exploring post-investment
state-firm dynamics36, but insights from the international business (IB) literature help
further develop the theory of MNC behavior. While this work shows less concern for the
potential policy consequences of MNC activity, IB scholars have made considerable strides
in theorizing how MNCs engage in corporate political activity.
Early IB scholars describe corporate political activity under the government
relations function of a firm as “fundamentally concerned with changing public policy (or
preventing changes in it) and/or with gaining favorable (or avoiding unfavorable)
treatment under existing policy” (Behrman, Boddewyn & Kapoor 1975). If we accept that
there are preferences and behaviors that are unique to multinational firms, we must still
question the structural significance of multinationality in terms how it impacts corporate
political activity.
In his set of 1988 case studies, Mahini lays out a typology of MNCs based on how
they conduct government affairs. Firms in what he calls the Assertive Mode anticipate

36

Notable exceptions can be found in some of the work on MNC influence in developing countries,
though these tend to be case by case. See Chapter 7 of Walter & Sen (2009) for a literature review
on this topic.
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policy issues, proactively pursue their political interests and incorporate a wide range of
policy issues into their public affairs strategies. In contrast, firms in the Diffuse Mode deal
with issues on an ad-hoc basis and treat political concerns as exogenous to their day-today corporate affairs. Based on his casework, Mahini finds that the firms that occupy the
Assertive Mode (e.g. IBM and Ford) tend to operate in politically “salient” industries and
to be “multinationals in the fullest sense of the word,” running manufacturing, marketing
and sales operations all over the world (1988, p. 30). Blumentritt’s 2003 study reinforces
some of this using a survey of 91 foreign subsidiary managers. He finds that larger
subsidiaries are more likely to engage proactively government affairs, and that the
technological advancement of the firm is positively associated with formalization of the
government affairs function.
At the same time, no multinational firm is a unitary entity. Categorizing a firm in
terms of a single set of incentives or strategies is to treat it as a fully cohesive, monolithic
entity. The very structure of a firm with one headquarters and a multiplicity of subsidiaries
requires a degree of delegation, a devolution of decision-making power. The organizational
hierarchy, in other words, may influence the extent to which the preferences of
headquarters are realized on the ground in a host country.
Based on a series of interviews conducted with members of global affairs teams
from various regions within a global consumer product company, Moss et al. (2012)
generalize the hierarchy of government relations in the following way:
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The central corporate public affairs function claimed to have overall
responsibility for determining the broad public affairs agenda, strategy and
goals, and for setting the direction for the function as a whole but devolved
responsibility for day-to-day public affairs operations to regional or country
level. (p. 53)
Similarly, Mahini finds that in companies with a designated government affairs function,
“it was primarily the country-level subsidiary managers who served as the first line of
communication with host governments” and were tasked with “presenting the company
position on specific issues” (1988, p. 69). In other words, while the parent may decide on
the policy preferences of the firm overall, the directive that goes out from headquarters
relies on the company’s international subsidiaries to translate the its preferences into
appropriate, localized policy proposals and to engage in the relevant form of political
influence.
In order to realize company goals, the staff of a firm’s government affairs team is
designed to fill three different roles—intelligence gathering, door opening, and
implementation (Behrman, Boddewyn & Kapoor 1975). Intelligence gathering refers to
maintaining a level of technocratic expertise in the policy areas of interest to the firm.
Door opening is less technical and more social; it is done by individuals who have
connections with the existing administration or experience in the political bureaucracy.
Ultimately, however, the government prefers to interface with someone at a higher level
who has real authority within the firm. Thus, implementation cannot be easily
accomplished without the direct participation of a high-level manager (Behrman,
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Boddewyn & Kapoor 1975). Though this may be generalizable up to a point, scholars of
organization and management make sure to emphasize that things like subsidiary size, the
degree of integration, and operational dependence on government policy can impact
decision-making in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship (Hillman & Hitt 1999;
Blumentritt 2003; Boddewyn 2007; Moss et al. 2012).
As with the coordination of policy position, the degree of communication between
subsidiaries of the same firm varies substantially across MNCs. Much of this variation, it
seems, arises from the reporting structure of the firm. When issues are likely to have
impacts on subsidiaries in multiple countries due to their operational interdependence,
Mahini notes that the management authority is delegated according to the functional
organization of the firm (1988). Issues impacting subsidiaries in both the U.S. and Canada
might be handled by the North American headquarters for the firm, whereas issues
affecting subsidiaries in Denmark and France would go to the European headquarters.
Other companies have a less geographically segmented structure, organizing public affairs
more along the lines of an “extended international network of communication/public affairs
offices and personnel” (Moss et al. 2012, p. 55).
The variation in intrafirm communication is in part a product of its
internationalization strategy. While there is a tendency to lump all MNCs into one broad
category together, separating them only from firms without operations in foreign countries,
some IB scholars have sought to understand MNC organization in terms of their very
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internationalization strategy. A typology popularized by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989)
suggests four distinguishable, organizational forms for internationalized firms—
multinational, global, international, and transnational. Though the authors discuss
multiple dimensions in their typology, including subsidiary assets and capabilities, as well
as the level of local responsiveness subsidiaries demonstrate, their most interesting
contribution in light of this project’s theory centers on the dissemination of knowledge. In
their book, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) use the term knowledge broadly, referring to
familiarity with local markets, expertise in product development, and awareness of
organizational policies and practices, among other things. Here, their typology becomes
important because of what it may tell us about the formulation and diffusion of public
policy positions and the strategies for addressing them. Figure 3.4 below shows how
knowledge is developed and disseminated within the network of each organizational type.
While a global or international firm uses its headquarters as the sole developer of

Figure 3.4: Dissemination of Knowledge by Firm Typology
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knowledge, multinational and transnational firms delegate some of the responsibility for
knowledge production to subsidiaries. However, whereas subsidiaries of multinationals
develop and retain knowledge for their own local needs, subsidiaries of transnationals have
an integrated approach to knowledge, diffusing and seeking knowledge jointly with other
branches of the intrafirm network. In generating empirical evidence to support Bartlett
and Ghoshal’s typology, other scholars have since found that firms of the transnational
type experience the highest “inter-subsidiary flows of products, people, knowledge and
information” (Harzing 2000, p. 101). Others have observed that advances in technology
and integrated systems approaches to production (bundled hardware, software, and
services packages, for example) have begun to shift all internationalized firms toward the
transnational strategic orientation (Ghoshal & Nohria 1993; Sambharya, Kumaraswamy
& Banerjee 2005).
For the sake of simplicity, internationalized firms are referred to as MNCs
throughout this project, but the distinction between the multinational and transnational
strategic orientation is worth considering. An earlier section of this chapter discusses the
kinds of firms that would stand to benefit the most from skill-selective immigration
policies. It concludes that based on skill-intensity and labor market characteristics, large,
multinational information technology firms are best positioned to propose the skill-selective
compromise to policymakers. Based on the empirical applications of the Bartlett and
Ghoshal typology, these firms may also be the most likely to have developed transnational
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strategic orientations. Firm behavior abroad should therefore be characterized by the
following two features, as derived from the insights of the IB literature: (1) a welldeveloped government relations function that has been somewhat decentralized to better
adapt to local political environments, and (2) a degree of inter-subsidiary knowledge
transfer.

The Multinational Advantage
The above expectations regarding the dissemination of knowledge within MNCs
and the organizational hierarchy of the government relations function provide an
opportunity to situate this project’s theory of firm behavior within the domain of
international policy transfer. As a theory, policy diffusion gained popularity in all subfields
of political science in the 1990s and early 2000s (Graham, Shipan & Volden, 2012). In the
international political economy literature, diffusion has been most frequently employed to
understand regulatory convergence and economic liberalization in the context of
globalization (e.g. Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, 2006; Levi-Faur, 2005; Simmons & Elkins,
2004). But it has also been central to explaining the international spread of norms (e.g.
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) and has been productive in assessing even fundamentally
domestic social policies (e.g. Weyland, 2005; Linos, 2013).
Immigration policy has not been considered in these terms. The traditional theories
of international policy diffusion draw on four direct government-to-government
mechanisms of transfer—emulation, learning, competition and coercion (Dobbins,
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Simmons & Garret 2007). In almost all cases, the pathways implicitly propose policymakers
who look to the actions of other governments in order to make their choices at home37. No
connection has yet been drawn between a network of international policy diffusion and the
internal network of a multinational corporation38. The main argument of this dissertation
is that this pathway does exist and can be used to explain the spread of skill-selective
immigration policies.

Mechanisms of Diffusion
Foreign subsidiaries are at a disadvantage in some ways, for while they enjoy the
same rights as domestic firms in a democracy, their international linkages are still visible
to their hosts. Because of this, they are burdened by laws that seek to limit undue influence
by foreign actors. At the same time, they have the advantage of being a part of a larger
network. While political actors in a host country may be easily able to identify a foreignowned firm and to say where the headquarters are, the complexity of the intra-firm
network prevents most reasonable observers from seeing the larger geopolitical picture.
Reaching beyond the contrasts between MNCs and domestic firms established by the
international business literature, there is a major advantage to multinationality as it

37

There are some interesting exceptions to this precedent, however. Chwieroth (2007), for example,
shows that the trained neoliberal economists serving as policy advisors helped diffuse the ideas that
led to the liberalization of capital controls in the 1990s. A similar argument has been made to
explain privatization during this period (Kogut & Macpherson 2007).
38
Although the transnational advocacy networks idea made famous by Keck and Sikkink (1999) is
similar in nature to the idea of a corporate network.
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pertains to nonmarket strategy. It is born of firms’ awareness of their own transnationality.
Studies examining federalism often point to regional political jurisdictions as
potential laboratories of democracy, in which local policy changes can act as trial balloons
for neighboring governments (Osborne 1988; Karch 2007). In the language of policy
diffusion, this laboratories concept suggests learning. Policymakers who observe that
reforms have resulted in positive outcomes in nearby areas may take away the lesson that
they should pursue similar reforms. Multinational firms have something of a federalist
structure of their own. This creates a structural opportunity for MNCs to use knowledge
gained from subsidiaries’ political successes to shape their approaches to political influence
in other host countries.
With regard to immigration policy, the successful application of the skill-selective
compromise in one country where an MNC subsidiary is located could lead that MNC to
try and establish similar compromises in some of its other host countries. In this example,
the strategy of the skill-selective compromise is learned at the level of the firm, not at the
level of the state, meaning that policymakers need not be explicitly aware of the
antecedents to their legislation. In fact, MNCs may even have an incentive to misrepresent
the purpose of transferring the policy to a new host country. For example, firms can point
to skill-selective immigration policies in other countries (perhaps even instances where
sibling subsidiaries have been instrumental in creating these policies) to demonstrate how
important a policy is to the competitiveness of an economy and to the MNC’s interest in
92

Chapter 3: Selective Immigration and the Multinational Firm
operating there. Such an argument is particularly potent, because a state’s ability to
compete economically is the concern of a policymaker, not a company. The MNC’s
liabilities are dispersed across many countries, while the government is fully invested in
the country it represents. If an MNC can persuade policymakers that skill-selective
immigration reform in another country makes that country’s economy more competitive,
a corresponding skill-selective reform at home would signal the intent of policymakers to
compete. So while multinational firms may be learning to promote skill-selection under the
heading of national economic competition from their subsidiaries abroad, the relevant
intent may actually become competition as the responsibility for change is passed into the
hands of policymakers.
Because of this role, an intra-firm network should be viewed as a constellation of
international pressure when it comes to policies the firm is willing to actively promote.
Once an MNC decides to engage in policy advocacy, that company’s subsidiaries will
attempt diffuse desirable policy, creating an imperfect but potentially recognizable,
geographical pattern of reforms along the lines of the intra-firm network.

Observable Implications
Building on the behavior of individual firms theorized above, it is possible to set
down some expectations about the larger, emerging policy pattern. In each polity, as we
know, there is a struggle between interests that oppose immigration and those that seek
to promote it. This chapter’s treatment of these factions uses existing work and polling
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data to establish the assumption that the general public is broadly opposed to immigration
and that business interests are broadly in favor.
This chapter lays out a model in which policymakers, who seek to strike a balance
between the opposing interests that keep them in power, will avoid issues on which no
common ground can be found, thereby incentivizing proponents of change to propose less
controversial, more limited reforms. The examination of societal preferences demonstrates
that space for such compromises exists around policies that favor potential immigrants
with a high social status, a concept that includes characteristics such as education and
income. The discussion of firm preferences presents a profile of the business interests best
able to take advantage of immigration reform that limits its scope to highly educated
migrants and finds multinational information technology companies to be the most likely
beneficiaries of such policies.
These companies are also uniquely positioned to carry their demands across
borders, creating a multiplier effect on the influence of their preferences. The theory
suggests that this multiplier goes beyond whatever influence each subsidiary might be able
to have on its host government if it functioned in the same way as domestic firms. Early
on in the cycle of policy diffusion, MNCs may be under greater pressure to present evidence
of labor shortages within the relevant labor market to convince policymakers of the need
for specialized policy reform. But as more countries embrace skill-selective immigration
policies, different arms of the same transnational firm have the opportunity to shift their
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evidence away from what’s happening in the domestic economy and toward what peer and
competitor countries are doing instead. Such knowledge can be passed along from other
members of the intra-firm network, enabling them to use the company’s victory in one
country to fuel further policy gains in others. If policymakers find this information
compelling, these firms will have effectively succeeded in constructing an international
competition for skilled labor merely by claiming it already exists.
Thus, the most central implication of the theory described in this chapter is that
liberalizations of skill-selective immigration policies can be linked to similar policy changes
in other countries, and that the pattern of linkages can be traced using the spatial, intrafirm networks of multinational information technology companies. A couple of other,
smaller hypotheses also arise. First, as illustrated by the Policymaker’s Dilemma (see
Figure 3.3), policymakers with particularly divided constituencies are more likely to be
faced with situations in which no acceptable compromise is available. Right-wing parties
receive higher levels of support from members of the public who hold anti-immigration
attitudes, so right-leaning policymakers, who draw support from this base while still relying
on contributions from the business community are the most likely to be faced with an
empty set of options. For this reason, governments dominated by right-leaning parties are
the most likely to respond to a new, narrower, less objectionable policy proposition from
employers. In other words, these governments are more likely to be in the Policymaker’s
Dilemma in the first place, and so more likely to need help getting out of it again.
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Second, this theory sets up a scenario in which there are only two opposing views
among members of society. This, while certainly an oversimplification, is more likely to
manifest in polities that operate on plurality electoral systems, often alternately referred
to as first-past-the-post. The way these voting rules are constructed, a candidate who
answers to the constituents of a specific geographical district faces a member from an
opposition party and the result is binary—the candidate either wins or loses. Unlike in a
system of proportional representation, where a small loss of votes may mean a
corresponding loss in seats, if a candidate running in a plurality system loses just one
additional percent of the electorate, it can mean the difference between complete victory
and absolute defeat. Because of the duality created by this institutional design,
policymakers in plurality systems should be more amenable to small, unobjectionable
policy changes, and therefore more likely to accept the compromise proposed by
multinational information technology firms. These implications are formalized into three
hypotheses laid out in Table 3.6 below.

Table 3.6: Hypotheses
If Policy ∆ in Country A
H1:  MNC Cohosting ®  Chance of Policy Lib. in Country B
H2:  MNC Cohosting * Right-Leaning Gov’t ®  Chance of Policy Lib. in Country B
H3:  MNC Cohosting * Plurality Voting ®  Chance of Policy Lib. in Country B
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The common purpose of these hypotheses is to uncover evidence of interdependence
in skill-selective immigration policy liberalization. They focus on the outcome, and they
are tested statistically in Chapters 5 and 6 using two new datasets described in Chapter
4. While this is arguably the most important set of tests of the theory laid out in this
chapter, additional empirical implications can be generated to evaluate the process
theorized to produce interdependence. However, these implications are not of the same
nature as hypotheses and refer more to the process by which X produces Y rather than
this relationship itself. In other words:
When the observable events that intercede between hypothesized causes
and observed effects have this character, they constitute “diagnostic
evidence,” not “variables.” Diagnostic evidence indicates the kind of process
taking place but does not transmit any independent effects to the dependent
variable. (Bennet & Checkel 2015, p. 7)
Drawing on the expectations that follow from the theories of firm preferences and
behavior developed above, three such diagnostic criteria for the policymaking process
emerge. First, the theory of firm preferences offers an argument for the multinational
information technology firm as the most obvious beneficiary of skill-selective immigration
policies. If these preferences are correctly assigned, the theory of firm behavior suggests
that the largest and most successful of these IT MNCs will proactively engage in attempts
to influence policymakers in favor of liberalizing skill-selective policies. Even where
lobbying is neither institutionalized nor regulated, clues to the actors involved in
policymaking processes can sometimes be gleaned from committee reports, evidence
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presented to parliamentary bodies, newspaper articles and so on. If IT MNCs are not
visible in this process or if they are surpassed by other groups with consistently higher
levels of participation in the development of skill-selective policy, this evidence would
indicate that the group relevant actors is broader than the theory predicts.
Second, the logic of the Policymakers’ Dilemma sets up a circumstance in which
firms have an incentive to demand narrow, low-controversy liberalizations from
policymakers because it increases the likelihood that they will be successful. Based on this,
empirical evidence that firms and policymakers view skill-selective immigration policies in
this light, as a way to liberalize immigration without generating backlash among antiimmigration voters, would lend additional support to the theory. This speaks directly to
the strategic aspect of firm behavior, so it is unlikely that firms will be particularly vocal
on this point.
Finally, the third aspect of firm behavior that would lend credence to the theory
proposed in this chapter concerns the presentation of skill-selective immigration as a
necessary tool in the international competition for talent. The employment of this rhetoric
by MNCs in their attempts to convince policymakers to liberalize skill-selective
immigration policies would be consistent with expectations. Together, these three
diagnostic criteria39 (summarized in Table 3.7 below) form the basis against which four

39

The diagnostic criteria (rather than hypotheses) are presented separately from the hypotheses
shown in Table 3.6 to clarify that they are evaluated using a different strategy. While the hypotheses
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case studies are evaluated in Chapter 7.

Table 3.7: Diagnostic Criteria
Empirical Implications for Qualitative Evaluation
A: IT MNCs engage in influence campaigns in favor of skill-selective immigration policy.
B: IT MNCs and policymakers see skill-selective immigration as a policy compromise.
C: IT MNCs use war-for-talent arguments to support their influence campaigns.

in Table 3.6 are tested statistically, the diagnostic criteria in Table 3.7 are evaluated against
qualitative case-study evidence.
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Chapter 4

Tracking Policies and Corporations
A major contribution of this project is the original collection of data that makes it
possible to provide a real look at patterns and events that have until now only been
documented anecdotally. The first dataset records changes to skill-selective immigration
policies, classifies the instrument and scope of each change, and indicates whether and for
whom each change makes immigration more or less restrictive. The second dataset tracks
the geographical expansion of major information technology companies, recording which
countries they operate in and which countries they expand to over time. Both datasets
represent knowledge that is missing on a larger scale from the resources commonly used
by political scientists, and both therefore serve as inroads into the vast space of
unmeasured information. The purpose of this chapter is to describe data collection and
measurement decisions, visualize the data that have been compiled, and discuss the logic
and mechanics of spatial regression—the chosen testing strategy.
Before getting into the details of the data collection process, this chapter discusses
the phenomenon of skill-selection as a method of straining the prospective migrant pool.
While there is much to be said about the evolution of ideas that has made this mechanism
of selection viable and about the governments and individuals that advocate these policies,
these elements are explored in terms of specific cases in Chapter 7. Instead, the focus here
is on making clear what a skill-selective policy is and what these policies look like
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empirically. The second part of this chapter is devoted to providing a clear and informative
picture of the data used to test the hypotheses, and the final part of the chapter outlines
the spatial regression modeling strategy and discusses why the data introduced here and
research question of this project lend themselves to this kind of technique.

Skill-Selective Immigration Policy
The first dataset records changes to skill-selective immigration policies in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) from 1980-2017. Over
the course of the past several decades, most OECD countries have experienced a shift in
their immigration policies. Whether admissions have become more or less restrictive or
rights have been extended or revoked, a skill-selective tendency has emerged in almost all
of these countries. This does not necessarily signal convergence in the realm of immigration
policy. In fact, states have found a variety of ways of differentiating their strategies, from
labor market restrictions to fast-track procedures to the selection mechanisms themselves.
Yet similarities have also been noted—a new policy tool will emerge in one country and
be picked up in a handful of others. In general, skill-selective policies appear to grow more
complex over time as new tools are phased in. Given this variation in policy design, how
should we set the bounds on what constitutes skill selection?
Most people, particularly those following the actions of the current American
government, have some familiarity with the most popular kinds of migrant entry streams.
In many countries there are three standard categories for entry. Migrants are allowed in
101

Chapter 4: Tracking Policies and Corporations
on the basis of their family ties to current citizens, in order to work jobs employers have
difficulty filling with access only to domestic labor, or because they have made a refugee
claim that has passed muster. However, no system in the world is actually this simple. In
most cases, each of these categories represents a multitude of different entry visas, each
with its own permissions and requirements. This project is concerned almost entirely with
the labor category, focusing particularly on a class of labor visa that limits access by setting
some minimum, skill-related bar for prospective foreign workers to pass.
As other scholars have already noted, “[i]t is problematic to define skill” (Cerna,
2016, p. 78). Using a statistical concept, we can think of skill as a latent variable, a
characteristic or combination of characteristics that cannot be (or at least is not) directly
observed. What policymakers want, it seems, is to be able to choose migrants based on
their future successes and contributions, or perhaps based on how well they will integrate
themselves into societal and economic life. But because the future obviously cannot be
known, they have to rely on information about the individual’s past to make a reasonable
guess at their prospect for success. This is a common problem in labor economics, but
when governments take on the job of sorting through prospective migrants based on their
economic potential, that problem becomes a matter of policy. Latent variables are dealt
with in statistical models by using observable proxies to give us more information about
the likely value of the unobservable variable.
The most common proxy for skill in political science work is education. As it turns
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out, this is a popular solution among policymakers as well, but it is far from being
universal. A study conducted by the European Migration Network in 2013 found that
among the 23 countries surveyed, only 13 maintained an official definition of “high skill”
that required a certain level of educational achievement. 10 included criteria relating to an
individual’s professional experience and 16 had definitions that required a minimum salary
(though the number itself varied from state to state) (EMN, 2013). Setting a minimum
salary presumably transfers the issue of skill determination to the employer, relying on the
assumption that an employer would only be willing to pay such a high income to an
individual judged to be worth the cost. Some systems, like Canada’s, that award points
for different criteria, also overtly place value on language ability (English or French, in
Canada’s case), age (over 18, but with plenty of time left before retirement is preferred),
and a verifiable job offer, none of which are features that necessarily speak to an
individual’s level of skill. There is some ambiguity too, about whether a sector-specific
program should be considered a mechanism of skill selection. Many countries maintain
occupational shortage lists, which use labor market statistics to determine which
occupations are insufficiently supplied by domestic labor alone. Most would consider a
scheme designated for information technology specialists to be skill-selective, but there is
a tendency for people to think of vocational work as something different, so the same could
not be said for metalworking machine operators, though this was the top shortage
occupation in Austria in 2015 (EMN, 2015).
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In the literature, the most frequently discussed variation in skill-selective
immigration policies centers on demand-driven versus supply-side systems. The focus on
this distinction probably arises from the fact that up until recently, most immigration
policy innovation (and therefore, most of the writing on immigration policies) happened
in the United States, Canada, and Australia. As Canada and Australia have both operated
supply-side, points-based systems for decades, the employer-led American policy has been
used to set up a natural contrast. Fundamentally, the difference is this: a demand-driven
system puts the agency in the hands of the employer. The employer, as in the case of the
United States, files the application for a potential migrant, pays the application fee, verifies
that appropriate steps have been taken to attempt to hire domestically first, and
guarantees that the migrant employee, once he or she arrives, will be paid fairly and
treated in accordance with domestic labor standards. Any migrant wishing to enter the
country on a labor visa, therefore, must have a pre-arranged deal with their future
employer.
A supply-side system, on the other hand, allows potential migrants to file their
own applications and selects entrants based on criteria that may or may not take the
preferences of domestic employers into account. The main advantage of employer-led
systems is that they respond directly to the needs of employers, while supply-side systems
are often touted as flexible and transparent (Papademetriou, Somerville & Tanaka, 2008).
Though the distinction between the two strategies is always more ambiguous than this
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simple dichotomy would imply, the points-based system has found its way into the
immigration policy strategies of Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hong Kong, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom (Duncan, 2012;
EMN, 2013)40.
On the whole, while it is tempting to use the demand-driven versus supply-side
distinction as a way of binning countries based on their immigration policies, a closer look
at how these systems really work reveals that the distinction is not very productive. The
points systems in Denmark and the Netherlands, for example, are used for only one or two
narrow entry tracks, so that supply-side selection represents a small fraction of total
immigration. Both these countries, as well as others on the list of points-system adopters,
use demand-driven selection for other entry tracks. A few countries have even introduced
fast-track, temporary permits specifically called “green cards,” in reference to the American
Green Card (though they more closely resemble H-1B visas—the American Green Card is
not a fast-track permit). Green cards have appeared in Germany, the Czech Republic,
Denmark and Ireland at least (EMN, 2013; Papademetriou, Somerville & Tanaka, 2008;
Martin, 2014)41. And even in Australia and Canada, the path-breaking innovators of the
points-system, demand-driven elements have begun to creep into the selection process.

40

Germany and the United States have seriously considered points-based systems, though neither
has ever adopted one (Duncan, 2012).
41
Oddly, the Danish Green Card was operated as a points-based, rather than employer-led entry
path, though it so heavily weighted education that it was possible to pass on education alone
(Papademetriou, Somerville & Tanaka, 2008).
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While supply-demand dichotomy may have been able to tell us something about
immigration standards 20 years ago, focusing on the distinction today draws attention
away from the variation that matters, such as the drivers of policy change.
In essence, this typology of immigration policies that separates supply-side and
demand-driven policies presents a false dichotomy and may be obfuscating the variation
that can actually tell us something about the development of immigration policy. In other
words, existing datasets may be measuring the wrong thing. Rather than distinguishing
between supply and demand mechanisms, the immigration policy dataset introduced here
focuses on policy dimensions, putting together a broad picture of how skill as an abstract
concept has been operationalized in existing policy. Secondarily, this creates an
opportunity to note which countries rely on which dimensions, distinguishing between
policies that set up vague, class-based mechanisms (using education, white-collar work
experience or salary) and those that home in on specific skill shortages (establishing lists
of narrowly defined occupations). The dataset that came out of this and the variables it
includes are discussed in more depth below.

Immigration Policy Data
The combination of frequent, low-publicity changes and the growing number of
policy instruments states use to assemble policies they can sell to their publics makes the
collection of immigration policy data a formidable task. Unlike scholars of international
trade, we have no World Trade Organization or analogous intergovernmental body to
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undertake the enormous process of recording the development of the full range immigration
policies around the world over time42. Because of this, much of the work must be done
country by country, year by year, accounting for the nontrivial comparison problems that
arise when dealing with different systems of lawmaking, bureaucracy, juridical procedure
and information archiving. The existing datasets on changes in immigration policy have
made a good start down this road43. Most aim to cover many aspects of immigration policy,
which means they are forced to paint in broad brush strokes and strictly limit the number
of countries and years they can cover. The dataset introduced here cannot overcome this
trade-off, but errs on the side of more detail about a particular set of target groups rather
than less detail about all target groups.
However, even as this dataset seeks to expand how we understand immigration
policy, existing data have proven crucial to its creation. The researchers who compiled the
DEMIG Policy data

44

had already put a considerable effort into categorizing the target

groups of the policies they recorded, so the skill-selective policies they identified and the

42

There are a few important caveats to this. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
and the United Nations (UN) have put in significant efforts to fulfill this role in terms of refugee
and asylum policies and the International Labor Organization (ILO) keeps some data on crossnational regulation of working conditions for migrants. Most importantly, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produces annual International Migration Outlook
reports that contain some information on changes to immigration policies in member countries.
These OECD reports are crucial sources for the immigration policy dataset introduced here, but
they lack systematic, comprehensive criteria for country reporting.
43
See for example the DEMIG Policy dataset (2015), Mayda (2010), and Peters (2015).
44
DEMIG (2015) DEMIG POLICY, version 1.3, Online Edition. Oxford: International Migration
Institute, University of Oxford. www.migrationdeterminants.eu
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sources they uncovered provided the scaffolding for the collection process behind this
dataset. The applicable observations in the DEMIG Policy data were researched and
recoded, and additional primary and secondary sources were reviewed for any further
relevant policy changes. The data, which follow policy changes in OECD member countries
(see Table 4.1 below for full list of countries covered) over the course of the 1980-2017
period, contain 1,407 country-year observations. In 322 of those country-years, some kind
of skill-selective policy change is coded, and of those 322, 139 are not captured by the
DEMIG data.

Table 4.1: OECD Countries Included in Dataset
Australia
Canada
Finland
Hungary

Austria
Czech Republic
France
Ireland

Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Israel

Bulgaria
Estonia
Greece
Italy

Japan
Luxembourg
Norway

South Korea
Mexico
Poland

Latvia
Netherlands
Portugal

Lithuania
New Zealand
Romania

Russia
Sweden

Slovakia
Switzerland

Slovenia
Turkey

Spain
United Kingdom

United States
Note: Data for former Soviet countries begins in year of independence.

The countries and years included in the data were selected for both theoretical as
well as practical reasons. The theoretical connection between skill-selective immigration
policies and the emergence of the information technology (IT) industry suggests that the
action must take place in those countries and years in which a tangible IT industry exists.

108

Chapter 4: Tracking Policies and Corporations
That said, there are a handful of countries that are not members of the OECD that
fit this criterion, including for example China, Singapore, Brazil, and India, among others.
Practically speaking, there is just not enough detailed information available in English
about the targets and instruments of the immigration policies of these countries to include
them at this time. Despite this weakness, there are a number of countries included in the
data that—much like China, Singapore, Brazil and India—develop nascent IT industries
over the course of the 1980-2017 period, providing some helpful variation in the type of
economy represented (Ireland and Israel, for instance).
The most basic measure of policy change recorded in the dataset ignores the
specifics of policy design and even the direction of the change (more or less restrictive) and
focuses solely on whether any skill-selective change to immigration policy occurred in a
given country in a given year. It simply seeks to determine whether a country sought to
alter its approach to skill-selection at all in the stated year, providing the broadest view
of action on skill-selective policies over the course of the period. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2
illustrate the distributions of policy changes captured by the dataset by country and year,
respectively.
Figure 4.1 maps out the total number of policy changes made by each country
throughout the period studied. Darker colors represent a larger number of total policy
changes. All countries in the sample have made at least a few skill-selective policy changes
over the course of the period, but three countries in particular—Australia, Canada, and
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New Zealand—stand out with the highest policy change counts. The status of these three
countries on the extreme end of the spectrum is not surprising due to their histories as
traditional receiving countries and their relatively early adoption of skill-selective
strategies, but it is important not to allow the experiences of these states to dominate the
overall story. This is discussed further in Chapter 6, in conjunction with statistical results.
Figure 4.2 shows policy changes by year. The trend is undeniably positive. This is
consistent with the oft-used but ill-supported claims regarding the proliferation of skillselective policy changes that inform the central puzzle of the project, but it also means
that time-related trends must be considered in the construction of the statistical models.
While the occasional policy touched on issues of skill in the 1980s, each decade thereafter
demonstrates an increased level of skill-selective focus. The highest count recorded in the

data takes place in 2014, when 24 out of 37 countries made changes to their skill-selective
immigration policies in one year. This is four times as many country-changes as were
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recorded in 1994, and more than twice the number documented in 2004. By anyone’s
measure, the increase in the popularity of these policies is astounding45.
In this project, skill-selective policies are defined by the kinds of individuals they
target. A policy is skill-selective if it limits entry, rights or procedural advantages to
potential migrants falling into one of five categories—the highly qualified, the
occupationally skilled, students, investors or intra-company transfers. Most of these
distinctions are easily determined, and policies tend to directly refer to students or
investors if these are the groups they seek to regulate. However, the highly qualified and
occupationally skilled categories are not uniformly classified across countries and are
usually not differentiated at all.
Despite this, this project considers them to be conceptually distinct. Here, the
highly qualified are potential migrants who are selected based on their educational
qualifications, non-specific white-collar profession, or high-end salary. The occupationally
skilled are potential migrants who are selected based on their specific vocation. Worth
noting is that individuals in the occupationally skilled category often fall outside the
purview of definitions of skilled migrants. Yet the word skill most aptly applies to
vocational or trade-specific work and has an occupational connotation that general

45

Although the dataset records changes through 2017, Figure 4.2’s trend line is truncated in 2015.
Many of the sources used exhibit delays in the documentation of changes by two or even three
years. Because of this, the data for the most recent couple of years are likely incomplete and are
therefore excluded here.
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educational qualifications do not. For this reason, occupational skills are included in the
general definition of skill selection but are also coded separately. Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5
break down and compare the targeting of these two groups among the countries and years
covered by the data. Across the period studied, Figure 4.3 shows that OECD countries
have favored strategies targeting potential migrants based on abstract qualifications rather
than occupational skills. In fact, Figure 4.5 clarifies that only just over half of the countries
in the sample have dabbled in occupational skill-based targeting at all. In contrast, almost
every country covered by the data has used some kind of qualification-based measure to
target migrants, as shown in Figure 4.4.
The remaining target categories are much narrower, much less frequently used, and
much easier to define. Students are, in this context, international students at the tertiary
level. Investors refers to international investors or entrepreneurs, potential migrants who
are selected based on their willingness to invest a certain quantity of money or create a
certain number of jobs in the receiving country. And intra-company transfers category
refers to potential migrants employed by companies already located in both the origin and
destination countries who wish to relocate their internal staff. Where applicable, more than
one group can be coded as the target of a policy change.
A central feature of the dataset is the inclusion of variables that describe changes
made to policy instruments. Unlike the overall measure of policy change, these measures
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reflect directionality, expressing a positive change when policies are made more permissive
and a negative change when they become more restrictive. The overall policy change
indicator is not coded as more permissive or restrictive because, even within admissions
policy alone, there are really two dimensions at work in any given policy and they can
move in opposite directions. These dimensions are referred to in this project as criteria and
red tape. Policies are coded as employing red tape instruments if they make changes to
administrative hurdles facing anyone within one or more of the above-defined target
groups. A red tape instrument has been used to liberalize policy if an administrative or
procedural barrier is reduced or dismantled, making it easier for potential migrants to
complete the immigration process successfully. For example, if skilled migrants were
previously subject to a labor market test (in which the employer must attest or show
evidence of having searched for a domestic worker to fill the position before looking abroad)
but are no longer subject to such a test, the red tape has been reduced, making the
regulation more permissive. Policies are coded as employing criteria instruments when they
alter the degree of selectivity and thus the scope of the target group itself. In other words,
policy can be liberalized without any change to red tape by lowering or expanding the
criteria for admission, meaning that a wider range of potential migrants now qualify for
entry. If, for example, a skilled migrant visa that previously required applicants to have a
graduate degree now only requires an undergraduate degree, the criteria for entry have
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been made more permissive.
Figure 4.6 compares the use of these two instruments in designing skill-selective
immigration policies over time. As mentioned above, each of these measures can be coded
as a positive value (more permissive) or a negative value (more restrictive), providing an
opportunity to get a look at the direction of policy changes as well as the magnitude. The
second graph in Figure 4.6 illustrates that almost all red tape changes over the course of
the period have been positive, while the first graph indicates that states have tinkered
with their admissions criteria in an ongoing attempt to match policy with preferences. For
both kinds of policy instruments, however, the liberalizations have outweighed the
restrictions, suggesting that the over-time trend tilts in favor of the expansion of skillselective strategies.
These data on changes to skill-selective immigration policies open up an
opportunity to test questions about the variables that contribute to such changes. Given
the increased regularity with which skill-selective designs have been employed by OECD
countries, this dataset constitutes a notable contribution to the study of contemporary
The coding of these data opens up new possibilities for researchers, expanding the range
of research questions we are able to pursue and productively complicating our
understanding of what matters when it comes to policy design.
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MNC Influence Data
The theory of firm behavior introduced in Chapter 3 proposes that firms with a
special interest in skill-selective immigration policies pursue a strategy that can be broken
down into three steps. They begin by orchestrating an information campaign about their
need for skilled labor. They then settle upon a narrow set of policy demands based on that
publicized need, and finally, they go about selling their policy ideas to lawmakers. While
all three steps are important in understanding how firms are able to leverage their position
within an economy to achieve policy goals, the third step in particular would be an ideal
place to show how active firms are in the policymaking process. However, such data are
available only in a few cases and for a limited number of years.
In the United States, in spite of the Lobbying Disclosure Act, it is widely
acknowledged that plenty of lobbying happens by way of lobbyists who, through legal
technicalities, are never required to register and whose activities go therefore unrecorded.
Unfortunately, the data on lobbying that the U.S. makes publicly available is probably
the best such data provided by any country in the world. Transparency standards in
lobbying have not yet become widespread, even within democracies. In fact, most countries
do not keep data on the lobbying activities of firms at all, meaning that there are no
existing records that could be made available to the public in the future. The Sunlight
Foundation offers a list of the countries that maintain lobbying registers as of 2016, noting
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also the kind of information contained in those registers so as to provide some kind of
measurable standard. Their list identifies 14 countries that make some kind of data
available, but only 10 of these disclose the client as well as the lobbyist, and only two of
the 14 include spending numbers (Watson 2016).
As much trouble as the U.S. has in defining who is a lobbyist and what kind of
activity must be disclosed, it does at least set a minimum threshold for what is
unambiguously lobbying, and those cases have been made transparent. Many countries in
Europe, on the other hand, have built influence channels into their formal policymaking
processes, allowing representatives of industry associations and labor organizations to
consult with policymakers and engage in things like labor market negotiations within the
context of policy planning. This does not mean that these groups and others are not also
engaged in influencing politicians in other ways, but it does add an extra layer of
complication in separating outside pressure on the policymaking process from what is
considered an internal part of the policymaking process itself.
Because of these issues, a sounder strategy for looking at the macrolevel outcomes
is to abstract away from measurable forms of influence and look instead at stakeholder
status. While it may not be possible to obtain information about how much a particular
company donates to a politician’s campaign or how often they employ lobbyists to push
their policy preferences, it is at least possible to determine whether a firm occupies a
position in a particular economy and is therefore subject to and able to comment on the
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rules of the corresponding polity. Specifically, if a parent company can claim a subsidiary
in a foreign country, the subsidiary, and by extension, the parent company are impacted
by and have an incentive to influence the laws of that foreign country.
Following this logic, the second dataset created for this project tracks the
international locations of the subsidiaries for 25 of the largest information technology
companies over the period 1989-2017. The full list of companies included in the dataset is
shown in table 4.2 below. The primary source for these data is the Corporate Affiliations
database, but the dataset also makes extensive use of the Moody’s International and OTC
Industrial manuals, 10-Ks obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission, and

Table 4.2: Companies Tracked in MNC Subsidiaries Dataset
Accenture

Apple Inc.

CGI Group Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc.

Atos

Capgemini SE

Cognizant

Dell Technologies, Inc.

Fujitsu Ltd.

Hewlett-Packard

IBM Corp.

Infosys Limited

Intel Corp.

LG Corp.

Microsoft Corp.

NEC Corp.

NTT Data Corp.

Oracle Corp.

Qualcomm Inc.

Samsung

SAP SE

Sony Corp.

Tata Consultancy Services

Toshiba Corp.

Wipro Limited
Note: Data missing for all companies for 1992, 1994 and 2009.

information in individual companies’ annual and financial reports. Even using all of these
sources and beginning as late as 1989, there are a number of years of missing data for most
companies. Figure 4.7 shows missing company-years marked by a black circle. The years
1992, 1994 and 2009 stand out as particularly data-poor. This is because, while the
Corporate Affiliations manuals for these years do exist, they are missing from the
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University of Pennsylvania’s collection.

Figures 4.8 and 4.9 track the changes in MNC subsidiary locations over time and
use interpolated data where the missing value can be guessed with a high level of certainty.
Figure 4.8 provides a series of plots that track the number of MNCs with a physical,
operational presence in each country over time. Unsurprisingly, the common trend is for
the number of MNCs hosted to increase, a reflection of the increased size and global
presence of the IT industry, particularly the big players in the IT industry, over the period
covered. A couple of countries, the United States and Germany, for instance, are such
attractive destinations for foreign direct investment that by the end of the period they
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have collected a subsidiary from every company included in the dataset. Figure 4.9
illustrates the change in geographical prevalence by company over time. A couple of
companies in particular, Cisco, IBM and SAP, for example, have locations in most OECD
countries by 2017. It is worth noting that this creates a special advantage when dealing
with phenomena occurring over the past several decades. The variation in subsidiary
locations that can be exploited for the purpose of looking more closely at MNC influence
over policy is disappearing. The more companies achieve this kind of ubiquity, the harder
it will be to determine the impacts they have on the polities they inhabit.
Due to the staggeringly complex nature of corporate hierarchy in modern MNCs,
compiling this data required a number of difficult coding decisions. The first concerns how
far to extend down the ladder of corporate ownership. The theory outlined in Chapter 3
anticipates that parent companies interact with their direct subsidiaries (i.e. children), but
should we expect a parent company to engage with a grandchild or great-grandchild? In
many cases this problem can be circumvented simply by noting that if the daughter firm
already represents a presence in a given foreign country, her subsidiaries will have a high
likelihood of being located within that same country. However, there are cases where this
is not true. For this dataset, coding was limited only to the direct children of the parent
company and its immediate children.
There are also a number of firms included in the dataset that operate in multiple
industries. Toshiba, for instance, is a big player in the information technology industry,
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but also produces things like household appliances, medical equipment and lighting. For
these mega-multinationals that span a range of distinct product and service markets,
coding begins on the second rung of the corporate hierarchy ladder, identifying the
headquarters of the information technology group or division as the ultimate parent firm.
In Toshiba’s case, for example, this means that first-level subsidiaries within the digital
products and electronic devices groups are coded, while subsidiaries within the home
appliances group are ignored. The assumption behind this choice is that firms operating
in multiple industries are likely to have several distinct, and possibly even conflicting, sets
of policy preferences. While the most general policy positions may be set at the highest
level, stances on industry-specific issues are more likely to be developed and pursued by
the affected divisions and groups.
A third important coding complication arises with regard to mergers and
acquisitions. Large, multinational companies are constantly in the process of purchasing
and selling other companies. Most acquisitions are small and do little to change the overall
geography of the firm’s internal subsidiary network, but occasionally a purchase of a
sizeable competitor will open up a whole new region of operations. For example, in 1991,
Fujitsu acquired International Computers Limited (ICL), a British computer giant
championed by the U.K. government with the intent of enabling it to compete with IBM.
Fujitsu had encountered obstacles in their attempts to gain a foothold in Europe.
Governmental actors sought to keep the growing Japanese IT industry from squeezing
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European players out of the market, but Fujitsu’s acquisition of ICL finally opened the
door. The increase in locations Fujitsu achieved in 1991 is visible in Figure 4.9 and is
largely the result of this major acquisition.
Thus, in cases where firms tracked in this dataset acquire other big, multinational
players within the IT industry, the subsidiaries of the acquired firm are coded as
subsidiaries of the new owner starting the year of (or, if the sources do not reflect the
change until the following year, the year after) the acquisition. However, if one of the firms
tracked in the dataset acquires a company belonging to a different industry, the
subsidiaries gained in this acquisition are ignored, consistent with the approach to multiindustry firms described above.
This dataset of subsidiary locations represents the stakeholder status of 25 of the
largest IT MNCs in each of the OECD countries. If a firm has a subsidiary in a given
country, it will be impacted by policy changes within that country. If it is impacted by
these policy changes, it has an incentive to try and influence them. While physical presence
is a straightforward criterion for establishing whether a company has a stake in policy
outcomes, the biggest weakness of these data is that they cannot shed light on the size of
that stake. Such a measure could theoretically be approximated by looking at the number
of physical locations a company has in a given country or the amount of business a
company does in that country, but this information is simply unavailable for most
companies throughout the time period covered.
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That said, all of the companies included are massive, powerful enterprises with
operations all over the world, so a binary proxy for stakeholder status can still has the
potential to reveal important information. For example, the fact that these companies have
locations in so many different countries, including those with relatively high wage rates
and tax requirements, suggests that market access is a significant determinant in locational
decision making. Furthermore, the sheer size and economic power of these firms guarantees
that they have the means to continue exerting influence on government actors even after
the locational decision has been made.
Even with all of these difficulties in mind, the dataset described here represent an
entirely new approach to understanding the way MNCs function in global politics. Past
work is primarily limited to comparing companies within a single country or comparing
subsidies of one company across a couple of countries. The emphasis, therefore, has been
largely on operational differences. Particularly with such low numbers for comparison,
similarities in behavior do not stand out. But this ignores the structure of the
contemporary multinational firm, which spreads out like a network across host countries,
expanding geographically without losing the fundamental, financial and organizational
links to firm headquarters. While subsidiaries must have some level of independence, the
needs of the firm overall cannot be ignored.
These data represent a first attempt at mapping out the changing network
structure of multinational firms over time. It focuses, as is consistent with the theory
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presented in Chapter 3, on a narrow subset of MNCs, specifically the largest, most global
firms in the information technology industry. Many of these firms are known to be highly
politically active, and the increasing importance of the computer industry suggests that
these data, beyond representing a new way of looking at MNCs, are themselves likely to
be a useful contribution as we continue to study trade, intellectual property, cybersecurity,
and more.

Taking Space into Account
Chapter 3 proposes a way of looking at multinational firms as policy diffusers. As
actors with interests in multiple polities, MNCs are likely to pursue similar policy reforms
in at least some of their various locales. Though the decision to pursue a policy reform is
naturally contingent on a number of factors that will vary by subsidiary—size and purpose
of the subsidiary, for instance, but also the institutional and economic environment of its
host—the overall impact will be a pattern of policy change that is associated with the
geographic shape of the firm’s multinational network. The idea that a private actor could
have political influence in multiple countries is simple enough. Modeling that influence,
however, becomes more complicated. Here, the spatial regression technique is introduced.
This section discusses its advantages and limitations and assesses how well the spatial
regression model lines up with the theory of this project.
The purpose of spatial regression is to model spatial interdependence. The word
“interdependence” refers to circumstances in which the behavior of one actor is at least
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partly predicated upon the behavior of another, separate actor. Thus, while the two actors
exist as distinct units, each with its own fully-formed decision-making capacity, the
decisions themselves are not fully independent. The “spatial” component of spatial
interdependence simply describes the nature (the direction and/or the strength) of the
interdependent relationship. Perhaps the simplest way to conceptualize this relationship is
in terms of physical, geographic space. Two gas stations located across the street from one
another are more likely to have the same price for gas than two gas stations located a mile
apart, for example, and the two located a mile apart will likely have a more similar price
than two located 100 miles apart. Their proximity determines the extent to which they
must consider the other’s price before setting their own. If a researcher were to attempt
to model gas prices by station, he or she would miss part of the story by excluding
information on the distance between the gas stations in the sample. Not only would this
reduce the quality of the overall model, it would increase the risk of omitted variable bias.
There are two standard ways of transforming a standard linear regression model
(OLS) into a spatial linear regression model (S-OLS). In form, they resemble the same
transformations we see in time-series analysis, where lagged elements are built into the
models to link past observations with present ones. Spatial models, rather than linking
observations by lagged units of time, link them by lagged units of space. What this means
in practice is entirely dependent on how space is defined within the model, a decision
discussed in more detail below. The first way to build a spatial regression model involves
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estimating spatially lagged errors (analogous to the error correction model in time series
analysis). This is meant to correct for spatial interdependence among the independent
variables. The second way to build a spatial regression model, which is also the method
used in the following chapters, is to include a spatially autoregressive term (i.e. spatially
lagged dependent variable). This version is analogous to the autoregressive time-series
model. It allows the researcher not only to correct for spatial interdependence but also to
try and measure it. Because the central hypotheses revolve around networks of intra-firm
connectivity and their political impacts, it is crucial that the testing strategy be able to
estimate the interdependence inherent in the relationships posited. For this reason, the
analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 employ the second kind spatial regression model described
above, adding a spatially lagged version of the dependent variable to the right side of the
equation. Franzese and Hays (2007) formalize the spatially lagged dependent variable
model in the following way:

𝐲 = ρ𝐖𝐲 + 𝐗𝛃 + 𝛆
In this model, y appears on both the left-hand and right-hand sides of the equation.
On the left-hand side, y is an NT * 1 matrix of particular instances of the dependent
variable, but on the right-hand side, where it is combined with the matrix W to form an
explanatory term, it represents the sum of all the other instances of the dependent variable
during the corresponding time period. Before these spatially lagged instances of the
dependent variable are summed, they are weighted by W, an NT * NT matrix containing
131

Chapter 4: Tracking Policies and Corporations
the distances between each pair of observations at each time period.
The example matrix Wt shown below illustrates how the weights might look in
time period t. The diagonal is represented by weights of 0 to ensure that country 1 is never
influencing itself. The product of Wt and yt give an N * 1 matrix, Wyt, representing the
sums of the weights influencing each country in year t. The real weights matrix covers all
countries in all time periods, but this single-year model provides a good visualization of
how the total weights are calculated.
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The data on skill-selective immigration policies described earlier in this chapter
provide the dependent variable, and the relationships between countries are expressed
using weights built out of the MNC subsidiary location data. But the construction of the
weighting matrix is not so straightforward. The first step is to establish a method for
turning these data into a measure of distance. When using spatial regression to incorporate
physical, geographical distance between countries, scholars often select some point (the
center or the capital city) in each country and calculate the Euclidean distance between
the two points. The MNC data introduced in this chapter, which record the presence or
absence of a subsidiary for each of 25 companies in each OECD country from 1989-2017,
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do not offer up a logical center. Because there are 25 separate companies that could
possibly create linkages between countries, there are too many dimensions to imagine space
in terms of Euclidian distance. However, some studies using geographic space choose to
measure linkages in terms of contiguity, instead. If two countries share a border, they are
linked. Franzese and Hays (2007) discuss the idea of comembership, saying:
[D]iffusion might alternatively occur via contiguity (borders), leaderemulation, cultural-connection, or other mechanisms. Here, outcomes from
some unit or set of units {j}, but not the outcomes from other units, would
be expected to diffuse to the outcome in i. This implies that the weights
are (n{j} - 1)-1 for those ij where i and j both belong to some group (e.g.,
share a border, language, or membership in an institution or any other
group) and 0 for all others. Call this class of interdependence patterns
comembership. (p. 144)
The MNC subsidiary data can be thought of in these comembership terms (where
two countries that both host subsidiaries of the same company are comembers in that
company’s network), but in a multidimensional space. It is possible, after all, for two
countries to host many of the same companies. The strength of the relationship is therefore
measured as a count. Each weight wij in the weighting matrix is given by the number of
companies with subsidiaries in both i and j. As the countries in this analysis are comembers
in hosting companies, this relationship is referred to in this project as cohosting. Figure
4.10 below displays a panel of graphs that describe the cohosting relationship between each
country in the data and four that have been selected for the purpose of visualization. While
it is clear from these graphs that certain cohosting relationships are stronger than others
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throughout the entire period, there is a good deal of variation in the cohosting measure
both over time and across partner countries.
Spatial regression analysis may also be prone to certain modeling problems.
Franzese and Hays (2007) write that S-OLS suffers from simultaneity bias due to the
endogeneity that exists by definition in the Wy term. That is, the interdependence in
behavior between two states will experience some level of feedback, where policy changes
in Australia may bring about policy changes in France, where policy changes may again
increase the likelihood of policy changes in Australia. However, the authors find that
simultaneity bias is “mild over a small-to-moderate interdependence range (ρ < .3) or so”
(Franzese and Hays 2007, p. 156). The coefficients of interdependence estimated in the
following chapter are quite small, so S-OLS should be appropriate in this case.
Another potential concern arises because the model specification places a lagged
dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation. Aklin (2015) says this is only
effective if serial correlation isn’t a problem. Because the dependent variable records
changes to policies rather than an overall level of restrictiveness, there is no theoretical
reason the value of the dependent variable in the previous time period should be
uncorrelated to its value in the current time period. A statistical test confirms that there
is no correlation. Chapters 5 and 6 use spatial regression to test the data introduced in
this chapter for evidence of interdependence in skill-selective policy liberalization.
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Chapter 5

Testing for Spatial Interdependence
This project introduces an empirical puzzle around the proliferation of skillselective immigration policies—how can we explain the recent and widespread proliferation
of these policies in the context of broad, anti-immigration sentiment? Chapter 3 lays out
a theory of multinational information technology firms as potential agents for the
international diffusion of such policies, and Chapter 4 describes two original datasets which
show how ubiquitous skill-selection in immigration policy has become and illustrate the
patterns of geographical expansion pursued by technology MNCs. In this chapter, these
elements are brought together, using the data described in Chapter 4 to test the empirical
implications outlined in Chapter 3.
The central hypothesis from Chapter 3 is that a permissive change in Country A
will increase the likelihood of a permissive change in Country B, and that this relationship
will be conditioned by MNC influence. Thus, a permissive change in a Country A must be
weighted in terms of MNCs’ potential to engage in policy transfer between Countries A
and B. The results discussed in this chapter exhibit strong evidence in support of this
relationship. These findings do not mean that MNC subsidiary networks are the only
factors affecting the liberalization of skill-selective policies, but the evidence shown in this
chapter suggests that ignoring them would mean excluding a crucial piece of the puzzle.
Further tests assess the interactive effects between MNC network connections and
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institutional and ideological characteristics of domestic environments. Findings from these
tests demonstrate that a right-leaning government ideology positively conditions skillselective immigration policy interdependence through the MNC-network pathway, but the
results do not support the hypothesis that the electoral system plays a similar role. The
transnational network structure of MNCs requires a testing strategy that has the ability
to capture interdependent outcomes. Therefore, the following tests utilize a spatial
regression technique to express the cross-border relationships inherent within a firm.
Though much of this chapter is devoted to exploring the models themselves, it
begins with a brief review of the most important points of the theory and hypotheses
explored in depth in Chapter 3. The next section introduces the spatial regression models,
beginning with a basic form and moving toward more complex specifications to validate
the robustness of the results. In each case, the findings are discussed in terms of the
hypotheses. The robust evidence provided in this chapter for the involvement of MNCnetworks in the recent wave of skill-selective immigration policy liberalizations opens up
an exciting new research direction for scholars of immigration and policy diffusion alike.

Expanding Firms, Expanding Influence
In Chapter 3, policymakers are described in terms of a central issue they face—
satisfying constituents that position themselves on opposite sides of an issue. However, the
theory allows for the possibility that well-organized interests within constituencies
anticipate or observe this dilemma and respond by asking for narrower, less politically
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contentious outcomes. That is, by reducing the scope of the sought-after policy reform,
they effectively shrink the number of people who are directly impacted (or who perceive
themselves as directly impacted), thereby decreasing the strength of the opposition46. At
some point, the sought-after policy reform becomes narrow enough to make it politically
viable for the policymaker to pass. In other words, the support he or she gains from the
pro-reform interest group outweighs the loss of support he or she incurs on the anti-reform
side.
It is within this context that this project proposes an explanation for the increased
use of skill-selective immigration policies in countries all across the OECD. The rise in the
political salience of immigration since at least the 1970s (see Grande, Schwarzbözl & Fatke
2018 for a good illustration of this) has made immigration-friendly policy reforms all but
impossible. Restrictions on immigration have emerged in many countries, and even those
that have resisted such changes have seen anti-immigration movements grow up within
their polities. Particularly in such an environment, interest groups that seek to expand
access for migrants have an incentive to narrow the scope of their requests. While not all
employers engage in significant recruiting abroad, those who do are unlikely to be pleased
by the squeezing of migrant entry channels.

46

Findings from a 2013 paper by Malhotra, Margalit and Mo support this expectation, showing
that attitudes toward H-1B visas (the main U.S. temporary work visa for skilled migrants) only
show evidence of labor market competition concerns when respondents are limited to the hightechnology sector. Because most people do not feel directly impacted by the immigrants who receive
these visas, this effect is “generally not detected in aggregate analyses” (p. 1).
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Chapter 3 notes that industries with low professional protections—such as
agriculture, maintenance and food service, and industries that don’t require licensing like
the information technology industry—are the most likely employers of migrant workers.
Within this subset of occupations, however, there is variation in the kind of labor different
employers seek. Employers looking for food service workers are interested in people who
are willing to accept low levels of pay and irregular hours. Employers looking for computer
experts, on other hand, are also interested in workers with particular experience or skillsets.
Emphasizing the employee characteristics they seek, they can separate themselves from
other industries demanding access to foreign labor by specifically demanding access to
highly skilled foreign labor. This has the effect of narrowing the scope of their sought-after
policy reforms.
This story, while impactful enough in terms of interest group strategy and domestic
political outcomes, becomes more important when it plays out on the global stage.
Ultimately, this is what distinguishes this project’s treatment of firm-level behavior from
past theories of interest-group politics. Multinational firms, besides being larger and more
politically engaged than domestic firms, are different in one very important way. An
MNC’s organizational structure, which is by its very nature transnational, requires that it
consider the resources, restrictions, and policies of all its subsidiaries’ various hosts within
the strategic planning of the firm as a whole.
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Putting Together a Base Model
The theory advanced in this project is rooted in the idea that multinational
information technology firms act as agents of policy transfer between states, using their
transnational network structure and subsidiary influence in host-country politics to
propagate firm-level goals on a global scale. As laid out in Chapter 3, these firms are some
of the central beneficiaries of skill-selective immigration policies and have demonstrated
commitment to engaging in non-market strategies of corporate political influence. The
central hypothesis tested in this chapter is therefore that the diffusion of skill-selective
immigration policies can be linked to the physical locations of IT MNC subsidiaries over
time—a policy liberalization in one country will increase the likelihood of liberalizations in
other countries contingent upon the number of IT MNC firms they cohost. Further
hypotheses tested in the following section posit that this influence of MNCs is likely to be
conditioned by factors that vary at the level of the host country. Two such factors are
most likely to impact policy change.
The first is government ideology. The choice to go after skill-selective policies in
particular is, as argued in Chapter 3, the result of a compromise firms propose to
policymakers, a compromise with the purpose of removing restrictions to foreign labor
without activating anti-immigrant backlash. Policymakers who rely more heavily on the
support of anti-immigrant voters are more likely to have their hands tied by the
Policymaker’s Dilemma laid out in Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.2). Unless they can reform
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immigration policy without betraying the base that elected them, they have no way to
respond to employers’ demands for foreign labor. For this reason, the second hypothesis
proposes that right-leaning governments are more likely to be responsive to the skillselective compromise advanced by multinational firms, so the interaction between a rightwing government and the MNC-cohosting weighted measure of policy liberalization abroad
should be positively correlated with policy liberalization at home.
The other factor that may condition the impact of MNC influence on immigration
policy is the electoral system. The relationship theorized in Chapter 3 is that policymakers
operating in a first-past-the-post

47

electoral system will be more receptive to the skill-

selective compromise proposed by multinational firms. First-past-the-post voting is
associated with a higher level of seat-vote elasticity due to its single-member district
design. The competitive nature of single-member districts opens up an incentive for
policymakers to invest in higher levels of campaigning, a strategy that requires more
extensive funding. Therefore, candidates must be willing to take small risks in order to
maintain the loyalty of the special interest groups operating in their geographic sphere,
making them good targets for special-interest-promoting compromises. Thus, the
interaction between a plurality voting and the MNC-cohosting weighted measure of policy
liberalization abroad should be positively correlated with policy liberalization at home.

47

This categorization of electoral systems includes both plurality and majoritarian voting.
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All three of the hypotheses outlined above refer to the same dependent variable—
liberalizations of skill-selective immigration policies. The data described in Chapter 4 do
not classify policy changes as permissive or restrictive overall, but rather sort out the
permissive and restrictive dimensions they contain. Each change is coded in terms of two
categories of instruments—Criteria and Red Tape—that capture separate dimensions of
policy design (see Chapter 4 for further discussion of these dimensions). To test the
hypotheses described above, which specifically posit liberalizations to policy, a combined
variable of positive changes is used. This indicator is coded as 1 whenever Criteria is
liberalized, regardless of Red Tape, but is also coded as 1 whenever Red Tape is liberalized,
regardless of criteria. It is coded as 0 when neither Criteria nor Red Tape have been
liberalized.
With regard to the central hypothesis, which posits MNCs as the agents of skillselective policy diffusion, the primary independent variable is the weighted liberalization
of skill-selective immigration policy abroad. If these two countries host none of the same
companies, we should not expect their policy liberalizations to be interdependent. On the
other hand, the more companies they share, or cohost, the wider the channel of potential
policy transfer becomes. Therefore, while the primary independent variable is
operationalized using data on liberal changes to skill-selective immigration policy in other
countries (1 for country-years with liberalizations, a 0 otherwise), each of these
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observations is multiplied by a dyadic matrix48 of cohosting relationships (simply the
number of firms cohosted by each pair in each year). In the models, this central
independent variable is labeled MNC-Cohost to represent other countries’ liberalizations
weighted by the cohosting connections.
The primary independent variables for the second and third hypotheses are
operationalized by interacting MNC-Cohost with data obtained from an external dataset,
49

the Database of Political Institutions

(DPI). For the government ideology hypothesis,

which posits that right-leaning governments are more likely to take up the skill-selective
compromise, the DPI’s variable for the ideology of the largest party in the legislature is
utilized. If the largest party is right-leaning, this variable is coded as 1, if not, 0. The
ideology of the legislature, rather than the ideology of the executive, is used for two
reasons. First, legislators are policymakers in the truest sense—their primary task is the
drafting and passage of law. Second, because they tend to be held accountable for the
actions of the body as a whole, legislators are more likely to be interested in the way
specific issues impact their constituents. For the electoral system hypothesis, the models

48

This matrix is then flattened so that each country-year observation has a single value of MNCcohosting policy pressure assigned to it. This value is the sum of all of that country’s dyadic
cohosting values, each of which has been multiplied by either 0 or 1 depending on whether a policy
liberalization occurred in the partner country in that year.
49
Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer and Carlos Scartascini (2016). "Database of Political Institutions
Codebook, 2015 Update (DPI2015)." Inter-American Development Bank. Updated version of
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. "New tools
in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions."
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employ the DPI’s dummy for plurality voting, which is coded as 1 for any first-past-thepost system and 0 otherwise.
The results from the base models are depicted by the coefficient plots in Figures
5.1 and 5.2 below. The model itself is a spatial ordinary least squares (S-OLS) regression
(described in more detail in Chapter 4). Because the dependent variable is binary, the SOLS specification becomes a linear probability model (LPM), wherein the coefficients on
the explanatory variables represent changes to the probability that the dependent variable
is equal to one.
The first term in the models, MNC-Cohost, represents the effect of a spatially
lagged, weighted measure of policy change—partner country-year liberalizations of skillselective immigration policy weighted dyadically by the number of MNCs they cohost.
This variable is scaled throughout the analyses in this chapter and Chapter 6 to make it
easier to interpret, meaning that it has been centered around a mean of zero and divided
by its standard deviation. Therefore, the coefficient for MNC-Cohost shown in the figures
below represent the effect of a one-standard deviation change in the MNC-Cohost
variable50. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that, consistent with the central hypothesis, this term
is positive and significant, providing initial evidence that the network of multinational

50

This values for this variable range from 0 to 302. The standard deviation is 52.76. Because the
MNC-Cohost variable is scaled, its coefficient represents the effect of a one-standard deviation
change in the value of the variable. This sounds large, but because of the way the variable is
constructed, a policy liberalization in a country that cohosts 15 IT MNCs with the home country
can single-handedly increase the value of MNC-Cohost by 15 in that year.
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information technology firms may act as agents of policy diffusion.
Figure 5.2 shows a second OLS coefficient plot that includes the interaction terms
between the MNC-Cohost variable and the indicators for a right-leaning government and
plurality electoral system. These interaction terms are used to evaluate the second and
third hypotheses. While there does appear to be evidence that a right-leaning government
has a positive conditioning effect on the diffusion of skill-selective immigration policies
through MNC networks, the interaction term MNC-Cohost * Plurality is neither
statistically significant nor consistent with the direction of the proposed relationship. Thus,
while these base models support the first and second hypotheses, the third hypothesis is
not born out by this specification.
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Figures 5.3 and 5.4 plot the marginal effects of the interaction terms shown in
Figure 5.2. This is important to look at because, while the indicators for government
ideology and the type of electoral system are constructed as dummy variables, the primary
independent variable (weighted changes to skill-selective policies in other countries) is a
continuous variable. It may be that government ideology or the electoral system impact
policy liberalization differently at different levels of this cohosting relationship, a dynamic
that cannot be captured by a single regression coefficient. A marginal effects plot shows
the estimated effects across the full range of the interaction. Again, the primary
independent variable (MNC-Cohost) has been scaled so that the mean is 0 and the
standard deviation is 1.
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In Figure 5.3, the marginal effect of MNC-Cohost on skill-selective policy
liberalization for observations with a right-leaning government is contrasted with the effect
of this variable for observations without a right-leaning government. The plot confirms
the aggregate results of the regression; MNC-Cohost is positive and significant across the
board and regardless of the ideology of the government. However, we do see that the

additional, marginal impact of a right-leaning government is only distinguishable starting
just above the mean level of MNC-Cohost (which is 0). This suggests that at very low
levels of connectivity, the impact of policy change abroad is not conditioned by government
ideology. This lines up well with the hypothesized relationship between government
ideology and the impact of cohosting on skill-selective policy liberalization.
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Figure 5.4 also depicts the marginal effect of MNC-Cohost on skill-selective policy
liberalization, but in this case the plot contrasts observations from plurality electoral
systems with observations with non-plurality-based electoral rules. In the regression results
from the base model, we noted that there was no significant added effect of a plurality
electoral system at a given level of MNC-Cohost. The marginal effects plot depicted in
Figure 5.4 confirms this result, showing that the slopes on the different electoral systems
actually converge as the cohosting relationship grows stronger. The only part of the plot
that shows a statistically distinguishable difference between plurality and non-plurality

systems is when the value of MNC-Cohost is below the mean, where there is a very weak
level of foreign pressure by way of the cohosting networks.
Overall, the evidence from the base models is consistent with the hypotheses
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regarding MNC networks and government ideology, but it does not support the
conditioning impact of plurality-based elections. Yet the base models are purely that—a
starting point from which to conduct additional tests of the findings’ robustness. The
remaining sections of this chapter present models with economic and institutional controls,
relax the temporal assumptions inherent in these models, and employ placebo tests to
strengthen confidence in the results. The findings are largely stable across these additional
checks.

Economic and Institutional Controls
Changes to immigration policies are often connected to macroeconomic conditions
and political institutional variation between countries. Incorporating some of these factors
into the model helps reduce the likelihood that omitted variable bias is impacting the
results. The economic controls include trade volume, inward FDI flows, a measure of GDP
and a measure of GDP per capita. These were selected in order to capture the general
state of the macroeconomy, particularly as it pertains to multinational actors. All of these
were obtained using the World Development Indicators (WDI) data compiled by the World
Bank51. The institutional controls include a regime type indicator (parliamentary or not)
and an indicator of federalism, both of which come from the Database of Political

51

The World Bank. (2012). World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank
(producer and distributor). http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators
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Institutions (DPI)52. These elements have been found in other studies to contribute to
foreign direct investment decisions (Jensen, 2006) because of the way that the impact the
translation of domestic interests into state policies. The centrality of interest group politics
in the formation of immigration policy suggests these variables may be important here as
well. The institutional controls also include a measure of veto points, obtained from the
Political Constraint Index Dataset53, and a dummy for EU membership based on the years
the countries in the datasets joined the European Union. Table 5.1 presents summary
statistics for this set of economic and institutional controls.

Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Control Variables
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

Trade

83.99

16.01

410.17

50.45

67

Inward FDI

4.30

-58.32

252.31

11.41

104

Log GDP

26.32

22.20

30.56

1.64

66

Log GDP p/c

10.12

8.18

11.63

0.77

69

Gov Right

0.45

0

1

0.49

217

Plurality

0.49

0

1

0.50

126

EU Member

0.52

0

1

0.50

8

Parliamentary

0.81

0

1

0.39

117

Veto Points

0.75

0

0.89

0.15

81

Federalism

0.83

0

1

0.38

215

52

Stand. Dev. Missing

Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer and Carlos Scartascini (2016). "Database of Political Institutions
Codebook, 2015 Update (DPI2015)." Inter-American Development Bank. Updated version of
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. "New tools
in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions."
53
Henisz, W. J. (2000). "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth." Economics and
Politics 12(1): 1-31.
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Table 5.2 provides the results from three models. Again, the models are S-OLS
models with a binary dependent variable, skill-selective policy liberalization, so the
coefficients represent the effects of the regressors on the probability that the outcome is
equal to one. The first includes only economic controls, the second only institutional
controls, and the third incorporates the full battery of control variables. The models are
divided in this way because of the modeling issues associated with the use of fixed effects.
All three models, include year-fixed effects, ensuring that an overall time trend does not
bias the coefficients of the other variables. The first model in Table 5.2, also includes
country-fixed effects. This is the most thorough way to ensure that observations from the
same country in different years are not treated as independent. However, many of the
institutional controls in the second and third models experience little or no variation within
countries over the period studied. To get reasonable estimates for these variables, the
country-fixed effects must be dropped whenever the institutional controls are included.
The models in Table 5.2 test the first hypothesis, which focuses on the impact of
MNC networks on the diffusion of skill-selective liberalizations. The variables of greatest
interest to the theory are highlighted in blue. The primary independent variable, MNCCohost—which represents the policy changes in foreign countries weighted by the strength
of the cohosting relationships—is directionally consistent with the first hypothesis across
all three models and is statistically significant in the second and third models. Gov Right,
which is an indicator for a right-leaning legislature, and Plurality, which is an indicator
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Table 5.2: Modeling Liberal Change to Skill-Selective Policies
Economic Controls Institutional Controls All Controls
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.456

0.050°
(0.030)
**
0.095
(0.033)
*
-0.085
(0.033)
0.079°
(0.046)
*
0.283
(0.130)
0.049
(0.040)
-0.149

0.044*
(0.020)
-0.0001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.025
(0.018)
0.096**
(0.034)
0.064*
(0.032)
**
0.121
(0.038)
*
-0.082
(0.037)
0.004
(0.054)
0.160
(0.165)
°
0.075
(0.045)
-0.355

(1.720)

(0.121)

(0.399)

Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R2

YES
YES
969
0.186

NO
YES
747
0.176

NO
YES
712
0.179

Adjusted R2

0.124

0.138

0.134

MNC-Cohost
Trade
FDI Inflow
Log GDP
Log GDP p/c

*

0.022
(0.018)
0.0002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.123
(0.104)
0.322
(0.205)

0.047
(0.018)

Gov Right
Plurality
EU Member
Parliamentary
Veto Points
Federalism
Constant

°p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01

Note:

for a plurality electoral system, are also both positive and significant in the models in
suggesting that these variables represent political or institutional factors conducive to skill152
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selective policy change. Without the interaction terms, however, their relevance to the
second and third hypotheses cannot be evaluated.
The models in Table 5.3, therefore, incorporate the interaction terms. Table 5.3
excludes the purely economic model because both interactions make use of institutional
variables. Otherwise, Table 5.3 is structured in much the same way as Table 5.2, showing
first the institutional control model, and then a model incorporating both economic and
institutional controls. Again, the relevant variables have been highlighted to make the
table easier to read. Consistent with the results obtained in the base interaction model
(see Figure 5.2 above), the interaction between the MNC-Cohost variable and the indicator
for a right-leaning government is positive, stable between models, and statistically
significant, providing further evidence that the skill-selective compromise advocated by
MNCs is more attractive to right-leaning governments. However, the second interaction
term also confirms the findings in the base model, suggesting that a plurality electoral
system, despite its tendency to divide constituencies into two camps, does not necessarily
provide special interests with the power to define the terms of compromise.
It should be noted that including the interaction term splits the effects of the
primary variable of interest, meaning that the coefficient on the non-interactive MNCCohost term only represents cases where both Gov Right and Plurality are equal to zero.
The fact that this term is not significant in these models should not be interpreted to mean
that the effect of MNC-Cohost is no longer relevant.
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Table 5.3: Modeling Liberal Change to Skill-Selective Policies

MNC-Cohost
Gov Right
Plurality
MNC-Cohost * Gov Right
MNC-Cohost * Plurality

Institutional Controls
(1)
0.036
(0.031)
0.045
(0.030)
0.096**
(0.033)
0.077*
(0.030)
-0.048
(0.031)

Trade
FDI Inflow
Log GDP
Log GDP p/c
EU Member
Parliamentary
Veto Points
Federalism
Constant
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Note:

-0.090**
(0.033)
0.082°
(0.046)
0.313*
(0.130)
0.056
(0.040)
-0.174
(0.120)
NO
YES
747
0.186
0.146
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All Controls
(2)
0.032
(0.033)
0.056°
(0.032)
0.120**
(0.038)
0.070*
(0.032)
-0.040
(0.033)
-0.0002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.024
(0.018)
0.091**
(0.034)
-0.084*
(0.038)
0.008
(0.054)
0.176
(0.164)
0.078°
(0.045)
-0.338
(0.398)
NO
YES
712
0.187
0.140
°p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01
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Time-Lagged Effects
Though the models shown up until this point have all used a contemporaneous
policy changes in the rest of the OECD to represent moments of increased pressure for
skill-selective policy change in a given country, there is no theoretical reason why this
assumption should be so rigid. A change in the weighted, spatially lagged measure of skillselective policy liberalization that serves as the main independent variable may have a
delayed impact on the dependent variable for a handful of reasons.
First, policymaking itself can be a slow process. In the U.S. Congress (which may,
admittedly, be one of the slower legislative systems in the sample) a new bill must be
sponsored by a congressperson, researched and approved by the relevant committee,
debated by the chamber, voted on, taken up by the other chamber, debated, voted on,
reconciled in conference, and assuming all of that goes smoothly, it must still be approved
by the president. Lack of sufficient support at any of these stages can delay or even
terminate the process. Second, before the institutionally designed obstacles can even be
confronted, interested actors must convince policymakers to use their limited social and
political capital to pursue the policy reform at all. Actors with pre-established government
affairs capabilities have an advantage here, but the business of lobbying is still one of
deliberative network building and iterative negotiations. Third, IT MNCs are included in
the weighting formula as soon as they give notice that they have begun operations in a
given country, but their first years in a new political environment are unlikely to be
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particularly politically lucrative. The establishment of a government affairs function itself
may take time, meaning that delays in the impacts of the main independent variable could
be expected to come from both the policy-influence and policy-process stages.
In addition to these mechanism-driven delays that can be imagined but remain
virtually impossible to observe, there is also a major issue on the operationalization side.
The unit of observation in the datasets is given by the country-year, meaning that the
data cannot specify whether an event (say a policy reform or the market entry of an MNC)
occurred at the start, middle, or end of a given year. Therefore, even weakly theoreticallydriven estimations of how long we might expect a policy in one country to have some
impact on policy in other countries will be suffer from noise induced by a relatively coarsegrained measurement of time.
To best deal with this, the models shown above are built using the simplest possible
expectation about policy interdependence—that some part of the effect will be observable
within a single time period. The models thus use MNC-weighted policy liberalizations that
happen in time t to look for influence on domestic policy changes in time t. However,
confidence in the above results can be improved by ensuring that the model estimates are
not dependent on this choice. Looking at several alterative specifications of the temporal
element of this relationship makes this possible. Traditional time lags are inappropriate in
this case because the main independent variable represents a weighted change rather than
a level. There is no reason why a country that made a policy change last year would be
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more or less likely to make one this year, so time lags, which were designed to deal with
autocorrelation, are not particularly helpful in this case. Instead, the models in Table 5.4
employ a moving average to capture the effects of weighted policy liberalizations over the
course of a time period that exceeds one year. For example, a two-year simple moving
average (SMA) calculates the unweighted average of the independent variable (MNCCohost) in t and t-1. A three-year SMA does the same for the current and previous two
periods.
A comparison of these models provides a chance to evaluate how robust the results
are to the specification of the temporal relationship. Table 5.4 shows results for five models.
The first model in Table 5.4 is the same as the model with both economic and institutional
controls shown in Table 5.2. It uses only a contemporaneous measure of foreign policy
change to calculate the independent variable. All of the same economic and institutional
controls have been included in this model as well, though they are not displayed in the
table for the sake of simplicity. The remaining four models in Table 5.4 show versions of
the original model that have been recalculated using simple moving averages going from
two through five years. The coefficient estimates predicted by these alternative
specifications are quite robust, showing that the relationship between the weighted policy
liberalizations abroad and the policy liberalizations people see at home remains positive
even when we account for a delayed impact of several years.
While it appears at first glance as though the three- and four-year SMAs may do
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the best job of capturing the interdependence in policy change, it is not necessarily true
that these coefficients are statistically larger than those estimated by the other models.
Unfortunately, the coefficients on the variants of MNC-Cohost shown in Table 5.4 cannot

Table 5.4: Simple Moving Average Models

MNC-Cohost

Original
Model

2-Year
SMA

3-Year
SMA

4-Year
SMA

5-Year
SMA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

*

0.044
(0.020)
*

MNC-Cohost (2-yr avg)

0.053
(0.024)
**

MNC-Cohost (3-yr avg)

0.093
(0.030)
**

MNC-Cohost (4-yr avg)

0.088
(0.033)

MNC-Cohost (5-yr avg)

0.068°
(0.035)
0.096
0.053
-0.042
(0.110)
(0.115)
(0.116)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
667
642
616
0.184
0.178
0.172
0.139
0.132
0.125
°p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Constant
Economic Controls
Institutional Controls
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R2
2
Adjusted R
Note:

0.078
(0.107)
YES
YES
NO
YES
712
0.179
0.134

-0.040
(0.107)
YES
YES
NO
YES
690
0.180
0.134

be directly compared because the use of lagged data in calculating the SMAs results in
lost observations in the earliest years of the sample. Thus, the sample size shrinks a little
bit as the window of the moving average grows, resulting in a different variance for each
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model. However, the models shown in Table 5.4 do much to help ensure that the results
presented thus far are not dependent on assumptions regarding the temporal dynamics.
Instead, we see that the central relationship stands up to alternative temporal
specifications.

Placebo Tests
The figures and tables discussed above provide a fairly thorough examination of
how robust the findings are to model specification. This should substantially increase
confidence in the relationship between the variables. But what if the primary independent
variable ends up being nothing more than an unusually noisy proxy for the orientation of
an economy towards a global market? The simplest way to strengthen the claim that the
models shown in this chapter are actually testing the theory advanced in Chapter 3 is to
conduct placebo tests. The weights constructed for the independent variable assign a
specific multiplier to each observation of the lagged dependent variable (expanded to
represent country-country dyads) based on the strength of that dyad’s cohosting
relationship. If this weights matrix is capturing something broader about the investment
environment, or if it alternatively is likely to be spuriously correlated with any policychange-based dependent variable, it should be possible to uncover this problem with a
couple of tests.
First, as discussed in Chapter 3, the basic expectation about the immigration
preferences expressed by multinational, information technology firms is that they would
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like access to a larger supply of skilled foreign labor. The theory further proposes that
these firms carry these preferences across country borders by diffusing them to their
subsidiaries, learning from policy liberalizations in other countries and subsequently
encouraging policy reform in new host states. If, as theorized, MNCs do play the role of
agents of policy transfer, we would expect to see interdependence in liberal policy change
along the lines of MNC subsidiary networks, which are represented by the cohosting
relationship. On the other hand, we would not expect these same companies to spread
restrictive policy reforms. Though companies may pass along information about new,
restrictive immigration regulations to their subsidiaries, it would be for the purpose of
ensuring that their human resources offices are not taken by surprise. We should not expect
to see restrictions follow the networks of IT MNCs because their interest would be in
preventing such changes rather than diffusing them.
Figure 5.5 below sorts the countries in the data by total number of policy changes
enacted over the period, showing restrictive changes on the left and liberalizations on the
right. It illustrates that many of the same countries that issue frequent liberalizations for
skill-selective immigration policy dominate the skill-selective policy restriction game as
well. If the cohosting weights are capturing something more general about the propensity
of a country to legislate immigration, they should be able to capture a similar relationship
for restrictive changes as they do for permissive ones. Thus, this reversal of the dependent
variable can be used to conduct the first placebo test.
160

Chapter 5: Testing for Spatial Interdependence

Figure 5.6 shows an OLS coefficient plot of the results from this placebo test. In
this placebo model, the dependent variable consists of restrictive changes to skill-selective
immigration policies. The same, cohost-based weighting scheme is now applied to a
spatially lagged version of the new dependent variable. Otherwise, the same base model
specification shown earlier in this chapter (see Figure 5.1) is utilized. Consistent with
expectations, the cohosting weighted restriction indicator is not significant.
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Figure 5.7 shows an OLS coefficient plot of this restriction model incorporating the
interaction terms. Neither of these interactions is significant, which further confirms that
the cohosting weights are appropriately constructed. One point of interest, however, is
that the indicator for a plurality electoral system in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 shows up here as
positive and significant, much as it did in the models of policy liberalization. While any
additional speculation on this finding would be purely inductive, it may suggest that the
back-and-forth swings associated with plurality electoral systems result in a constant kind
of course correction when it comes to contentious policy issues.
A second way to ensure that the weighting system is appropriately capturing the
dynamic laid out in the theory chapter is to consider other forms of immigration
liberalization. Chapter 3 discussed the issue of the Policymaker’s Dilemma, in which
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policymakers faced with constituent factions that represent necessary resources (votes,
campaign contributions) for reelection but who cannot find compromise space on a
particular issue have an incentive not to act. If one of these factions is intent on seeing
policy movement on that issue, they have the opportunity to narrow the scope of the
desired reform, limiting its impacts until it becomes unobjectionable enough that a
compromise space is created between the two groups. In terms of immigration policy, skillselective policies can be thought of as this kind of strategically narrowed reform. Firms
requesting better access to skilled foreign labor thus leave everything else off the table,
allowing the broader issue of immigration reform to go without their added support.
From this, a second placebo test can be constructed. The weighting system is
designed to capture MNC-cohosting relationships and thereby to approximate the
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networks of political influence they represent. If MNCs have chosen to strategically focus
their efforts on skill-selective immigration policies, the same weighting system should not
be able to tell us anything about immigration policies targeting other groups. That is, we
should not expect to see MNCs spreading liberal changes to family-based immigration
policies, for example.
Figure 5.8 shows an OLS coefficient plot of the results from the second placebo
test. The dataset of changes to immigration policy introduced in Chapter 4 focuses
exclusively on skill-based targeting, so for this model the dependent variable of permissive
changes to family-based immigration policies is constructed using data from the DEMIG
Policy dataset54. Again, the weights are the same, but this time they are applied to a

54

DEMIG (2015) DEMIG POLICY, version 1.3, Online Edition. Oxford: International Migration
Institute, University of Oxford. www.migrationdeterminants.eu
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spatially lagged version of the liberalizing changes to family immigration. As before, the
weighted term is not statistically significant. The coefficient for a right-leaning government
is negative and weakly significant in this model. This is consistent with the expectation
that right-leaning policymakers face, on the whole, a greater degree of opposition to
immigration from their voter base, making them more likely to be paralyzed by the
Policymakers’ Dilemma on this issue.
The coefficient plot for the family model with interaction terms included is shown
in Figure 5.9. Neither of these interaction terms are statistically significant, confirming

that the cohosting measure is not important for explaining all liberalizations in
immigration policy, but rather becomes relevant only for skill-selective liberalizations,
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consistent with the theory55. Again, the coefficient for a right-leaning government is
negative and weakly significant56. The results of this placebo test, therefore, provide further
confirmation that the models shown in the earlier part of this chapter are appropriate tests
of the theory.

Summarizing the Findings
The primary purpose of the testing conducted in this chapter is to evaluate whether
MNC-cohosting relationships can constitute an instructive tool for understanding spatial
interdependence in skill-selective immigration policymaking. By utilizing a spatially lagged
dependent variable and a weights matrix constructed from original data on the
geographical expansion of multinational subsidiary locations, the models in this chapter
test the idea that policy changes in other countries impact policy changes at home, and
that shared status as hosts of major IT firms channel this transfer. The results from these
models provide strong evidence in favor of this idea.
Additional tests look at some possible ways in which domestic political factors may
condition the ability of MNCs to spread their policy preferences across borders.
Specifically, the models consider government ideology and the design of the electoral
system in these terms, using the logic of the Policymaker’s Dilemma (introduced in

55

The confidence bands have been constructed at the a = .05 level. The first term in the model
looks like it could be read as positive under a different confidence threshold but is not significant
at the a = .1 level.
56
Gov Right is significant at the a = .1 level.
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Chapter 3) to construct a hypothetical set of circumstances under which this sequence of
events might be most likely to unfold. The models provide evidence that government
ideology may be an important conditioning factor on the strength of the interdependent
policymaking relationship. They do not confirm that a plurality electoral system has a
similar effect. Together, these findings suggest that multinational information technology
firms may be acting as agents of international policy diffusion, at least with regard to
immigration policy.
Even with these compelling results, there are some additional questions that must
be addressed. Chapter 6 employs additional empirical tests to resolve questions regarding
outliers and alternative mechanisms. Chapter 7 turns to the case material, focusing on
crucial points in immigration policy history across a handful of countries to figure out
where skill-selection comes from and how it has spread. Together, Chapters 5-7 provide
strong and varied results that together form the basis for the central finding of this
project—to understand the emergence of skill-selective immigration policies and the
evolution of immigration policy more broadly, we must not restrict ourselves to the
standard set of domestic political determinants that have been used in the past. Instead,
we have to consider these changes in terms of the broader structural economic transition
that trudges relentlessly on. We are by no means living in a borderless world, but the
tension between would-be borderless actors and the remaining political barriers that
constrain them is crucial to understanding the international political economy today.
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Chapter 6

Outliers, Alternatives, and Policy Dimensions
The models shown in Chapter 5 provide statistical evidence supporting the claim
that MNCs act as agents of international policy diffusion with regard to skill-selective
immigration policies and that this relationship is particularly potent under right-leaning
governments. However, issues specific to the data, their distribution and leverage, and the
operationalization of variables create a need for some additional checks.
This chapter approaches that task in three different ways. The first section
discusses the potential bias introduced by outliers and poorly operationalized control
variables and assesses the results of a number of tests designed to confirm that these issues
are not driving the central results of the project. The second section of this chapter
examines two potential alternative ways in which skill-selective immigration policy
interdependence could be obtained and finds that while some limited evidence in favor of
these mechanisms exists, neither path diminishes the result in favor of MNC network
influence. Finally, the third section explores the main results of this project in terms of
policy design. The main takeaway from this assessment is that MNCs are more impactful
when it comes to criteria-based policy liberalizations as opposed to red tape cuts. Overall,
the purpose of this chapter is to develop a more comprehensive, nuanced, and well-rounded
understanding of the main results presented in Chapter 5.
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Outliers and the Operationalization of Controls
A helpful way to gain a more complete picture of a dataset and to improve
confidence in statistical findings is to conduct an analysis of how outlying data points
impact the results. First, changes to skill-selective immigration policies are not uniformly
distributed across countries. Figure 6.1 below shows a coefficient plot drawn from an OLS
regression in which the dependent variable, permissive changes to skill-selective
immigration policies, is regressed on a set of country dummies57.
What stands out is that some countries explain a larger proportion of the total variation
in the dependent variable than others, pulling the overall model farther from the intercept.
In particular, because it contributes so many of the instances of skill-selective policy change
itself, Australia is a stronger predictor than any other country. This is not a problem of
measurement or operationalization, but simply a feature of how active the Australian
government has been on the issue of immigration reform58. A simple way to overcome this
issue would be to include country fixed effects in the model, a strategy that has the
practical effect of running separate models for each country in the dataset. However, as
discussed in Chapter 5, employing country fixed effects limits the controls that can be
included—any controls that exhibit no variation within a country over the period covered

57

The constant has been suppressed in this model, allowing all country coefficients to be shown
and forcing the intercept to be set at zero.
58
Australia is similarly active in skill-selective policy restriction. Refer back to Figure 5.4 for a look
at restrictions and liberalizations by country.
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by the dataset will be effectively dropped from the model. As many of the institutional
controls used in this analysis are unlikely to contain a great deal of year-to-year variation,
country fixed effects become an impractical solution. Instead, the information yielded by
Figure 6.1 assists in the development of a more suitable approach. Reviewing the full model
with a dummy in place for Australia can help ensure that one country is not driving the
outcomes of interest.
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The first model in Table 6.1 below includes an Australia dummy along with the
full batter of economic and institutional controls and the added interaction terms. As one
would expect, the Australia indicator is both positive and significant, and has a notably
larger magnitude than any of the other coefficients estimated by the model, so we can see
that the inclusion of the dummy variable is successfully accounting for the outsized
variation associated with Australia in Figure 6.1. At the same time, the interaction
between MNC-Cohosting and Gov Right remains positive and significant in this model,
confirming that the prolific legislation of immigration policy in Australia is not driving the
result.
While Australia’s unbalanced representation in the sample of the policy changes
that make up the dependent variable does not appear to be causing any fatal bias, it is
also important to consider the possibility that outlying observations within the control
variables are distorting the fit of the model. Figure 6.2 shows the results of three-pronged
test used to detect outliers in regression modeling. The observations, represented in Figure
6.2 by the bubbles on the graph, are plotted on the x-axis by their hat-values (the influence
of observations on predicted outcomes) and on the y-axis by their studentized residuals
(residuals divided by their standard deviation). The size of each bubble is scaled by the
value of the observation’s Cook’s distance (effect on the model of deleting the observation).
No one of these three metrics represents a foolproof way of identifying outliers, so
it’s useful to draw upon multiple methods. Thirteen total observations, which have been
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labeled by their country code and year in Figure 6.2, were identified as potential outliers
by one or more of these methods59. Interestingly, a few countries, including Luxembourg
and Mexico, for example, appear in this short list multiple times. Whether this is because

of errors in the data or some highly irregular years in these countries, it is important to
make sure that a group of unusual observations is not driving the results. The second
model in Table 6.1 shows the full model run without the thirteen potential outliers shown

59

The cut-offs used to make this determination are as follows: Studentized residuals—outlier if
more than three standard deviations from the mean. Hat-values—outlier if larger than three times
the mean. Cook’s distance—outlier if more than two standard deviations from the mean.
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in Figure 6.2 above. As with the first model in Table 6.1, the results of the second model
show that the findings on policy interdependence and the role of right-leaning governments
are robust to the exclusion of these observations.
Beyond this issue of outliers, we should also retain some skepticism as to whether
the controls have been chosen and operationalized correctly. The economic controls
included in the models shown Chapter 5 were selected to capture broad macroeconomic
trends and the degree of international orientation reflected by a country’s economy. While
these variables have the potential to impact skill-selective immigration policy
liberalization, they are also relevant to the investment decisions of MNCs. Thus,
controlling for the level of the GDP, GDP per capita, total trade, and inward FDI help to
internalize some of these issues, improving the strength of the claim that the MNC
networks themselves—and not just the economic conditions that covary with them—are
relevant to understanding variation in policy change.
However, these economic controls are not exhaustive. It may also be important to
consider the economic factors that have the potential to create demand for skill-selective
policies entirely outside the interests of multinational firms. For this reason, the third
model in Table 6.1 includes measures of the unemployment rate and the labor force
participation rate. If skill-selective policies can be explained in terms of labor shortages,
we might expect to see more permissive policies emerge when unemployment is low (a
negative relationship) and labor force participation is high (a positive relationship). Model
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Table 6.1: Additional Checks on Skill-Selective Liberalization Models
Australia Dummy Outliers
MNC-Cohost
Gov Right

Labor Market Executive

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.034
(0.033)
0.062°
(0.031)

0.034
(0.033)
0.059°
(0.032)

0.028
(0.034)
0.058°
(0.033)

0.036
(0.034)

Exec Right
Plurality
MNC-Cohost * Gov Right

0.099*
(0.038)
0.066*
(0.031)

0.119**
(0.038)
0.067*
(0.032)

0.139**
(0.040)
0.073*
(0.033)

MNC-Cohost * Exec Right
MNC-Cohost * Plurality
Trade
FDI Inflow
Log GDP
Log GDP p/c
EU Member
Parliamentary
Veto Points
Federalism

-0.041
(0.033)
0.0001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.015
(0.018)
0.077*
(0.034)
-0.063°
(0.038)
-0.003
(0.053)
0.105
(0.164)
0.073°
(0.044)

-0.041
(0.033)
-0.0002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.024
(0.018)
0.091**
(0.034)
-0.088*
(0.038)
0.011
(0.054)
0.178
(0.165)
0.071
(0.046)

Unemployment
Labor Force Partic
Australia Dummy

0.284**
174

-0.041
(0.034)
0.0001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.013
(0.020)
0.054
(0.040)
-0.050
(0.045)
0.042
(0.057)
0.174
(0.194)
0.079°
(0.047)
0.003
(0.005)
0.009*
(0.004)

0.043
(0.033)
0.120**
(0.042)

*

0.076
(0.033)
-0.050
(0.034)
-0.0002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.028
(0.020)
0.094*
(0.036)
-0.078*
(0.040)
-0.004
(0.060)
0.225
(0.183)
0.091*
(0.046)
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Constant
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2

(0.085)
-0.396
(0.395)
NO
YES
712
0.200
0.153

-0.327
(0.399)
NO
YES
704
0.186
0.138

-0.964°
(0.525)
NO
YES
667
0.192
0.142

-0.297
(0.440)
NO
YES
669
0.182
0.131

°p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01

Note:

3 shows evidence of a positive relationship between labor force participation and skillselective policy liberalization. However, the coefficient on the unemployment variable is
neither significant nor negative, making it difficult to draw conclusions about the impact
of these labor market indicators on changes to skill-selective policy. Still, the direction and
approximate magnitude of the coefficient for the MNC-Cohost and right-leaning
government interaction term remains positive and stable. It should also be noted that the
scarcity of labor market data for some years and countries results in the loss of almost a
hundred observations in Model 3, so it may be preferable to exclude them in order to
maximize the generalizability of the model.
Finally, the fourth model in Table 6.1 constitutes a check on the choice to look at
the ideological position of largest party in the legislature to measure government ideology.
In Chapter 5 this choice is justified by considering the role of legislators as lawmakers,
arguing that the issue of pleasing both pro- and anti-immigration interests is most
problematic and salient at this level. However, it is not hard to imagine cases in which the
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real drive behind policy change comes from the executive60. To help ensure that the
operationalization of this key variable is not driving the bulk of the findings, the fourth
model in Table 6.1 uses a measure of a right-leaning executive in place of a right-leaning
legislature. This substitution shows no evidence of model dependence. The interaction
between the MNC-Cohost variable and the new measure of executive ideology is positive
and significant, making it consistent with the models using legislative ideology. However,
as is the case with Model 3, the use of a less populated variable results in the loss of a
large number of observations, so the legislator-based measure remains the preferred
operationalization choice.
The four models in Table 6.1 all produce results that are consistent with the
findings in the models shown in Chapter 5. This provides additional support for the theory
that MNCs play the role of agents of policy transfer, particularly in domestic contexts in
which right-leaning governments would be more receptive to a skill-selective compromise.

Alternative Paths to Policy Transfer
The diffusion literature opens up an important set of potential explanations for
international policy change. However, these explanations often go together. Countries that
take cues from their next-door neighbors may also feel a need to keep up with economic
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In the U.S. for example, the executive immigration orders created by Presidents Barak Obama
and Donald Trump in order to bypass Congress have received a considerable amount of attention
from the media and the public.
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competitors, for example. This has made it difficult for scholars to establish confidence in
a singular mechanism of diffusion—why should one explanatory variable be accepted when
it correlates highly with three others? A set of placebo tests (see Figures 5.6-5.9 in the
previous chapter) helped demonstrate that the main explanatory variable—skill-selective
policy liberalization abroad weighted by the strength of the IT MNC subsidiary network—
is unlikely to be spurious, but these models were not able to test the potential significance
of alternative mechanisms. To discover whether the pattern of skill-selective immigration
policy liberalization can be explained by alternative connections between states, the design
and results of two additional tests are discussed below.
The first of these tests incorporates geographic distance. There are a couple of ways
geographic distance could be playing an important role in the spread of immigration
policies. First, the importance of distance in the determination of a migrant’s destination
61

was one of the earliest scholarly insights in the study of immigration , and gravity models
continue to be employed by economists and demographers interested in push and pull
factors. Because distance impacts destination decisions, countries in close proximity to one
another are more likely to experience migrant flows from the same places, subjecting them
to a common set of experiences. States that experience the same phenomena should be
more likely to institute control measures. This is not, in and of itself, a diffusion story.
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Ravenstein’s first law in his famous work, “On the Laws of Migration”, published in 1885, noted
that the vast majority of migrants “only proceed a short distance” (p. 198).
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But states that experience the same phenomena may also be more likely to emulate one
another’s responses, borrowing a policy mechanism from a neighbor rather than going
through the trouble of instituting a new one itself. Closer proximity between the two states
may also raise the likelihood that policymakers become informed of policy changes made
by a neighboring government due to dynamics like cross-border social interactions,
economic activity, and media spillover, to name a few (Linos 2013).
Based on this logic, Figure 6.3 below shows the results of a model that incorporates
a geographically weighted independent variable, using the inverse of the logged geographic
62

distance

between two countries to represent their spatial connectivity. The use of an

inverse measure of distance makes the explanatory variable consistent with a hypothesis
based on proximity, so that we should expect a positive relationship between policy
liberalizations in nearby states and policy liberalizations at home. The results shown in
Figure 6.3 are not consistent with the proximity hypothesis. The coefficient for proximity
is both negative and not significant, suggesting that geographic distance is not a helpful
predictor of skill-selective policy diffusion.
As noted above, one mechanism of policy diffusion does not preclude another.
Fortunately, the spatial regression technique can be expanded to include multiple matrices
of connectivity simultaneously (Beck, Gleditsch, Beardsley 2006). This enables the MNC-
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Measures of geographic distances obtained from the Centre d'Études Prospectives et
d'Informations Internationales’ (CEPII) GeoDist database. See Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011)
Notes on CEPII’s distances measures: the GeoDist Database CEPII Working Paper 2011-25.
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cohosting explanatory variable to be included in the same model to provide a point of
comparison and to serve as a check that one measure of connectivity is not by proxy
capturing some of the effects of another. As the first coefficient in Figure 6.3 shows, the
measure of the MNC-cohosting relationship is still significant and directionally consistent
with expectations about the role of IT MNCs as agents of policy diffusion. Furthermore,

the positive coefficient on the interaction between MNC-cohosting and a right-leaning
government is also robust to the inclusion of the proximity measure.
The second alternative pathway for diffusion tested in this section makes use of
bilateral trade relationships. In existing work, scholars have incorporated trade to explain
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the diffusion of other policies using varying logics, including using the network of trade
relationships or the similar trade product profiles to approximate trade competition
(Simmons & Elkins 2004; Elkins, Guzman & Simmons 2006) and conceptualizing trade
ties as an indicator of communication between states (Jandhyala, Henisz & Mansfield
2011). In his 2016 study of the diffusion of pollution, Aklin argues that stronger trade ties
between states enable firms to engage in production (and therefore pollution) outside of
their home country without sacrificing easy access to the home-country market (Aklin
2016). It is possible to imagine that for one or more of these reasons, strong bilateral trade
relationships may signal an increased incentive for states to harmonize access to skilled
foreign labor.
Using a combined measure of dyadic import and export flows as a proportion of
home-country GDP, the model in Figure 6.4 tests the possibility that the strength of
bilateral trade relationships can tell us something about the diffusion of skill-selective
immigration policies. Again, the measure of MNC-cohosting relationships is included as
well for comparison. As with the results for geographic distance, the coefficients in Figure
6.4 show no evidence that bilateral trade relationships impact the diffusion of skill-selective
immigration policies. While the coefficient on the bilateral trade variable is positive, which
is consistent with its hypothesized relationship to skill-selective policy diffusion, it remains
statistically indistinguishable from zero. It is possible that the concurrent testing of the
bilateral trade and MNC-cohosting mechanisms are partly washing each other out—the
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cohosting of major global firms is likely to be correlated the strength of trade ties. That
said, the measures of MNC-cohosting connectivity and the interaction of this term with a
right-leaning government, however, remain positive and statistically significant.

To ensure that the strength of the MNC-cohosting measure is not overwhelming
the importance of these other possible mechanisms of policy diffusion, Table 6.2 provides
full regression results for models including the geographic distance and bilateral trade
variables but excluding the MNC-cohosting variable, and here we do find some evidence
to support the potential importance of alternative mechanisms of diffusion. Models 1 and
2 Table 6.2 test these measures of connectivity without including interactions with
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government ideology or a plurality electoral system, while Models 3 and 4 do incorporate
these interaction terms.
The coefficients for geographic proximity in both the interaction and no-interaction
models are weakly significant (allowing a rejection of the null hypotheses at a = 0.1, but
not at a = 0.05) and the magnitude of the coefficient is consistent across the two models.
Interestingly, while the relationship between geographic proximity and the diffusion of
policy hypothesized earlier in this section is positive, the coefficients for geographic
proximity Table 6.2 are negative. It is possible that the extraordinarily large distance
between two of the major drivers of skill-selective liberalization in the world (Australia
and New Zealand) and the rest of the countries in the sample is responsible for reversing
the direction of the proximity effect.
Models 2 and 4 test the relevance of the bilateral trade measure of connectivity in
the diffusion of skill-selective policy. Though model two shows no evidence that bilateral
trade ties may help explain this policy interdependence, the coefficient for bilateral trade
in Model 4 is positive and weakly significant. This is particularly interesting because Model
4 incorporates the two interaction terms—the measure of trade connectivity combined
respectively with a right-leaning government or a plurality electoral system. Thus, the
coefficient on the term Bilateral Trade/GDP in Model 4 represents cases in which both
interaction terms are equal to zero (meaning the government is not right-leaning and the
electoral system is not based on plurality voting). This is a fairly narrow subset of cases
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Table 6.2: Alternative Explanations for Skill-Selective Policy Diffusion
No Interactions

Proximity

With Interactions

Geographic
Proximity

Bilateral
Trade

Geographic
Proximity

Bilateral
Trade

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

°

°

-0.141
(0.084)

-0.144
(0.085)
0.032
(0.033)
-0.043
(0.032)

Proximity * Gov Right
Proximity * Plurality
Bilateral Trade/GDP

0.019
(0.024)

BiTrade/GDP * Gov Right
BiTrade/GDP * Plurality
Gov Right
Plurality
Trade
FDI Inflow
Log GDP
Log GDP p/c
EU Member
Parliamentary
Veto Points
Federalism
Constant

°

0.059
(0.032)
0.111**
(0.039)
-0.0002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.018
(0.018)
**
0.091
(0.034)
-0.060
(0.039)
0.024
(0.054)
0.225
(0.166)
0.072
(0.045)
-0.197

0.043
(0.034)
0.141**
(0.046)
0.0001
(0.001)
-0.0002
(0.001)
-0.015
(0.024)
**
0.119
(0.040)
-0.067
(0.042)
-0.009
(0.071)
0.143
(0.191)
0.080°
(0.048)
-0.875°
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°

0.061
(0.032)
0.108**
(0.039)
-0.0002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.018
(0.018)
**
0.091
(0.034)
-0.058
(0.039)
0.026
(0.054)
0.235
(0.166)
0.071
(0.045)
-0.181

0.106°
(0.056)
-0.057
(0.047)
-0.084
(0.060)
0.039
(0.034)
0.137**
(0.047)
-0.0004
(0.001)
0.00003
(0.001)
-0.026
(0.025)
**
0.128
(0.040)
-0.062
(0.043)
-0.013
(0.071)
0.137
(0.191)
0.082°
(0.048)
-0.628
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Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2

(0.450)
NO
YES
712
0.177
0.132

(0.513)
NO
YES
616
0.172
0.122

(0.450)
NO
YES
712
0.180
0.132

(0.529)
NO
YES
616
0.177
0.124

°p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01

Note:

and completely excludes the six most prolific skill-selective policy adjusting states
(Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United State, the United Kingdom, and France). It
is possible that this result is an indication of different pathways of policy diffusion in
countries with lower immigrant inflows. However, this result is quite weak and it must be
emphasized that any implications discussed here are purely speculative.
On the whole, this assessment of potential alternative paths of policy diffusion
explanations in comprehensively modeling interdependence in skill-selective policy
liberalization, the inclusion of relational variables like geographic proximity and bilateral
trade by no means diminishes the significance of the MNC-cohosting measure. These
cannot be effectively used in place of the MNC-cohosting mechanism. Therefore, these
tests provide further evidence of the contribution made by this project; thinking of MNCs
and their subsidiary networks as potential agents of policy diffusion can help us improve
our understanding of phenomena like the spread of skill-selective immigration policies.

Digging into the Dimensions of Policy
As discussed in Chapter 4, the datasets introduced in this project represent one of
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its central contributions. Operationalizing policy change requires a strong set of coder
assumptions regarding which data are important and whether data points are comparable.
Studies of immigration policy have suffered in part from the fact that these policies are
immensely complex, reaching across departmental jurisdictions, operating along multiple
dimensions, and targeting different groups using different instruments. The immigration
policy data introduced in this project represent a first step toward addressing some of
these concerns. As described in Chapter 4, the dataset of skill-selective changes to
immigration policies codes policy developments according to their target group (Highly
Qualified, Occupationally Skilled, Student, Investor, or Intra-Company Transfer), and
with reference to the dimension along which the policy is changed. The data distinguish
between two possible dimensions of policy liberalization or restriction—Red Tape and
Criteria (see Chapter 4 for additional information on these coding decisions). This opens
up an opportunity to suspend the assumption that all skill-selective policy changes work
in the same way.
The main advantage of having this additional data is that it facilitates a more
inductive exploration of how and when policy design matters in the study of policy change.
Scholarly theorizing on the purpose of a particular policy design will necessarily be focused
on the outcome of the policy, which is observable, rather than the motivation for it, which
is not. This bias is especially hard to swallow for researchers in political science, who should
be especially cognizant of principle-agent dynamics and the problem of perverse incentives.
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Therefore, it is worthwhile to try and develop a stronger empirical understanding of the
determinants of variation in policy design.
The models in Table 6.3 are the same workhorse models used elsewhere throughout
this project, but the dependent variable has been broken up by policy dimension63. Red
Tape liberalization is regressed on the covariates in Models 1 and 3, and Criteria
liberalization is used in Models 2 and 4. Models 3 and 4 include the interaction effects
between the spatial regressor—MNC-Cohosting—and the indicators for government
ideology and a plurality electoral system, while the first two models exclude these
interactions.
It is immediately apparent from these results that liberalizations along the Criteria
dimension are more consistent with the overall findings than liberalizations along the Red
Tape dimension. In Models 1 and 2, which test the relevance of MNC-Cohosting as a
relevant measure of connectivity for spatial interdependence in policy change, the
coefficient on MNC-Cohosting is positive and significant only in the Criteria model.
Similarly, in Models 3 and 4, which test the differential impact of this effect given a rightleaning government or plurality electoral system, the only interaction with a positive and
significant coefficient is the one between MNC-Cohosting and a right-leaning government
in the Criteria model. This suggests that while Red Tape liberalizations are likely
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An analogous set of models divided by target group can be found in Table A.? in Appendix A.
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Table 6.3: Determinants of the Dimensions of Liberalization

MNC-Cohosting
Gov Right
Plurality

No Interactions
Red Tape
Criteria
(1)
(2)
0.008
0.050**
(0.017)
(0.013)
0.008
0.071**
(0.027)
(0.021)
°
0.063
0.067**
(0.033)
(0.026)

MNC-Cohost * Gov Right
MNC-Cohost * Plurality
Trade
FDI Inflow
Log GDP
Log GDP p/c
EU Member
Parliamentary
Veto Points
Federalism
Constant
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R2
2
Adjusted R
Note:

-0.0002
(0.0004)
0.002°
(0.001)
0.005
(0.016)
0.016
(0.029)
0.018
(0.032)
-0.015
(0.046)
0.140
(0.142)
0.049
(0.038)
-0.419
(0.343)
NO
YES
712
0.102
0.053

-0.0001
(0.0004)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.021°
(0.012)
**
0.061
(0.023)
**
-0.082
(0.025)
0.021
(0.036)
0.115
(0.112)
0.034
(0.030)
-0.121
(0.271)
NO
YES
712
0.145
0.098
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With Interactions
Red Tape
Criteria
(3)
(4)
0.025
0.016
(0.029)
(0.022)
0.006
0.067**
(0.027)
(0.021)
°
0.062
0.068**
(0.033)
(0.026)
**
0.004
0.062
(0.027)
(0.021)
-0.030
0.001
(0.028)
(0.022)
-0.0002
-0.0001
(0.0004)
(0.0003)
0.002°
0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.006
-0.021°
(0.016)
(0.012)
**
0.013
0.060
(0.029)
(0.023)
**
0.014
-0.079
(0.032)
(0.026)
-0.011
0.020
(0.046)
(0.036)
0.145
0.123
(0.142)
(0.111)
0.048
0.037
(0.038)
(0.030)
-0.425
-0.097
(0.343)
(0.270)
NO
NO
YES
YES
712
712
0.104
0.155
0.051
0.106
°p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01
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contributing to the overall findings shown in the main models in Chapter 5, the Criteria
liberalizations are the true drivers of these effects.
While it is possible that policymakers are more willing to respond to MNC influence
by expanding the range of people who qualify for admission rather than lowering
administrative hurdles, there may be simpler explanation that accords better with the
theory introduced in Chapter 3—it may be that Red Tape changes are serving as a proxy
for bureaucratic and ministerial decisions, whereas Criteria changes better reflect the
decisions made by policymakers with real accountability to voters. This is important,
because the skill-selective compromise is premised upon the idea that policymakers are
under pressure to balance the interests of large, pro-immigration business interests and a
more general anti-immigration sentiment from their constituents. While many elements of
immigration policy are decided by the legislature, bureaucratic officials and courts also
have the power to impact the shape these policies take (Guiraudon 2000). Furthermore,
the division of policymaking authority among these three arenas varies based on the
institutional histories and structures of different states. In discussing immigration policy
in France, Cerna notes that “in contrast to the most recent, parliamentary-approved laws,
many of the previous initiatives were circulars, implemented by the government and
relevant ministries” (2016, p. 204).
Interestingly, much of the literature on MNC-host government bargaining focuses
on regulation and the aspects of policy that may slow or hinder cross-border transactions.
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These issues are more similar in form with immigration policy changes coded as Red Tape,
but they are also more likely to be controlled by bureaucrats than to reflect changes voted
on by a legislature. In the context of investment incentives, this makes sense—the
bargaining happens behind closed doors and policymakers seek out regulatory exemptions
rather than risking public disapproval. But with regard to the theory of policy
interdependence proposed in Chapter 3, the mechanism relies on private actors engaging
in influence campaigns to sway the votes of legislators. Thus, it is only logical that the
measure of MNC-Cohosting, which ultimately approximates connectivity among highinfluence business interests between countries, would be more important in explaining
Criteria changes.
At the same time, the Red Tape-Criteria distinction, though it may naturally
capture much of the division between bureaucratic and legislative authority, is not
designed to code this distinction. The variation in institutional authority makes it difficult
to determine the source of the authority from anything other than primary source material,
which is often not easily available. However, among cases where the source of a change
can be clearly tracked, it is clear that the policy dimensions used in this dataset do not
perfectly line up with the bureaucratic-legislative division. For instance, a change in the
visa cap is coded in the data as Red Tape, because it represents a reduction in arbitrary
hurdles without altering the actual criteria for selection. In Australia, the migration
planning levels (or caps on total migration) are set by the Ministry for Immigration and
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Citizenship based on the annual budget, so in this case the ministerial authority lines up
well with the Red Tape coding. However, in the U.S., visa caps are set by the Congress,
actually written into the bills that legislators vote to approve or reject. The upshot of all
of this is that while the finding in favor of the importance of the Criteria category is likely
demonstrating something about the importance of distinguishing between policymaking
venues, a conclusive finding will have to wait for additional data coding and a more explicit
test of this dynamic.
Table 6.4 breaks down the average values of the MNC-Cohosting variable for the
Red Tape and Criteria dimensions by target group. The values associated with the Criteria
dimension are higher across the board, suggesting that the importance of MNC
connectivity for criteria-based policy changes is not limited to a particular migrant stream.
This imbalance is particularly large for the policy changes targeting investors and intracompany transfers, and difference in means tests illustrate that the differences between
the average MNC-Cohosting values associated with a criteria-based change as opposed to

Table 6.4: Mean Cohosting Value by Policy Dimension and Target
Target Group

Red Tape

Criteria

Difference

Highly Qualified

70.14

80.81

10.67

Occupationally Skilled

87.03

101.06

14.03

Student

76.41

96.79

20.38°

Investor

61.38

92.81

31.43*

Intra-Company Transfer

66.27

113.14

46.87*

°p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01

Note:
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a red tape-based change are greater than zero for these two groups. The fact that investors
and intra-company transfers are the most overtly business oriented target groups of skillselective immigration policies increases the plausibility that the importance of the Criteria
dimension is a real part of the MNC influence network story.

Substantive Takeaways
The primary purpose of this chapter has been to use the information gleaned from
additional statistical tests to gain a more complete and secure understanding of how well
the quantitative work in this and the previous chapter build up a foundation of support
for the central theory of this dissertation. Tests to determine whether the central models
presented in Chapter 5 are dependent on the leverage of outlying observations suggest that
the results are robust to their exclusion. A look at alternative mechanisms of policy
diffusion across states also supports the strength of the findings in favor of the central role
played by MNCs. Finally, a dissection of the main results according to policy dimensions
suggests that future work should seek to learn more about the involvement of MNCs in
altering the criteria required for immigrant admission and the extent to which the
policymaking venue matters for this relationship to hold.
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Chapter 7

Variation in the Skill-Selective Turn
Locating the Skill-Selective Turn
The previous two chapters demonstrate statistical support for the claim that the
subsidiary linkages within multinational information technology companies can help
explain the recent diffusion of skill-selective immigration policies. However, these statistical
findings cannot tell us whether the theory is supported where the politics of immigration
actually takes place—within the domestic policymaking apparatus. In other words, an
argument, even one backed by evidence of statistical correlation “will be not be very
meaningful, will be difficult to generalize upon, and may also be difficult to prove in a
convincing fashion” without an examination of the underlying process or mechanism at
work (Gerring 2012 p. 217).
Therefore, this chapter uses a process-tracing technique to explore the evolution of
skill-selective policymaking across four short case studies: The United States, Australia,
Germany, and the United Kingdom64. All four of these countries are immensely popular
migration destinations in today’s world. Additionally, all four exhibit high levels of MNC
cohosting and high propensities to liberalize skill-selective immigration policies, making

64

This section also includes a short assessment of the European Union’s influence and jurisdiction
over immigration policy to give a more complete picture of the actors and events impacting changes
in Germany and the U.K.
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them typical cases, or cases that are “representative of the phenomenon under study”
(Gerring 2007, p. 49). Because of this, they help strengthen the plausibility of the causal
mechanism proposed in Chapter 3. At the same time, they also provide important variation
in terms of their external and intervening variables. Beyond having diverse political
institutions and practices for incorporating the interests of businesses in policymaking,
these countries offer distinct historical approaches to immigration policy and have varied
experiences in the growth and success of their IT industries. This lends credibility to the
assertion that the actions of IT MNCs are the driving explanatory variable.
While Australia and the United States are traditional countries of immigration
with policy regimes that have been explored in detail all the way back to the days of their
founding, Germany and the U.K. have only recently begun to view themselves as receiving
countries. In the 19th century, both were primarily immigrant sending countries, and
between them they supplied large percentages of the populations in Australia and the U.S.
This variation in the historical legacy of immigration helps ensure that the similarities
across senders and receivers are not overdetermined by path-dependent policy regimes. At
the same time, both country pairs exhibit real variation in the degree to which their
economies have been engaged with the multinationalization of IT firms and production,
and together, the four countries present a wide spectrum of the relative importance of IT
to an OECD economy.
Table 7.1 below shows that U.S. firms have been by far the most active in
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orchestrating cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the IT industry. This should not be
too surprising, given that many of the global giants in this industry were founded in the
United States. Interestingly, however, the IT industry does not demonstrate the same
overwhelming dominance within the U.S. economy. Though it does account for a
considerable share of total merchandise exports over the period shown, these numbers
barely exceed those from the United Kingdom’s IT industry, despite its overall smaller
size. Thus, it is clear that the IT industry has not played the same role in shaping the
contemporary economies of each of the four cases examined in this chapter.

Table 7.1: Case Variation in ICT Industry Strength
1. ICT Cross-border M&A Deals by Country of Acquirer
Country

1999

2000

2001

2002

Australia

32

45

31

23

Germany

67

174

93

44

United Kingdom

139

228

139

105

United States

527

622

356

262

2. Share of ICT Goods in Total Merchandise Exports
Country

1996

1998

2000

2002

Australia

3.6

3.3

3.3

2.7

Germany

8.5

9

11.1

10.4

United Kingdom

16.9

18.2

20.1

19.2

United States

20.3

20.3

23.5

19.5

Source: OECD Information Technology Outlook, 2010

As mentioned above, this chapter employs process tracing to evaluate how skillselective strategies are liberalized. Bennett and Checkel define process tracing as “the use
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of evidence from within a case to make inferences about causal explanations of that case”
or, “the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about ... whether
and how it generated the outcome of interest” (2015, pp. 4-6). Though this chapter does
provide some historical context for each of the four cases, the main focus is on the moment
referred to here as the skill-selective turn. The purpose is to uncover when and under what
circumstances skill selection became a major instrument in immigration policy.
The case studies in this chapter explore where the ideas for the policy changes
came from, which actors were involved, and how the societal mood and economic
environment contributed to the drive for change. Borrowing from Bennett and Checkel,
this information is treated as “diagnostic evidence,” or rather, “observable events that
intercede between hypothesized causes and observed effects” (2015, p. 7). To make this
possible, the case studies in this chapter draw upon primary and secondary sources, using
not only other scholars’ accounts of the politics surrounding policy change but also
contemporaneous newspaper articles (particularly those containing interviews with
prominent business leaders), governmental reports and press releases, transcripts from
committee hearings and parliamentary minutes, and in the U.S. case, additional committee
documents obtained from the National Archives in Washington D.C. and College Park,
Maryland.
Just as the statistical analyses in the previous chapters are designed to reveal
whether the macro-level pattern of skill-selective policy liberalization could be in part
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explained by IT MNC networks, the case studies are designed to help establish micro-level
support for the expectations concerning the behavior of policymakers and firms.
Ultimately, much of the evidence presented in this chapter is consistent with the diagnostic
criteria generated in Chapter 3 (these are reproduced in Table 7.2 below for reference).
There are indications that an expanded view of the relevant MNCs in future work might
provide a more generalizable model of influence.

Table 7.2: Diagnostic Criteria
Empirical Implications for Qualitative Evaluation
A: IT MNCs engage in influence campaigns in favor of skill-selective immigration policy.
B: IT MNCs and policymakers see skill-selective immigration as a policy compromise.
C: IT MNCs use war-for-talent arguments to support their influence campaigns.

Traditional Receiving States
Settler State Policy History
In contrast to traditional sending states, Australia and the United States have
always viewed immigration to be central to their national identities. In large part, this
comes from their origins as British colonies. As far-flung settlers clinging to the rims of
unfathomably large, indominable territories, the first British colonists to stake claim to
the shores of these foreign lands must have felt the true meaning of safety in numbers. Yet
contradictory impulses arose.
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The influx of Chinese laborers recruited at the onset of the Australian Gold Rush
during the mid-19th century was seen by white colonists as a cultural and economic threat
(de Lepervanche 1975). Strong trade unions pushed through a series of exclusionary
policies, directed first at the Chinese and later other nationalities as well, with the intent
of keeping cheap labor out of the Australian market. Organized labor was also the driving
force behind the Chinese Exclusion Acts passed in the second half of the 19th century in
65

the United States (Tichenor 2002) . While American independence ensured that the
British could not overtly interfere with the U.S. legislation, the racism built into these
policies was so explicit and offensive that the British, concerned about their own trade
relationships in East Asia, eventually insisted that the Australian colony find a less overtly
bigoted way to restrict immigration (Stevens 2016).
Although Australia acquiesced, their new approach was the creation of a dictation
66

test , during which potential immigrants were commanded to write 50 words dictated to
them in any European language chosen by the testing official67. Upon Australia’s
acquisition of independence in 1901, this immigration test was formalized in the White
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The similarity between the Australian and U.S. policies here is not coincidental. While each
country certainly did experience the same external catalyst—an increase in Chinese immigration—
they looked to each other to learn from the exclusionist policies each installed. Anti-Chinese
immigration policies were passed in Canada and New Zealand during this time period as well.
66
Modelled on a similar such test imposed by a white colony in South Africa (Jupp 1995).
67
As though the racial bias were not already clear enough in the design of this test, the testing
officials also had wide discretion to determine potential immigrants unsuitable for settlement even
if they passed.
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Australia Policy, enacted by the newly established Federal Parliament as part of a broader
Immigration Restriction Act. Thus, one of the new government’s earliest acts was the
establishment of a racially exclusionary Australian identity (Castles, Vasta & Ozkul 2014).
In the United States there were parallel efforts to institute a literacy test during
this period. Attempts began before the turn of the century and were vetoed by Presidents
Grover Cleveland, Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson before finally passing over Wilson’s
veto in 1917. However, while literacy certainly seems like it could be an early incarnation
of skill selection, it was generally understood that “the chief purpose behind the literacy
test was to decrease the total volume of immigration rather than to select a more desirable
type of immigrant” (S. Rep. 81-1515 1950, p. 202), and that illiterates was simply another
category to be added to the list of excluded groups, along with criminals and insane
persons.
Both countries found themselves struggling to establish cohesive post-War
immigration strategies, initially clinging to the racially biased selection systems of the past.
In Australia, the 1901 legislation was finally replaced by the Australian Migration Act of
1958, which can be characterized as a “lack of policy on all but the most basic issues”
(Hawkins 1991). With the McCarren-Walter act of 1952, the United States government
succeeded in putting together a codified form of the many disparate immigration bills that
had been passed, piecemeal, during the earlier decades, but the new legislation was
unsatisfying in its complete lack of reform.
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United States
The McCarran-Walter Act of 195268, which modified but fundamentally
maintained the national origins quotas established by 1920s legislation, was meant to be a
codification of the many disparate U.S. immigration laws. The first preference category
under the 1952 legislation divided the first 50% of each quota area between immediate
relatives and skilled workers. To clarify the meaning of skilled workers in this context, the
1952 act calls for:
qualified quota immigrants whose services are determined by the Attorney
General to be needed urgently in the United States because of the high
education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability
of such immigrants and to be substantially beneficial prospectively to the
national economy, cultural interests or welfare of the United States.
(Immigration and Nationality Act 1952)
On its face, this makes it sound like the skill-selective turn in the United States
came about in the 1950s, but the logic behind such a policy choice can sometimes force a
reevaluation of its purpose. In codifying the existing U.S. immigration laws, the McCarranWalter Act served to reinforce the national origins quotas built into the foundation of the
preference system. Truman, in opposition to the perpetuation of the national origins
quotas69, vetoed the bill, and then proceeded to appoint the Presidential Commission on
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Officially the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
The bill and Truman’s opposition to it, however, must be considered through the lens of global
politics. Much of the support for restricting immigration at the time came from the ardently anticommunist camp, who saw migrants from countries with communist movements as threatening.
Truman was particularly concerned about cases in which these sentiments had the potential to
alienate U.S. allies (Tichenor 2002).
69
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Immigration and Naturalization (PIN) just a few short months after his veto was
overturned. The purpose of the commission was to conduct its own study of the
immigration policy of the United States, this time including the most recent legislation,
and to make recommendations for legislative and administrative action based on this
examination. According to Zolberg, “this was tantamount to a counter-McCarran
Commission, whose composition ensured a liberal recommendation” (2006, p. 318). While
the economic criteria in the 1952 act were almost completely overshadowed in the
Commission by discussion of the national origins quotas, there were iterative exchanges on
the distribution of manpower between Europe and the U.S., the free movement of scientists
and the location of scientific conferences, and the handling of foreign investors.
One illustration of this is a chain of correspondence between the North Atlantic
Council and the House Committee on the Judiciary during the writing of the McCarranWalter Act. It highlights the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) interest in
redistributing what was seen as a surplus of skilled labor in parts of Europe to the U.S.,
where unforeseen labor shortages could be “impeding defense production” (North Atlantic
Council, Jan. 1952, p. 1). Based on the letters on file, the legislative response to these
concerns was the H visa, a nonimmigrant visa allowing for temporary residence of highly
skilled or urgently needed labor introduced by the McCarran-Walter Act. Referring
specifically to section of the bill that introduces the nonimmigrant class, the North Atlantic
Council expressed concern about the temporary nature of these visas, stating that “it would
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hardly be economically feasible, for instance, to transport labor from NATO countries to
the United States for a period of less than three years” (North Atlantic Council, Dec. 1951,
p. 1). The authors of the act may have felt that a temporary economic entry track would
be a clever way to circumvent raising quotas.
The National Foreign Trade Council also made its voice heard, sending Congress
multiple requests for greater leniency for foreign investors throughout the drafting of the
McCarran-Walter Act. The National Foreign Trade Council asked that the new legislation
make it possible not only for foreign investors to enter as nonimmigrants, but that they
also be allowed to “secure like privileges of entry and sojourn for the executive, managerial
and technical personnel essential to the effective operation of their business enterprises”
(Sullivan 1949). Of particular interest was the reasoning behind the request. In the years
following the Second World War, the U.S. signed a series of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation Treaties to enable American investment abroad. As with many international
agreements, reciprocity was a key ingredient for successful cooperation. However, certain
operational considerations, such as the international movement of investors and their
employees, could not be guaranteed by treaty unless Congress made the necessary changes
to immigration policy first. While the McCarran-Walter Act did alter the treaty-trader
nonimmigrant class to include investors, Representative Francis Walter (D-PA)
commented to the Foreign Trade Council that “a further extension of the scope of the type
of visa authorized to be issued to ‘treaty traders’ did not appeal to us,” and so the
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introduction of the intra-company transfer visa was effectively put on hold (Francis Walter
1952). Thus, it was not for the sake of attracting foreign investors that the U.S. first
granted them exemption; instead, the motivation derived from American business interests
with global aspirations.
Even if the legislation passed in 1952 did not signal the beginning of a skill-selective
turn, it did sketch the outline for some of the skill-selective policies that would follow.
70

However, the picture did not resolve for several decades yet. The 1965 Hart-Celler Act

simply carried over the economic preference tier, the investor visa, and the H-1 visa. Its
real purpose was to end the national origins quotas that had shaped U.S. immigration
policy for so long. However, this landmark reform set in motion a drastic shift in the
composition of the immigrant inflows. The national origins quotas had artificially tilted
the scale in favor of early-19th century migration to the United States, favoring Northern
Europeans while at the same time blocking immigration from Asia and Latin America.
The high levels of immigration from the latter regions in the years following the 1965
reform were unexpected and brought on an increase in hostility toward immigration among
the general public. During the 1970s and 80s, much of the public attention focused in on
the high levels of immigration and in particular on undocumented immigration, and the
U.S. Congress found itself in a stalemate as the issue became increasingly toxic (Tichenor
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Officially the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.
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2002; Zolberg 2006).
In an attempt to try and build some legitimacy and consensus around immigration
policy again, in 1978 Congress convened a Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy (SCIRP), a group comprised of representatives from both houses, several members
of the cabinet, and a handful of members of the public. Among the policy issues SCIRP
discussed were skilled immigration and the possible implementation of a points system.
Members of the Commission expressed distaste for skill selection, noting that they were
designed to exclude “groups or types of persons who lack education or English language
skills” (as cited in Stevens 2016, p. 80). In the official report they produced in 1981, they
emphasized the social benefits of family reunification, the importance of immigration for
U.S. economic prosperity, and the significance of a generous refugee program for supporting
U.S. foreign policy (Tichenor 2002). Somehow the spirit of the SCIRP’s findings were lost
in the legislative proposals pursued by two of its members, Senators Edward Kennedy (DMA) and Alan Simpson (R-WY). Both advocates of a Canadian or Australian-style points
system71, which they felt would help ensure “that these people who come here assimilate
themselves” (Simpson, as cited in Stevens 2016, p. 80), they included such a system in the
1989 legislation they introduced into the Senate, cherry-picking elements of the

71

Interestingly, this political marriage was born of two separate goals. While Simpson was
influenced by U.S. business interests through the Business Rountable, Kennedy had plans to allocate
the points to favor potential Irish immigrants, who claimed that the 1965 Act’s family preference
category placed them at a disadvantage (Tichenor 2002).
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Commission’s recommendations to support their proposal while conveniently ignoring
others.
In one important way, SCIRP was highly influential. Before the Commission
offered its report, much of the political discourse around immigration tended to take one
of two tones—it would either pander to racist stereotypes and fear of cultural threat, or it
would espouse a liberal vision of altruism and generosity. After the Commission’s report
was issued, the discourse centered almost entirely on the national interest and how
immigration could be used productively to promote it (Tichenor 2002; Stevens 2016).
It was in this environment that the American Electronics Association (AeA) issued
a study in the early 1980s claiming that the U.S. economy was about to suffer a “crisis
level shortage of engineers” (Cerna 2016, p. 172). Though they later retracted this claim,
calling it an “unfortunate editorial misrepresentation” (Hubbard, as cited in Reed 2006),
their revision came only after considerable investment had been made to grow engineering
schools and combat the predicted shortage (Reed 2006). Yet the hearings that eventually
produced the 1990 Immigration Act quoted extensively from a 1989 National Science
Foundation (NSF) study that made similar claims (Cerna 2016). “Responding to the wishes
of the electronics industry,” the new policy produced by the 1990s Act “facilitated the
recruitment of highly skilled and managerial employees by easing regulations for the award
of H-1B visas” (Zolberg 2006, p. 381). In 1992, evidence of poor methodology and lack of
peer review presented during a Congressional hearing all but destroyed the credibility of
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the NSF report (Reed 2006). Though the skills shortage arguments advanced by the AeA
and the NSF during this period relied on dubious evidence, they discovered that the new,
national interest-focused view of immigration policy had rendered policymakers
sympathetic to their claims.
As the 1990s continued, “[t]he AeA, the ITAA72, the Chamber of Commerce and
the Computing Research Association (CRA) were the main pro-H-1B actors. The members
of AeA and ITAA were largely MNCs, many of them belonging to all three organisations”
(Cerna 2016, p. 173). As the information technology (IT) industry grew larger and began
to experience a boom in the late 1990s, they used this strategy repeatedly to secure
increases in the cap on H-1Bs. Specifically,
Companies such as Microsoft, Cisco, Amazon, Texas Instruments, Oracle
and Intel took their claims of labour shortage to Congress, citing strong
projected job growth, higher than average salaries and industry
unemployment rates of about 2%. They argued that, because the IT
industry made up nearly one-third of the growth of the US economy and
IT had entered almost all sectors, a shortage of high-skilled IT labour
threatened the global competitiveness of the US economy. (Cerna 2016, p.
175)
These corporations successfully organized to pursue the liberalization of skilled
migration. Fourteen CEOs of major IT companies signed a letter to Congress attesting to
the necessity of access to skilled foreign labor to ensure future growth (Senate Report 106260 2000; Watts 2001). Bill Gates, the CEO and founder of Microsoft, testified before
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Information Technology Association of America.
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congress in 1998, emphasizing the importance of “immigration policies that give our
industry and other high-tech companies access to the best and the brightest” (“Testimony
of Bill Gates” 1998).
In 1996, “[e]xecutives from such companies as Intel, Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Sun
Microsystems, Oracle, Varian, Sybase, Xilinx and 3COM [wrote] to California Senator
Dianne Feinstein” (“US executives” 1996). The immigration bills under review at the time
contained provisions for removing family preference status for siblings and adult children
and broader cuts to legal immigration. In their letter, these IT MNCs asked for an
amendment that would formally separate issues of legal and illegal immigration and fix
certain flaws they saw in the bill’s changes to legal immigration. But these flaws had
nothing to do with protecting the family preference categories—rather the MNCs wrote
that certain forms of legal immigration should be spared, because “we need to be able to
transfer key employees in our overseas subsidiaries back to the US,” and that continued
restriction of access to skilled workers might “compel some companies to transfer high wage
engineering and research jobs overseas” (“US executives” 1996).
These actions illustrate how IT MNCs built up a narrative of necessity around the
issue of access to foreign labor, pressed policymakers to separate their actions on skilled
migration from changes to family or illegal migration, and then organized their influence
in favor of skill selection. The evidence of an organized influence campaign and IT MNCs’
recognition that lower restrictions on skilled immigration would be less objectionable than
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broader immigration reform supports the first and second diagnostic criteria laid out above.
The rhetorical choices further show that IT MNCs chose to frame their demands in terms
of the competitiveness of the U.S. economy and its continued value as a country of
operation, which is consistent with the third diagnostic criterion.
On the other side, there was little organized opposition to the expansion of the H1B program. In a study of interest groups’ immigration platforms during this period,
Marquez and Witte find that the only real opposition to the immigration of skilled workers
came from nativist groups that opposed immigration across the board. Organized labor,
they find, including the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO), was largely uninterested in the discussion of skill-selective
immigration and took no position (2009)73.
The advocates of H-1B increases were successful in 1998, raising the H-1B cap
temporarily to 115,000. But as the IT boom continued, they returned to congress to try
the same tactic again. The AeA reiterated that a higher cap was “a critical business issue
for our member companies” (Dash & Thibodeau 2000). A spokeswoman for Intel warned
that “[i]f Congress decides not to raise the cap, companies will move more work offshore,”
and her assertion was supported by a survey conducted by the Employment Policy
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A notable exception to this generalization was the American Engineering Association, which
released a statement to the Senate in 1995 in which it stated “a powerful coalition of multinational
corporations and universities which find it in their self-interest to encourage skilled immigration
regardless of the impact on U.S. workers” (Bellinger 1995).
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Foundation (EPF), which found that “[m]ore than one-third of 42 Fortune 500 companies
surveyed … said they would move jobs out of the U.S. if H-1B workers weren't available”
(Dash & Thibodeau 2000).
In response, in tandem with a parallel bill that passed in the Senate,
“Representatives Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) and David Dreier (R-CA), both of whom represented
IT-heavy districts, co-sponsored a bi-partisan bill in the House that would raise the cap to
200,000” (Freeman & Hill 2006, p. 11). The chair of the House Immigration Subcommittee,
Lamar Smith (R-TX), proposed an alternative bill with a more modest H-1B cap,
attempting to moderate the corresponding Senate bill. But the Conference Committee
made the unusual decision to adopt the Senate’s version on all counts, essentially choosing
to consider the Lofgren-Dreier proposal instead of the bill submitted by the Subcommittee
chair (Freeman & Hill 2006). The H-1B cap was accordingly raised to 195,000 for the next
three years.
Although the first signs of skill selection in U.S. immigration policy can be traced
at least to the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, the skill-selective turn did not really take
shape until the 1990s. With the Immigration Act of 1990, the H-1 visa that had been
created in 1952 was reshaped to serve the purported needs of the electronics industry. The
strategic use of data to compel Congress to take this action served as an important lesson
for the IT industry in the years that followed. With the economy performing well and the
IT industry booming, the technology giants began to look like the true drivers of the
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contemporary economy, and they leveraged the discourse introduced by the SCIRP report
to ensure that skill-selective policy would be viewed as part of the national interest.

Australia
In Australia, immigration in the post-war years had been characterized by a high
rate of returns. People who passed the highly subjective entry standards were making the
decision to return to their country of origin with disturbing frequency. Given the longstated government goals of growing the Australian population, the administration
perceived this as problematic and commissioned an inquiry with the purpose of improving
the process of selection. They wanted people who would stay. Though Prime Minister
Whitlam was himself in favor of a Canadian-style points system, the division even within
the Labor Party at the time tempered this progressive impulse (Hawkins 1991). The system
that finally did emerge in 1973—the Structured Selection Assessment System (SSAS)—
put some emphasis on potential economic contribution while leaving a good amount of
discretion to consular officials to evaluate cultural and social suitability. Hawkins refers to
the SSAS as a “half-way house” because of the awkward and inefficient way it attempted
to reconcile the concerns of the Labor Party and the Liberal opposition74 (Hawkins 1991).
The SSAS should not be viewed as the skill-selective turn in Australian
immigration policy. Though the incorporation of economic criteria makes it tempting to
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The Australian Labor Party is recognized to be ideologically center-left while the Liberal Party
is center-right.
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label this as the first real instance of a government focus on skills, the purpose of both the
economic and social components of the entry evaluation was to vet migrants for integrative
capacity. However, it may be the case that in Australia, as in the United States, the early
experimentation with economic criteria helped encourage the later distillation of the skillselective compromise.
During the 1970s, however, the country remained committed to Labor’s interest in
75

integration. While Australia was by no means as liberal as Canada in its view of diversity ,
integration in this context not to be confused with assimilation. The Minister of
Immigration under Whitlam, Al Grassby, gave a speech in 1973 entitled A Multi-Cultural
Society for the Future. It was the first mention of multiculturalism in an Australian
government document (Koleth 2010), a value the Labor Party proceeded to develop and
espouse through the 1980s. Interestingly, the true implementer of the new multicultural
ideology was Malcolm Fraser, who led the center-right Liberal Party when it took control
of government in 1975. Fraser was committed to maintaining high levels of immigration
in the name of national development and security. In accordance with this, he did away
with the lingering vestiges of policy aimed at enticing British immigrants and immigration
policy became considerably more focused on granting entry to people with family ties and
those claiming asylum (Hawkins 1991). The numbers of immigrant arrivals by origin show
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The government explicitly sought to avoid the formation of ethnic enclaves, for example (Hawkins
1991).
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how impactful these changes were—in 1975, the first year of the Fraser administration,
19% of immigrant arrivals came from Asia while 64% came from Europe. By 1985, those
numbers had shifted to 40% from Asia and 30% from Europe (Stevens 2016).
Unfortunately, this rapid and visible shift led to a popular backlash against
migrants of Asian origin, and the increased salience of immigration as a political issue was
reflected back in an important change in the rhetoric coming from politicians. If the 1970s
were not the harbinger of the skill-selective turn, the 1980s certainly were. The pendulum
swung again to Labor in 1983, but at some point during this period the widespread public
support for multiculturalism had evaporated. A speech made by historian Geoffrey Blainey
to a local Rotary Club in 1984 and the following explosion of news coverage and attention
it received illustrates this well. Blainey warned that the rising level of Asian immigration
had the potential to create a backlash against immigration in general. His overt reference
to an ethnic group, however, helped create the backlash he predicted by bringing race back
into the public discourse on immigration (Stevens 2016). While a few Liberal
parliamentarians attempted to capitalize on this anti-Asian furor to gain support for a
more restrictionist stance on immigration, debates in the Australian parliament in 1984
reflected the subtler approach chosen by the Labor administration. Rather than addressing
the racially-driven outcry outright, they “redirected the debate toward discussing the
weighting allocated to the family reunification migrant intake in relation to the skilled
migrant intake” (Stevens 2016, p. 44).
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This dichotomy was used to address the public tension while attempting to avoid
language that would harken back to an era of Chinese exclusion and the White Australia
policy. The political signaling was effective—while in the 1960s there had been high levels
of public support for increasing immigration overall, by the mid-1980s there was a general
consensus that immigration levels were too high and the distribution of entry visas should
be more skewed toward skilled migrants (Goot 1991)76. Thus, the 1980s saw the emergence
of the rhetoric and public support for skill-selective policies. Still, policy did not quite
match the new rhetoric. The government at the time was led by Prime Minister Bob
Hawke of the Labor Party, a politician who had previously served as President of the
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). While the family-skilled immigration balance
under Hawke shifted marginally toward skill selection (from an 80-20 to a 66-33 split), he
also pushed though requirements stipulating that employers seeking to hire a skilled
migrant had to demonstrate both that no Australian could be found to fill the open position
and that the employer had put enough money into workforce training (Wright 2010).
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Interestingly, there is some evidence that even when survey respondents were not explicitly asked
to choose between skilled and family-based migration, mere reference to family ties was enough of
a signal to inflate opposition. A poll conducted by Morgan in May 1984 asked “Next about
immigration. Last year about 93,000 people came to Australia to live permanently. In your opinion
were 93,000 people too few, too many or about right?” 58% of respondents felt this number was too
high. The same month of the same year, a poll conducted by McNair phrased the question a little
differently, asking “In 1984 about 90,000 migrants in total will be allowed to come and live in
Australia, mostly relatives of previous migrants. Do you think this is too many migrants or too few
migrants or about the right number?” Despite the fact that the question rounded the previous year’s
intake down from 93,000 to 90,000, the percentage of respondents who thought the number was too
high jumped to 64% (Goot 1991, p. 280).
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Furthermore, the Department of Immigration was not particularly committed to
skilled migration but saw the inclusion of economic criteria as a way to protect its own
position. In an interview with scholar Chris F. Wright, one official from the Immigration
Department explained the Department’s position by pointing out that “You can more
easily defend immigration if it’s easily seen that immigrants are adding to the economic
welfare of Australia” (2010 p. 66). In other words, skilled migrants were not valued so
much for their economic contribution as for their low level of visibility to the Australian
public77.
Though the ideas needed to activate the skill-selective compromise had taken hold
within society, employers were not quite ready to exploit them (Wright 2010). United,
they may have been able to steer into the skill-selective turn years earlier, but the sectoral
pattern of trade protectionism in Australia during those years set manufacturing against
other industries (Bell 1995). Manufacturing, for its part, was not particularly interested in
pursuing immigration as a policy issue, a stance that hobbled the ability of business
organizations to make cohesive representations of employer interests to the government
(Wright 2017). In contrast, trade unions were well-organized and effective during the 70s
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The FitzGerald Report, published by the government-commissioned Committee to Advise on
Australia’s Immigration Policies in 1988, drew the same conclusions about economic criteria. In the
Executive Summary of the report, the Committee writes “The [current immigration] program is not
identified in the public mind with the national interest, and must be given a convincing rationale.
Selection methods need a sharper economic focus, for the public to be convinced that the program
is in Australia's interests” (p. 1).
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and early 80s.
All of this changed under the Hawke government in the late 80s. Both the high
levels of protectionism and the power of organized labor were dismantled under by Hawke
and his Treasury Minister Paul Keating78, who together were responsible for a large-scale
restructuring of the Australian economy. During this period, Hawke and Keating
dismantled tariffs, deregulated finance, and floated the Australian dollar. These reforms,
amazingly, were carried out with the cooperation of the ACTU, which, having suffered
crippling job losses in the struggling manufacturing industry, had agreed to sign on to the
government’s economic revitalization strategy in return for some welfare service guarantees
(Collins & Cottle 2010). The liberalization and privatization of the economy created space
for widely encompassing employer associations to flourish.
Ultimately, the skill-selective turn finally appeared in the 1990s. The initial
architecture for skill-selection had been built up by administrations attempting to stave
off anti-immigration sentiments during the previous two decades. Society had learned to
think of skilled migrants as the less-threatening alternative to family members and
refugees. And finally, as the 1980s came to a close, a newly restructured Australian
economy emerged, ready to flex its industrial muscle.
In 1994, in response to “the concern expressed by Australian business … that
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Keating followed Hawke as Prime Minister, taking office in 1991.
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existing business entry policies and procedures were too complex,” Prime Minister Keating
commissioned the Committee of Inquiry into the Temporary Entry of Business People and
Highly Skilled Specialists (Voigt-Graf & Khoo 2004, p. 138). To head the committee, he
appointed Neville Roach, who was Managing Director (and soon after, CEO) of Fujitsu
Australia at the time79. The report that the committee produced recommended creating a
new visa class for temporary, skilled business migrants. They asked for less onerous criteria,
streamlined procedures, fast-track processing, and a path to permanent residency, all in
line with “the principle of benefit to Australia” (Roach 1995). The idea of a temporary
employment visa might have been repugnant to Australian politicians, who had long
rejected the concept of guest worker programs, but in the wake of the recent wave of
economic liberalization, the flexibility afforded by such a program received bipartisan
support (Wright 2015).
The Roach Report was welcomed by Australian business leaders. Though the
inquiry was commissioned by a Labor Party administration under Keating, the
Committee’s recommendations were realized by Liberal Prime Minister John Howard with
the creation of the 457 Visa. Philip Ruddock, the Minister for Immigration and
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This was not the only occasion on which Roach contributed openly to government affairs. He
was later also appointed to the Business Advisory Panel for oversight (Birrell 2003) and the National
Multicultural Advisory Council (Mares 2013). This involvement was strategic and intentional. In a
1995 interview, Roach explained “[w]hen I became managing director of Fujitsu (in 1989) it did not
have as high a profile as our competitors. One objective was to lift that profile, to become closer to
the top of the minds of the decision-makers” (Head 1995).
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Multicultural Affairs, announced the new visa in 1996, stating that the reform was
representative of the government’s “commitment to work closely with business to ensure
that the Australian economy maintains a competitive edge internationally” (Ruddock
1996).
The years that followed were marked by a flurry of reforms intended to further
liberalize business and skilled immigration. Employers sought to lower the entry criteria
for skilled workers across the board but found resistance from a government that worried
about reconciling their economic rationale with a diluted definition of skill that had the
perceived potential to displace Australian workers. Business leaders pushed back against
these concerns: “Price Waterhouse's Australasian director, Mr. Bob Gillen, who
represented the firms, said the temporary business immigration program was designed to
help employers fill skills and experience gaps, and not to replace local workers” (Field
1997). Instead, a policy making it easier for recent graduates of Australian universities to
obtain skilled visas was passed. Based on interviews with business leaders and Immigration
Department officials, Wright argues that “this idea originated within the business
community, gained support from [employer organizations] and several industry
associations who then successfully lobbied the Immigration Minister and Cabinet” (Wright
2017, p. 357).
The government was also “under enormous pressure from the information
technology and communications industries to increase the supply of skilled workers in these
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fields” (Birrell 2003, p. 41). Anderson Consulting80 and IBM-Australia actively complained
of the difficulties they were having in recruiting skilled IT workers, noting that their
business and ability to compete in the market was “constrained by lack of staff” (Hollands
1998). The influence of these industries was reflected in the shortage occupations list,
which grew rapidly to include almost every ICT occupation despite the recognition among
policymakers that:
[t]here has been a question mark hanging over the commonly cited figure
of 30,000 jobs vacancies, which was first quoted by the Australian
Information Industry Association and has been repeated by the Minister
for Information Technology, Senator Richard Alston. (Hepworth 1999)
Senator Alston also echoed the rhetorical device of the global war for talent, telling
an audience that “countries such as Taiwan [are] paying enormous amounts of money to
attract back their technology graduates from the US” and that skilled workers, rather than
coming to Australia, “are rushing to Silicon Valley” to take advantage of the high salaries
American IT firms offered (Potter 2000). Bob Gillen, Director of Price Waterhouse in
Australia, added that barriers to immigration in the form of regulation were also a “major
disincentive to setting up regional headquarters in Australia because multinationals needed
to be able to bring in specialists. Other countries in the region [are] not burdened with this
kind of disincentive” (Field 1997).
In these examples, it is clear that the influence MNCs exerted over the development
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Anderson Consulting formally changed its name to Accenture in 2001.
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of immigration policy was strategic. The influence campaigns are consistent with the first
diagnostic criterion described above, and the intentional narrowing of policy to skilled
workers to make it more widely acceptable is consistent with the second criterion. Wright’s
interviews with employer organization officials provide formidable support. He writes that
“[t]he focus in business advocacy on higher-skilled rather than lower-skilled immigration
was also seen as crucial, because ‘you could only press the envelope so far and still retain
community acceptance of the programme’” and that “presenting credible evidence was seen
as important for persuading sceptics in government and the broader community” (Wright
2017 p. 359). Finally, the rhetoric used by politicians and business leaders is consistent
with the third diagnostic criterion.
Although economic criteria became a part of the immigrant selection process early
in the post-World War Two period, the policies enacted during years up until the 1990s
were primarily characterized by an uneasy shifting back and forth between liberal ideals
of multiculturalism and rising anxieties about the perceived cultural threat of non-white
migrants. Economic criteria in these years were employed as something of a relief valve
for popular pressure in the form of racial animus, but they also built the groundwork for
the skill-selective turn in the 1990s. The Australian public had been primed to see the
employer-led push for skill-selective policies as both predictable and legitimate.

Comparing the Receivers
Much like Australia, the United States found itself searching for immigration
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reform in the years after the Second World War. Though both states found it difficult to
shake the legacy of racism in their immigrant selection procedures, they each began to
experiment with new criteria of selection as well. Thus, we can see that it would be a
mistake to characterize economic selection criteria as a straightforward replacement for
ethnic and national criteria. These elements existed together at first as Australia and the
United States built up the courage and the public will to enter a new policy space.
The two countries’ post-World War Two immigration experiences mirror each
other in several ways. After a halting start, both succeeded in abolishing the race-based
selection practices they had employed for decades. For both, the new combination of family
ties and economic criteria stimulated a transformation of their migrant streams, pulling in
migrants from East Asia and, in the United States, from Latin America as well. The
popular backlashes that arose in response to these shifts demonstrated that the rewriting
of legislation was only the first step in overcoming the racist legacies both countries’
immigration regimes bear.
And in the face of these anti-immigration movements, we can see the architecture
of the postwar policies being used to achieve a new end. Rather than demanding that
immigration policy be overhauled, business interests saw an opportunity to address their
own needs using some of the policy instruments that were already in place. The 1990s,
then, signaled the skill-selective turn in both Australia and the United States.
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Traditional Sending States
Europe’s Policy History
In some ways, the immigration stops that swept across Europe in the 1970s provide
a natural foundation for the investigation of selective immigration policy. These stops,
which were primarily the result of a drop (or anticipated drop, for some countries) in labor
demand due to the widespread macroeconomic impacts of the 1970s oil crises, ensured that
each participating country would be forced to reassess their immigration policy some years
in the future. Though active labor recruitment strategies—including guest-worker
programs and the extension of rights to colonial subjects—had been common in Europe in
the 1950s and 60s, most European powers rejected the notion that they had become
countries of immigration. Rather, they saw the surge in labor demand as an aberration.
This distinction had to be upheld by virtue of policy rather than economics. Indeed, the
demand for foreign labor in the post-World War Two boom years was responsible for the
import of a massive wave of foreign workers. Yet the labor recruitment schemes were
intentionally designed to facilitate temporary residence in most cases (despite the
investment costs of training labor and the resultant employer preference for longer periods
of stay), a choice that reflected a general refusal to accept long-term change.
The freezes on recruitment that appeared in so many countries in the 1970s are
important for two main reasons, and both emerge from one of the central problems of
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immigration policy—there is often a profound difference between intention and outcome
(Cornelius, Martin & Hollifield, 1994). First, as European states clamped down on entry,
many of the imported workers who were meant to return home after a few years decided
not to risk leaving in case they were never allowed back in. And many of these individuals
brought their families in to join them, meaning that despite the reduction in labor
recruitment, overall immigration levels remained high. Most scholars see this unanticipated
outcome as a major element in explaining the politicization of immigration and immigrant
policy across Europe, though perspectives vary on whether this jump in salience is a
reaction more to perceived cultural or economic threat. In any case, the debate on whether
to insist on immigrant assimilation (or allow for multiculturalism) that already raged in
the traditional countries of immigration found its way into politics in Europe in the 1980s
and 90s. But a segment of public opinion in Europe called for a third path. These groups,
which rose on the tide of nationalism and xenophobia, pointed out that the integration
dilemma could be obviated by simply closing the doors to immigration overall. The
consequences of the recruitment stops changed the prominence of immigration as an issue
for the average citizen in Europe, and this shift is central to explaining the policies that
have followed.
The second reason the recruitment freezes provide a good background for
examining policy change is that their failure to achieve the desired outcome has pushed
policy makers to strategically reevaluate their responses to demands for foreign labor. The
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reduced demand for foreign labor that justified the immigration stops in the 1970s
evaporated as economies recovered, but governments were reluctant to return to policies
that had gone so wrong in the past. How could short-term economic migration be made
viable? This problem was further complicated by the expansion of anti-immigrant
sentiment among the populace.
Finally, toward the end of the 90s and in the first years of the new millennium,
several European countries made profound changes to their immigration policy regimes.
These are of paramount importance here because they represent the moment in which
European countries begin to reach out for skill-selective, foreign models of immigration
policy. Most of this section is dedicated to an examination of the skill-selective turn in
Germany and the United Kingdom. Following these examinations of specific cases, this
section gives an overview of the European Union’s attempts to formulate policy on
immigration and the role the E.U. has played in the move toward skill-based selection
schemes.

Germany
Germany remained steadfastly opposed to any acknowledgment that it had become
a country of immigration until 2000, when that image began to erode. During the 1990s,
the German government had found ways of allowing the import of foreign labor without
being forced to admit to an end to the recruitment ban. For example, by subcontracting
foreign companies to complete projects and allowing them to bring in their own equipment
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and labor, but only for the duration of the project (Martin, 2014).
In 1998, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Green Party
formed a coalition government, replacing the center-right coalition that had been in place
for 16 years. Though the SPD-Green coalition was certainly more pro-immigration than
the government it replaced, change was not immediately forthcoming. Otto Schily, the
Interior Minister of the SPD, rejected the possibility of immigration reform in 1999, stating
that “There is no need for an immigration law because, if we had one, the quotas would
be zero” (Martin, 2014, p. 237).
In 2000, however, major business leaders within the German IT sector had begun
to voice their disagreement with Schily’s assessment. The CEO of Siemens, Heinrich von
Pierer “warned that the number of electrical engineers who graduated last year fell to
9,000, down from 13,000 in 1995,” and the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce
“confirmed Pierer's warning” (Menke-Gluckert 2000). CEO of IBM Germany, Erwin
Staudt, “said that by conservative estimates his company and those in his knowing might
soon need at least 10,000 IT experts in near future” (Gurha 2000). The Federation of
German Employers put out a statement that “as many as 1.5 million high-skilled
immigrants were necessary for Germany to remain competitive” (BBC, as cited in Duncan
2012). Some in the media noted that a few “big companies like SAP, Dell and Compaq
and the smaller ones like J. D. Edwards, Daamgard and Tria Software have managed to
fill all vacancies,” arguing that the outcry over the need for skilled labor was overblown
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(Gurha 2000). Reporters pointed out that there was no centrally collected data on the
number of IT jobs available in the country, meaning that most estimates were produced
by IT companies themselves (Gurha 2000).
Yet in response to the urging of the newly formed IT industry association,
BITKOM, and Initiative D21 (an organization that referred to itself as a public-private
partnership between the federal government and the information technology industry), the
government announced the creation of the German Green Card—a new, high-skill work
permit—in March 2000 (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009). Initiative D21 was founded
by the chief of IBM-Germany at the time, Erwin Staudt with the support of German
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and comprised a “body of computer bigwigs, including IBM,
Deutschland, Siemens, Debis and Microsoft” (Gurha 2000). Unsurprisingly, the Green Card
strongly reflected these business leaders’ concerns—a five-year permit designed to bring in
third-country computer programmers to address skill shortages in the information
technology (IT) industry (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009). Consistent with the first
diagnostic criterion, large, multinational IT firms (including IBM, Siemens, Sony, and
Microsoft, all of which are included in the dataset introduced in Chapter 4) played a
central role in influencing policymakers in favor of skill-selective immigration in Germany.
The unveiling of this new program changed the way policymakers in Germany
thought about immigration. The program received broad media attention and was opposed
by trade unions and a large portion of the general public. In part because it was a time of
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high unemployment, German labor fretted about the creation of a new entry permit. These
fears were encouraged by the center-right party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
and in particular by a politician named Jürgen Rüttgers. Rütters began using the slogan
“Kinder statt Inder,” meaning “children instead of Indians” to express the sentiment that
the government should be investing in education and training rather than importing
foreign labor (“Kinder statt Inder”, 2000). The overt reference to a specific national group,
however, allowed him to speak to a feeling of xenophobia among the general public that
most policymakers had spent years trying to keep under wraps.
In April 2000, IBM-Germany Chief Erwin Staudt gave an interview with the
newspaper Berliner Zeitung in which he responded to the CDU-led critiques of the Green
Card program and emphasized how important the Green Card would be for the
competitiveness of the IT industry in Germany. When asked if he was surprised by the
remarks made by the opposition, he admitted he was, telling the interviewer “[w]e had
expected bipartisan approval. Because we have always said that the green card should
only apply to a limited number of highly qualified candidates” (Michel 2000). Implicit in
this statement is the expectation that by narrowing the range of the policy to apply only
to the highly skilled, they could successfully avoid a parliamentary battle. This is
consistent with the second diagnostic criterion laid out above, which states that IT MNCs
see skill-selective policies as a necessary compromise to achieve immigration reform.
In September 2000, Reuters reported that “[d]omestic and foreign firms, including
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Siemens AG, IBM and Sony, told Schröder the technology sector depended on non-German
expertise and warned that right-wing intimidation was scaring off skilled foreign workers”
(“German IT firms” 2000). The Green Card passed. The CDU did not work up enough
opposition to block the program, and labor unions agreed to support the new policy so
long as employers would commit to increasing their investment in training programs
(Duncan 2012). In his April interview, Staudt responded to a question about whether the
Green Card should be further liberalized by saying “[y]es. But we cannot rush things. We
have to take the fears of people seriously” (Michel 2000). Again, the acknowledgement here
of the compromise represented by skill-selective immigration is apparent. Staudt is clear
that he hopes to avoid inciting a nativist response by moving slowly and liberalizing
immigration selectively and incrementally.
In spite of the rhetoric and the societal tension it inspired, the unveiling of Green
Card program did two things. First, because the opposition party was ultimately unable
to block the policy, it helped “break the mantra that Germany is not a country of
immigration” (Martin, 2014, pp. 234-235). Second, it reimagined German immigration
policy in terms of the competition state. As opposed to the side entrances the government
had opened in the 1980s and 90s to allow some limited and temporary mobility, the Green
Card was being touted as a way to bolster the competitiveness of the German IT industry.
Dieter Hundt, the president of the German Employers’ Federation, tried to make
the link as explicit as possible for policymakers. He asserted that enabling the immigration
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of skilled IT workers to Germany was crucial “to stopping the migration of young IT
companies from Germany” (Gurha 2000). IBM-Germany Chief Erwin Staudt explained
that Germany could not afford to place additional barriers in the way of skilled migrants,
because young, qualified information technology workers already “want to go to the USA”
(“Green Card” 2000). A Siemens representative echoed this problem, voicing the preference
she’d heard from many Indian programmers: “I don't want to go to Germany. I would
much rather go to the US” (Harding 2000).
In contrasting the attractiveness of Germany as a destination state to that of the
U.S., advocates of the Green Card attempted to shift the perceived purpose of the program
away from their own narrowly defined interests and toward the national interest. This
shows that, consistent with the third diagnostic criterion, the IT MNCs that acted to push
skill-selection in German immigration policy did so in part by invoking the rhetoric of
international competition. Beyond this, the name of the German program was borrowed
from the American Green Card, though in design it more closely resembled the H-1B (the
temporary skilled employment visa created in the United States in 1990). In the years just
prior to the introduction of the German Green Card, the U.S. had begun to raise the cap
on the quota of H-1Bs, ratcheting up the number of skilled foreign workers U.S. employers
could recruit from abroad. IBM had also been an active participant in these developments.
Not only was the German Green Card inspired by an American program, its
subsequent failure to attract the desired number of IT specialists to Germany was
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attributed to the fact that the comparable American visa, which offered a longer period of
stay and a possible path to permanency, was more attractive to prospective migrants
(Cerna 2014). Staudt lamented in his April interview that “Indians or our neighbors in
Eastern Europe prefer to go to the USA or England. Because the Americans send a clear
signal to the foreign elites: Here you are welcome. This signal does not come from
Germany” (Michel 2000).
Beyond changing the way German policy makers regarded immigration, there is
some evidence that the Green Card “inspired other European governments to follow suit”
(De Somer 2012 p. 5). According to Caviedes, “[i]n Austria and the Netherlands employers
explicitly referenced the German policy in order to motivate their governments to action”
just shortly after the Green Card was announced (2010, p. 197). In both cases, the IT
sector succeeded in getting its government to lower some entry restrictions for IT
specialists, though neither engaged in a full immigration policy overhaul for a number of
years. In Austria, Hewlett-Packard (HP) took the lead, with CEO Jörg Menno Harms
advising the government to support the creation of a body similar to Germany’s Initiative
D21, which he directly credited with the successful passage of the Green Card program.
HP executive Wolfgang Gruber elaborated, explaining that Austria faced the same
obstacles as Germany, namely a “lack qualified employees” to maintain the competitiveness
of the information technology industry (“Schrittmacher” 2000).
The turbulence caused by the German Green Card program drove leaders of
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German political parties across the spectrum to the conclusion that comprehensive
immigration policy reform was necessary. In June 2000, Interior Minister Otto Schily
announced that the government was assembling a commission to study the problem of
immigration policy and make recommendations. He appointed Rita Süssmuth, a CDU
party leader, to head the commission, hoping to protect the commission’s work from
accusations of partisan bias. The commission’s recommendations, published in 2001 in a
report entitled “Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration fördern” (shape immigration, promote
integration), call for a Canadian-style points-based system for selecting immigrants.
Interior Minister Otto Schily proceeded to introduce legislation largely in
accordance with the commission’s recommendations. Minister Schily, who only two years
earlier had flatly rejected the need for a new German immigration law, now claimed that
“Germany is an immigration country,” and pointed to the “competition among the
industrialized countries for the best minds” to justify moving “immigration law more
strongly toward our own economic interests” (“Germany” 2002).
Though a points-based system was never enacted in Germany81, the new legislation
did maintain the skill-selective focus that emerged with the Green Card initiative and
gained support from the Süssmuth commission’s report. While policy remained restrictive

81

The passage of the legislation was halted on a technicality and the governing coalition lost seats
in the German Parliament in 2002. By the time a revised version of the legislation made it through
in 2004, the initial momentum had been lost and the major features of the commission’s
recommendations had been gutted (Geddes & Scholten, 2016).
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overall, exceptions were made for the highly skilled and for students. A “third exception,
taken direction from US legislation, applies to investors,” (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou
2009, p. 259).

United Kingdom
Much like in Germany, the shift in immigration policy in the United Kingdom was
th

sudden. In the early part of the 20 century, British immigration policy had been mostly
unrestricted. As the center of a global empire, the U.K. chose to allow its immigration
policy to reflect the tone of a benevolent colonizer, giving all Commonwealth citizens the
right to enter and work in the U.K. In 1962, however, there was a restrictionist shift as
geopolitical upheaval in Africa, the Caribbean, and South Asia caused a sudden rise in the
number of Commonwealth citizens who sought to resettle in the U.K. (Wright 2012). For
British citizens, this meant not only more migrants, but also more migrants of visibly
foreign origin, unlike those that had come from Australia, Canada and New Zealand in
previous years. The response was the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, which
essentially closed the doors to nonwhite immigration (Duncan 2012). With minor
adjustments, this policy persisted through the 1980s when, under the leadership of Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher, “strict controls against nonwhite immigrants were considered
good for race relations” (Duncan 2012, p. 90).
Immigration was so restrictive in Britain for such a long time that political
discussion of the issue had all but disappeared by the time the Labour Party won control
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of government in 1997. Their platform called for reform on a number of social and economic
issues, but “immigration played no role in the campaign” (Hansen, 2014). Outside of
government, however, nascent ideas were taking shape. In 1994, the Institute for Public
Policy Research (IPPR)82 produced a report in which they advocated a friendlier and more
evidence-based approach to immigration. Policies aimed at attracting highly skilled
immigrants would be central to this change.
In preparing the report, the IPPR consulted with the Confederation of British
Industry (CBI), a multi-industry employer organization the Financial Times has referred
to as “Britain’s biggest business lobby group” (Groom & Parker 2014). The CBI brought
the institute’s questions to some of its members, who responded that the barriers to hiring
foreign workers were problematic. Sue Shortland, the Manager of the CBI Employee
Relocation Council, explained the position the CBI’s members in a letter to the IPPR’s
Sarah Spencer, who was the driving force between the thinktank’s report on immigration.
According to Shortland, Britain’s immigration regulations were particularly problematic
for multinational firms:
“[f]or example, a multi-national company with a UK headquarters may wish
to recruit in the US, bring the trainee to the UK to gain UK HQ experience
before deploying him in the US or elsewhere in the Company’s global
network. Restrictions via the Work Permit Scheme on such recruitment
and training strategies may result in multi-nationals moving their HQ
82

The Guardian’s list of thinktanks in the U.K. characterizes the IPPR by asserting that it “rose
out of the ashes of Labour's 1987 election defeat, aiming to invigorate leftwing thinking” (“List of
thinktanks” 2013). The Guardian also notes that “[p]roposals from the IPPR formed much of
Labour’s agenda under Tony Blair” (Inman 2018).
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operations to countries where work permit restrictions are considered less
onerous (Shortland, as cited in Spencer 1994, p. 312-13).
Referring to the IPPR report’s policy recommendations, a 1994 article in the
Financial Times drew out its main points, namely that “immigration restrictions are
depriving UK businesses of much-needed professional and managerial skills,” and that
liberalizing entry requirements for skilled workers could “help in attracting international
companies by making it easier for them to transfer staff to the UK” (Willman 1994). Yet
policymakers were not immediately responsive. Under John Major, who served as prime
minister in the years between the Thatcher and Blair administrations, the United Kingdom
was “widely characterised as having the most restrictive immigration selection criteria of
any developed economy” (Wright 2013, p. 137). By the time Tony Blair stepped into the
role of prime minister in 1997, the “policy orthodoxy [surrounding immigration] had become
so deeply entrenched among the major political parties and within the bureaucracy” that
liberalizing immigration policy was not even considered to be an option (Wright 2012, pp.
732-33). Within the next couple of years, that orthodoxy had been shredded.
The cracks in Britain’s restrictionist posture really began to show in 1998. While
the Home Department maintained a dogmatic focus on asylum seekers, proposing no
changes to the character of labor migration (Home Department, 1998), the Department of
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Trade and Industry (DTI)83 published a white paper on competition in which it endorsed
immigration policies that open the door to the highly skilled (DTI 1998). The Institute of
Directors, an employer organization for international business leaders, responded to this
report by submitting a memorandum to the Select Committee on Trade and Industry
backing the DTI’s recommendations and urging the parliament to “take steps to encourage
entrepreneurs and skilled individuals from overseas to come and work in Britain” (IoD
1999).
The same year, representatives of multinational firms began to speak out as well.
They drew upon the mobilization of business leaders in the U.S. around H-1B-visa
liberalization to bolster their case. Trish Boag, head of resourcing at KPMG, a
multinational professional service company84 headquartered in the Netherlands, pointed to
the lobbying efforts of Bill Gates and others in the U.S., warning British policymakers that
“[t]he UK should reconsider its own policies on such matters, or risk being left behind in
the continuing scramble for IT skills” (Nicolle 1998). The Japanese Chamber of Commerce

83

The primary objective of the DTI, according to a web archive capture of the department’s website
in 1997, was to “seek to identify the needs of UK business through a close dialogue with individual
sectors and an understanding of what influences competitiveness at home and abroad” (DTI 1997).
84
KPMG is best known for its financial auditing, consulting, and tax services. Along with companies
like Ernst & Young and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, however, KPMG also offers assistance in the
international recruitment, transfer, and management of employees. KPMG’s website notes that “[a]s
multinational companies continue to expand into new global markets, there is an increasing demand
for highly mobile, international workforces,” and their U.K. subsidiary subsequently offers
immigration advice, expatriate tax advising, and other such services (KPMG 2008). KPMG is not
one of the firms included in the dataset of MNCs introduced in Chapter 4.
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and Industry expressed similar concerns on behalf of the companies it represented, claiming
in the evidence it submitted to the Select Committee on Trade and Industry that “the
process of issuing [and] … extending work permits by the Department for Education and
Employment takes too long,” and asking that special allowances be made for the family
members of intra-company transfers. It noted that these issues in particular were “seen as
an impediment to living and doing business in the UK” by Japanese companies (Japanese
Chamber of Commerce and Industry 1998).
Tony Blair’s administration was not initially set up to be responsive to these
demands. During his early years in office, Blair suffered a constant media barrage on the
subject of asylum seekers. This high level of media attention stemmed from the perceived
threat of the “bogus asylum seeker,”85 a phrase “used to represent asylum seekers/refugees
as perpetrators of two types of fraud, namely, ‘identity fraud’ and ‘welfare fraud’” (Khan
2012, p. 67). Blair’s Minister of Immigration, Michael O’Brien, struggled to balance his
attempts to quiet the “moral panic,” enforcing control mechanisms on one hand while
trying to avoid mass deportations on the other. He was not successful, and in 1999, Blair
replaced O’Brien with Barbara Roche. Whether Blair had intended it or not, Roche was
surprisingly progressive on the issue of immigration. She did not like deportation, felt that
asylum seekers should be allowed to stay, and saw the existing British immigration policies
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It is not clear where this phrase originated, but it became a popular way to refer to migrants in
the British tabloids in the early 90s and was picked up by right-wing politicians as well as the U.K.
Home Office (Khan 2012).
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as undeniably racist (Bower 2016).
Coincidentally, Blair’s progressive new immigration minister also happened to have
formerly served as a junior minister in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and
was familiar with the DTI’s white paper on competition, which presented skilled
immigration as a desirable policy. At the same time, Roche was also acquainted with Sarah
Spencer, the researcher behind the IPPR’s 1994 report. Blair’s appointment of Roche
provided the necessary connection between advocates of skill-selective policies and an
administration desperate for a way to change the conversation and quiet public outrage
on the issue of immigration. Utilizing Spencer’s research on business demand for skilled
migrants, Roche set out to shift the national discourse on immigration, a process she called
an “imaginative rethink” (BBC, as cited in Wright 2010). In his critical examination of the
Blair administration, Tom Bower notes that Roche explicitly connected her policy ideas
to the demands of employers:
Employers had frequently complained about red tape preventing their
recruitment of skilled foreign workers, despite the dearth of equivalent
British labour. To overcome that bottleneck, Roche argued that Britain
should ‘modernise the work permit system.’ (2016, p. 176)
By the time the government commissioned a review of immigration to the U.K. in
2000, the views of the IPPR had found a prominent place in the party’s platform on
immigration policy.
In 2000, the existing system of demand-driven work permits was relaxed and
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expanded, and a pilot, supply-side program called the Innovators Scheme was added. To
emphasize the potential economic benefits of the Innovators Scheme, the new program was
introduced jointly by Barbara Roche, the Minister for Immigration, and Alan Johnson,
the Minister for Competitiveness. This collaboration was underlined in a speech made by
Roche to the IPPR a few months later, in which she claimed that the U.K. was “in a
competition for the brightest and best talents,” and suggested that immigration policy
should be designed to reflect that reality (Roche 2000). Roche told her audience that new
visa policies could be used to address the “shortage of skilled workers in the IT sector,
where there is an international scramble to attract experts and wealth creators,” and
reiterated that she was “particularly keen to hear from members of the business community
about how they think the Government can help to attract those with the skills and
expertise they need” (Roche 2000).
The government waited until the 2001 election had passed to make another move,
but the lack of overtly negative reaction to the immigration policy changes of 2000 and
the landslide victory returning Labour to power in 2001 were enough of a mandate to move
forward. The High Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP)86, a points-based selection system
was announced that year.
The new rhetoric portraying immigration as a national asset and an engine of

86

The HSMP was introduced as an Australian-style points system. Hansen claims that associating
the program with Australia instead of Canada was intentional, as the government feared that
Canada “appeared too soft on immigration” (Hansen 2014, p. 206).
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economic growth caught on. As the government proceeded with this previously untried
strategy, they sought input from external actors, including “Labour-aligned think-tanks,
above all the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), and interest groups, especially
employer associations” (Consterdine & Hampshire 2014, p. 286-7). This meant that
employer organizations were included directly in the immigration policymaking process in
a way they hadn’t been before and became “especially crucial to the development of policy”
(Somerville & Goodman 2010). It also inspired them to increase their lobbying on the
issue, which had previously been somewhat anemic and ad-hoc, thus also amplifying their
87

indirect influence on immigration policy

(Consterdine & Hampshire 2014). According to

Somerville, “[e]mployers who have lobbied for high-skilled labour migration include
insurance companies, major oil and energy companies (such as BP and Shell), accountancy
firms and financial companies working in the City of London financial markets” (p. 108).
Though the U.K.’s immigration policy was highly restrictive as recently as the mid1990s, the numerous skill-selective liberalizations that began in 2000 and continued for the
next ten years completely changed the policy environment. The immigration troubles
experienced by Tony Blair’s administration initially made the idea of liberalizing
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Wright argues that while employer associations were consulted in the policymaking process, they
were not the driving force behind the changes. He cites an official from the CBI as saying that while
the government’s new policies “did have the support of the CBI” it was not pressure from the CBI
that “motivated the decision” (2017, p. 361). Instead, he suggests the immigration liberalizations
were driven largely by “core executive agencies” like the Treasury and the Home Office (2017, p.
363).
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immigration unthinkable. The actions of Barbara Roche suggest that skill-selective policies
were intended to address economic demands for migrant labor without stoking the debate
on asylum seekers. This is consistent with the second diagnostic criterion, which states
that policymakers see skill-selective immigration as a policy compromise. Additionally, the
involvement of KPMG, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the CBI
(together with the CBI’s discussion of multinational members) shows the active
involvement of multinational firms in shaping and supporting this compromise, and the
language used by these actors illustrates their choice to frame the issue in terms of
international competition. This shows, consistent with the first and third criteria, that
MNCs did engage in influence campaigns in support of skill-selective immigration policies,
and that a major rhetorical justification was the global war for talent.
That said, in the United Kingdom case IT firms do not stand out as the central
players. Though there is plenty of evidence of MNC involvement, much of the influence of
private actors is channeled through employer organizations, making it difficult to
distinguish interests and priorities at the level of the industry. However, the outspokenness
of KPMG and Somerville’s mention of financial and accounting firms may suggest that an
IT-only theory is too narrow, and that expanding the scope of influence to include more
of the high-income service sector would better represent the politics of the issue.
Furthermore, this grand transformation in British immigration policy may only have been
possible given the exceptionally strong growth experienced by the British economy in the
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90s and the cooperation of the labor unions, which was forthcoming.
Though skill-selective entry tracks have been affected less than other visa classes,
the 2016 Brexit vote provided another hairpin turn in the history of British immigration
policy. It remains to be seen whether the next government will continue to favor the highly
skilled.

European Union
The European Union has made numerous attempts to claim supranational
competence to harmonize immigration policy among member states since the early 1970s,
inspired, in part, by the 1973 oil crisis and the widespread restrictions on immigration that
followed in all member states. The European Commission took a broadly pro-immigrant
stance, suggesting that member state barriers to immigrant rights were causing some of
the integration problems they were experiencing and urging states to give third-country
nationals the same treatment they reserved for citizens of the European Community. By
and large, states resisted this pressure from the Commission, and the gap between the
freedoms accorded EC nationals and TCNs only grew wider (Roos 2013). Despite the fact
that the core of the EU’s strength in coordinating other issue areas had been reliant on
the logic of economic gains from cooperation, the European Commission experienced
virtually no success on labor migration until the 2000s. Two policy drafts—the first in
2001 and the second in 2007—and an examination of the strategic shift in purpose and
framing that occurred between them, can help shed light on the priorities of member states
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and the role of the EU.
After decades of member-state resistance, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 finally
created space for the European Commission to develop legislation on economic immigration
policy. The first draft, proposed in 2001, took a comprehensive approach to labor
migration. Drawing on existing member state immigration legislation and anticipating
fears of increased labor market competition, the Commission’s proposal allowed for the
imposition of salary thresholds and outlined a Community preference principle, which
required employers to try to hire from within the EU before turning to third-country labor.
As Roos puts it, the draft outlined “a flexible framework that left a lot of discretion to
member states” (2013, p. 156). Despite this, the effort was rejected by the European
Council. The generalized nature of the draft, in failing to discriminate between different
kinds of labor migrants, sparked opposition from Austria, Germany and France (Menz
2009), and several delegations found fault with the Community preference principle,
pointing to planned or implemented green card schemes that would fail to satisfy such a
requirement (Roos 2013). Within a couple of years, the proposal was abandoned.
Before proposing a new draft, the Commission spent some time working on a
strategy to ensure that the next attempt to pass labor migration legislation would not
encounter the same hurdles. In 2003, the Commission released a communication that “can
be interpreted as an attempt to reframe the issue after the first proposal for an EU labour
migration directive failed” (Roos 2013, p. 160). The communication pointed to
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demographic decline and labor market shortages as common problems across EU member
states, mentioned an international competition for the highly skilled and suggested that
an EU-wide policy would be an effective way to make the Union as a whole more
competitive. It also reminded its audience that such a policy would be in line with goals
stated in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, which prioritized improving the competitiveness of the
EU as a knowledge-based economy (CEC 2003, p. 336). In 2004, the Commission released
a green paper juxtaposing two different approaches to labor immigration policy and
initiated a consultation procedure, asking member states and interest groups to express
and explain their preferences. The two broad policy options presented in the green paper
included the “horizontal” approach, which was mostly consistent with the Commission’s
2001 draft proposal, and the “sectoral” approach, which was explained as follows:
This draft legislation could focus on seasonal workers, intra-corporate
transferees, specially skilled migrants (not necessarily only highly qualified),
contractual service suppliers, and/or other categories, putting aside for the
time being any overall common framework for the admission of thirdcountry workers. The advantage in this case could be an easier adoption of
common rules. (CEC 2005, 811, p. 5)
The results of the consultation procedure gave the Commission reason to believe
that EU-wide cooperation could be achieved for four different categories of labor migrant—
the highly-skilled, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees and paid trainees (CEC
2005, p. 669). In 2007, the Commission introduced its proposal for the Blue Card, a scheme
to attract high-skilled workers. The proposal was negotiated among member states over
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the next two years, during which the range of potential migrants who would be eligible for
the Blue Card was drastically narrowed and intra-EU mobility for Blue Card holders (a
provision that had been a priority for the European Commission) was scrapped.
Additionally, member states retained the right to maintain parallel, national skill-selective
immigration schemes, meaning each could essentially choose to render its Blue Card
irrelevant.
On the whole, the developments in economic immigration policy at the EU level in
the 2000s appear to be responding to, rather than driving, national immigration policies.
It is clear that between the Commission’s 2001 and 2007 proposals, a conscious shift in
framing has occurred as the Commission tries to drive home the added value of
harmonization. This is the window that represents the skill-selective moment for the EU.
However, much of this seems to be picking up on the kind of language already appearing
in member state discourse on immigration, and the final form of the Blue Card shows that,
even given overlapping preferences, member states have not yet surrendered their
authority to regulate high-skilled immigrants. While this evidence is by no means
conclusive, it suggests that the EU has had more of a reinforcing, rather than causal role
in the determination of national immigration policies of member states.

Comparing the Senders
In both Germany and the U.K., the end of the 1990s marked a reevaluation of
what had long been a restrictive approach to immigration policy. In both cases, newly
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elected center-left governments struggled to reinvent their countries as places that
embraced the possibility of a long-term immigration regime. And in both cases the decision
was made to focus liberalizing moves on a limited group of highly skilled migrants. But
there are some differences between the two countries’ experiences that should be
highlighted as well. In Germany, the introduction of the German Green Card ignited a
national debate on the purpose and form of immigration policy, spurring the opposition
party to throw support behind an anti-immigration movement. In the U.K. on the other
hand, the newly liberal approach toward skilled migrants was adopted specifically to
distract from an anti-immigration movement that had erupted around the rising numbers
of asylum seekers. Despite this, the Innovator’s Scheme and HSMP initially received
minimal attention from the press. While it is true that employers advocated for skillselective immigration policies in both countries, the IT industry appears to have been a
driving force in Germany, while in the U.K. individual IT companies and IT industryspecific organizations do not appear to have become more involved than non-IT employers.
In part, this difference may be determined by institutional factors. As neither
country has a clearly delineated and regulated route by which private actors are given
access to policymakers, informal forms of lobbying abound in both places. In the U.K.,
private business interests are more likely to be in conversation with the Department of
Business, Innovation and Skills, than with the Home Office, which handles immigration
policy (Wright 2017).
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Evaluating the Skill-Selective Turn
The four cases explored in this chapter—Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia,
and the United States—all experienced the skill selective turn around the same time. The
1990s and early 2000s were largely a time of widespread economic prosperity, and they
signaled the take-off of information and communications technologies, rocketing the
industries’ innovators to the forefront of the global economy. In Australia and the United
States, economic criteria for immigrant selection were not new. Even in Germany and the
United Kingdom, where immigration had been heavily restricted in the decades leading up
to the 1990s, there were historical memories of the recruitment of foreign labor. But the
policies that characterized the skill-selective turn in each of these places looked different.
Primarily intended for temporary migration, often specifically directed at IT occupations,
and mostly streamlined and expedited for ease of use, these were policies that were meant
to circumvent immigration restrictions, not to reinvent immigration regimes.
This chapter explores each case in terms of the economic circumstances, social and
political conditioning factors, and behaviors of relevant actors. Broadly speaking, these
vignettes support the expectations laid out with regard to policymaker and firm-level
behavior. In Germany, Australia, and the U.S., this chapter examines explicit examples of
the ways in which multinational information technology companies involved themselves in
the policymaking process. Consistent with the diagnostic criteria, employers responded to
an environment hostile to immigration liberalization by setting their sights on a
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strategically narrowed set of policy demands and presenting these preferences to
policymakers along with argument and evidence to undergird their importance.
Policymakers too, behaved mostly in accordance with expectations. In the U.S. and the
U.K. in particular, the skill-selective compromise appears to emerge from an issue area
that has otherwise been considered no-win and untouchable.
At the same time, there are places where the cases reveal themselves to be
inconsistent with expectations as well. First and foremost, policy change in the U.K., while
supported by multinational employers, does not show information technology MNCs to be
the major drivers of change. Instead, there is evidence that other skill-intensive service
industries (e.g. finance and consulting) may have been more involved. Furthermore, while
the strategy of supporting narrow, skill-selective policy reforms was rapidly picked up by
employers in the United States following the successful gambits by the AeA in the early
1980s and the NSF in 1990, these initial instances are lessons more than examples of true
intentionality. Within a few years of the 1990 Immigration Act, however, IT MNCs had
become the leading advocates of skill-selective policy.
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Concluding Remarks
The current administration’s views on legal immigration can be effectively
summarized by the comments President Donald Trump made in an Oval Office meeting
in January 2018, disparaging immigrants from Haiti and Africa while embracing those
from Norway. The incident generated a good deal of media attention, but the outrage
seemed to derive more from the impolite language the President used and from the baldness
of his remarks than from the sentiments behind his words. A Harvard-Harris poll
conducted just a week after the President’s comments were reported found that 79% of
respondents think the U.S. immigration system should be based on merit rather than
family ties. Part of this result comes from linguistic signals—the idea of merit or of making
a contribution implies deservingness in a way that national origin does not. And yet, the
preferences expressed by the President and those stated by the survey respondents amount
to the same thing. All else equal, people prefer immigrants from high-income countries to
those from low-income countries.
During the year of 1984, just two OECD countries passed skill-based changes to
their immigration policies. In 2014, 24 OECD countries made such changes. Phrases like
“the best and the brightest” and “the global war for talent” are ubiquitous in the rhetoric
policy makers and business leaders use to evaluate the world labor market today, and they
signal to the public that skill-based immigration is vital to our national interests. But why,
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if our competitive edge and innovative capacity are so reliant on the skills of foreign
nationals, is skill-selection in immigration policy such a recent phenomenon? How can this
international trend be explained by the political positioning of domestic interest groups?

Multinational Firms and Policy Diffusion
In the context of immigration policy, an unusually controversial policy issue, proimmigration interests have an incentive to seek a political outcome that will enable some
liberalization of access to foreign labor without awakening the full force of immigration
opponents. Due to societal prejudices toward immigrants of a lower socio-economic status,
high-skilled immigration policies have become just such a compromise. Chapter 3 points
in particular to the labor mobility needs of multinational firms and to the skill-intensive
and low-protection nature of the information technology labor market to identify IT MNCs
as the most likely proponents of skill-selective immigration policies.
The theory advanced in this dissertation expands traditional political economic
explanations for immigration policy by incorporating the transnational interests and
incentives of multinational firms. While MNC subsidiaries have many of the same qualities
as domestic firms, holding stakes in local economies and experiencing the consequences of
local regulation, they are organizationally and financially linked to their global network of
sibling subsidiaries and to corporate headquarters. The main argument made in this project
is that these global MNC networks can be viewed as potential pathways of policy diffusion,
and that the proliferation of skill-selective immigration policies can in part be traced back
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to these paths of influence.
This argument is tested using two different strategies—spatial regression and case
study analysis. The theory of policy diffusion relies on the idea of interdependence in
policymaking, which takes place when policy change in one state somehow impacts the
likelihood of policy change in another state. To show not only that liberalizations of skillselective immigration policies can be explained in terms of policy diffusion, but that the
pattern of interdependence is consistent with the theory of multinational firms as conduits
of influence, Chapters 5 and 6 utilize a spatial regression technique. This strategy allows
for MNC networks to be incorporated into the model as a system of weights for the key
independent variable—skill-selective policy liberalization abroad.
The primary research objective in Chapters 5 and 6 is to determine whether there
is statistical evidence for interdependence, and the results presented in these chapters
stand in support of this hypothesis. The findings in Chapters 5 and 6 also support the
hypothesis that right-leaning governments, which more heavily rely on anti-immigration
voters, have a positive conditioning effect on this interdependent relationship. However,
no such evidence is found to support the idea that plurality electoral systems, which have
been theoretically linked to lower insulation from special-interest influence, have a similar
condition effect. Chapter 5 also demonstrates that the finding in favor of interdependence
is robust to the inclusion of a simple moving average to account for institutional delays,
and that MNC networks do not show the same statistical association with restrictive
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changes to skill selective policies or liberal changes to family policies. Chapter 6 further
probes the robustness of the MNC network-based interdependence finding, showing that
it remains robust to the exclusion of outliers and performs better than potential alternative
paths of interdependence like geographical distance and bilateral trade ties.
Together, the results discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 provide strong evidence that
there is an interdependent relationship between the liberalization of skill-selective
immigration policies across the OECD, and that the strength of this relationship can be
partly quantified by the MNC networks these countries share. This is a major finding in
the studies of international political economy and immigration, both for what it says about
MNC networks as well as for what it suggests about the popularity of skill-selection.
At the same time, the statistical results say little about what is happening on the
ground. Chapter 7 uses case studies to gain additional insight into the process by which
skill-selection has been incorporated into the broader immigrant admissions strategies of
four countries—the United States, Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom. These
vignettes support the expectations for policymaker and firm-level behavior generated in
Chapter 3. In Germany, Australia, and the U.S., there are explicit examples of the ways
in which multinational information technology companies involved themselves in the
policymaking process. In Germany, the idea for the Green Card is credited to Ewin Staudt,
the CEO of IBM-Germany. In Australia, the 457-visa, the temporary skilled entry visa,
emerged from a set of recommendations made by a committee headed by Neville Roach,
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the CEO of Fujitsu Australia. In the United States, a coalition of multinational information
technology firms organized a coordinated campaign to voice their support for a liberal
change to the quotas placed on H-1Bs, the primary, temporary skilled entry visas in the
U.S.
Consistent with the theory described in Chapter 3, these multinational IT firms
not only led the campaigns for skill-selective policy liberalization, but also invoked the
global war for talent to make use of similar changes abroad and to strengthen their case.
Evidence from the U.S., Australian, and U.K. cases also line up well with the hypothesis
that firms and policymakers view skill-selective policies as a strategic way to avoid public
backlash. Though in every case there must be domestic factors that distinguish a country’s
relationship with immigration and approach to its management, the crucial influence of
IT MNCs at the moment of the skill-selective turn in each of these places cannot be
overlooked. These observations provide helpful qualitative support for the elements of the
theory that cannot be tested using statistical methods.
The work contained in this dissertation project represents both major theoretical
and empirical contributions to the field of political science. The study of immigration policy
by nature crosses subfield boundaries, so while this work is organized primarily to speak
to scholars of international political economy, its contributions should also be of interest
to those who study immigration policy in the American or comparative contexts. The
central theoretical contribution of this dissertation is its conceptualization of the MNC as
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an agent of policy diffusion. Though the international business literature has done some
theorizing of the MNC as a network, this definitive structural characteristic has not been
applied to questions of policy influence or policy outcomes. This dissertation makes this
connection as explicit as possible, using the spread of skill-selective immigration policies
to show how the locational patterns of IT MNC subsidiaries can be used to explain
interdependence in policy liberalization. As a story of diffusion, this diverges from the
traditional image of policymakers as observers of the world. Rather, it suggests that, at
least in the case of MNCs, domestic influence can be transnationally motivated.
Additionally, the datasets described in Chapter 4 represent tangible, empirical
contributions to the field. One of the main limitations of immigration policy scholarship is
the perpetual lack of reliable, comparative data on immigration policies. No one dataset
can solve this problem, because immigration policy is in reality a vast category of policies,
ranging from family reunification policies to border control policies to citizenship policies
and beyond. However, the dataset on changes to skill-selective immigration policies
introduced in this dissertation represents an additional step toward making immigration
policy operationalizable, and its unique approach to the different dimensions of policy
instruments may help inform further data construction work.
The other dataset discussed in Chapter 4 is the first of its kind, focusing only on
tracking the annual subsidiary locations of major multinational information technology
firms as they become global giants. Though the concept behind this data is quite simple,
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the difficulty associated with obtaining historical information of this kind has led most
scholars interested in MNC expansion to use foreign direct investment data instead. Such
alternatives sacrifice the ability of the researcher to associate investment with a specific
firm. This issue is particularly problematic when it comes to the study of policy change,
because a disproportionate amount of amount of policy influence comes from a small
number of very large companies. The MNC subsidiary dataset thus represents the start of
what will hopefully become a much larger database tracking the expansion of MNC
subsidiaries without abstracting beyond the level of the firm.

Avenues for Further Research
The findings presented in this dissertation open up several interesting paths of
study. Most importantly, the central finding in support of the role IT MNCs play in the
process of skill-selective immigration policy diffusion should be evaluated in the context of
other policy areas. This project homes in on IT MNCs as the most likely proponents of
skill-selective immigration policies because of the relative skill-intensity of their labor
demands and because IT professions have not experienced the same degree of occupational
closure as some other high-skilled occupations. Even within this population of IT MNCs,
there are other areas of government regulation that may be equally as relevant as skillselective immigration policies, if not more so, including policies regarding the protection
of intellectual property rights and the regulation of information and privacy.
However, nothing about IT firms suggest that they are unique in their potential to
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diffuse policy along their intra-firm networks. One major and exciting undertaking would
involve expanding the sample of MNCs to include the giants of manufacturing, food
production, banking and so on. This would make it possible to assess the interdependencies
that exist within a whole slate of policy areas, including the general-interest issue areas of
trade and tax policy, which occupy such a central position in the international political
economy literature. With further additions to the MNC data to record information on the
primary activity of each subsidiary, employment by subsidiary, or the names of subsidiary
CEOs, (most of which, admittedly, is unavailable up until the most recent years) the
theory of MNC interdependence could be more fully fleshed out.
Within the realm of immigration policy, the findings on the differences in policy
dimensions in Chapter 6 indicate that additional coding of the immigration policy dataset
could also provide further leverage in understanding the influence of MNCs. Further work
should make an effort to distinguish between the venues in which policy changes occur,
because the determinants of bureaucratic change likely differ substantially from the
determinants of legislative change.
Another important extension of this work involves expanding the data to include
countries outside of the OECD. China and India are the invisible actors behind this
project—it is largely because of the enormous developmental and educational changes in
these behemoth states that the size of the skilled labor market has ballooned in recent
years. Furthermore, the industrial policies oriented toward promoting the nascent IT
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industries in these countries have drastically increased the potential benefits available to
IT MNCs with consistent access to foreign labor. At the same time, both of these countries
have recently begun to court their skilled diaspora populations, suggesting they are no
longer content to play the role of emigration states.
Separate from this, there are several other non-OECD countries that have been
adopting and adjusting skill-selective immigration policies in a way that looks very similar
88

to the strategies highlighted in this project. Places like Singapore , Taiwan, South Africa
have been active in their pursuit of skilled migrants in recent years. While the availability
of good, comparative information on the features of immigration policy is poor in developed
states with long histories of established immigration policies, this problem grows even more
intractable outside of the OECD. Still, a concentrated effort to include more places that
do not have a Western political and economic legacy would add some helpful variation to
the sample and would better describe the global skill-selective trend.
On the qualitative side, further work would benefit greatly from added variation
in the selection of case studies. The cases used in this project, the United States, Australia,
Germany and the United Kingdom, establish a strong picture of MNC policy influence and
the skill-selective turn in large, developed economies with high levels of IT MNC cohosting.
Two considerations in particular would greatly improve the ability of case study work to
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Singapore has been particularly purposeful in this regard, and overt policy strategies to attract
the highly skilled to Singapore go back to the 1980s.
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contribute this line of research. First, a case that exhibits a low level of IT MNC cohosting
would offer an important opportunity to examine how skill-selective policies are proposed
and adopted (or not) in an economy without the expected primary influencer. Second,
many scholars have noted the problems that may arise when selecting on the dependent
variable while choosing cases. While some have argued that “selecting on the dependent
variable is not a problem for process-tracing within case studies,” it becomes problematic
as soon as cases are compared (Levy 2008, p. 8). Therefore, a case that shows little or no
evidence of having experienced a skill-selective turn in immigration policy would be a
crucial ingredient for a qualitative, causal claim.
Finally, Chapter 6 briefly touches on the difference between instrumental and
political motivations that shape policy design and the potential importance of policy
dimensions and target groups in exploring this issue. A thorough treatment of this issue is
beyond the scope of this project, but by including some of this basic policy design
information, the skill-selective immigration policy dataset described in Chapter 4 makes a
future exploration of these issues possible for the first time. In Chapter 6, a division of the
data by policy dimension illustrates that the MNC-network pathway of interdependence
is a better explanator for policy liberalizations that focus on criteria (e.g. the level of
education achieved by the migrant or the field they specialize in) as opposed to regulatory
and red-tape barriers. This relationship should be further explicated.
Additionally, while this project looks at several different target groups that all fall
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within the general category of high-skill immigration, a couple of these target groups should
be examined separately. For instance, immigration policies that seek to promote the
recruitment of international students, while supported by IT MNCs, on the whole, are
likely also driven by institutions of higher education. In the United States, high educations
institutions often make more money from the steeper tuition fees charged to international
students than they do from domestic students.
Investor visas should also be considered in terms of the unique dynamics that
encourage their adoption. A number of small countries often thought of as tax havens have
in recent years begun to offer residency (and in some cases citizenship) to investors, often
without any of the job-creation requirements prevalent to investor tracks in larger states.
These visas, which have sometimes been termed “golden visas,” then essentially become
memberships for purchase, allowing individuals with large quantities of money to escape
potential legal issues in their countries of origin and sometimes, with the help of a new
citizenship, achieve a level of global mobility they could not previously access. While this
dissertation focuses on the influence of IT MNCs, these are just a couple of examples of
the other special interests that may be served by the propagation of narrowly defined,
selective visas.

Research and Policy Implications
This dissertation does not argue that the multinational firm is out of control, or
that states are experiencing a race to the bottom in immigration policy. It does not argue
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for open borders, or that employers are wrong to seek access to foreign labor. Rather, it
does posit that we who study the international political economy have missed an important
facet of the multinational firm—namely, that such a cross-border economic actor will also
be a cross-border political actor. In recognizing this, researchers must begin to unpack how
the influence of the multinational firm is informed by and spread through its intra-firm
network. Diffusion work has long struggled with the difficulty of tracking the mechanisms
of policy transfer (Gilardi 2016). Even with the understanding that multinational firms
have the incentive and capability to spread policies across states, they process by which
this takes place inside of the firm is still a black box. Incorporating case work at the level
of the multinational firm would enable scholars of diffusion to build upon the theory
introduced in this dissertation and to develop a clearer picture of when firms become
important agents of policy transfer. Policymakers must, at a minimum, seek to make
information about the organizational structure of multinationals available to the public.
There is nothing inherently wrong with the idea that firms can become constituents of
multiple states by way of their subsidiaries, but this information should be made
transparent.
Furthermore, while immigrant admissions policies are perhaps flawed by the very
nature of their exclusivity, it is hard to imagine a reasonable way to dispense with them.
Still, if states must select, they must also be subject to criticism for their chosen strategies
of selection. Skill-selective policies are an in-between place, a compromise that employers
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have chosen to make with society in order to hold on to some level of labor mobility. But
they are a compromise in other ways too. Skill-selective policies compromise the already
shaky moral basis for admissions regulations, they compromise the ability of our labor
markets to adjust to short-term disturbances, and they compromise our chances for
broader immigration policy reform.
The push toward skill-selective immigration policies that grows only more common
among advanced industrialized countries contains a fundamental willingness to allow
potential immigrants branded as undesirable to be shut out and stripped of options.
Policymakers on both left and right are willing to accept this compromise because it
enables them to be responsive to businesses as well as to a more broadly xenophobic public,
which means that the pattern is spreading unchecked. Ultimately, most do not view this
compromise as problematic. Selecting based on skill speaks to the contemporary
appreciation for the idea of meritocracy, and enough economists have produced
calculations showing that highly skilled migrants are economic assets that many have
internalized skill-selection as consistent with the national interest.
Yet compromises do not last forever. After the U.S. government responded to the
union organized outcry against cheap Chinese labor by enacting the Chinese Exclusion Act
in 1882, employers began to recruit Japanese labor instead. In 1907, the Gentlemen’s
Agreement with Japan restricted Japanese labor too, so employers began to recruit
Filipinos. Restricting migrants by race may no longer be politically viable (current U.S.
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executive orders notwithstanding) but favoring those with better access to educational and
professional opportunities is hardly more just.
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Percent of Respondents

Figure A1: U.S. Public Opinion on the Level of Immigration, 1965-2018
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Table A.1: Logit Models of Liberal Change to Skill-Selective Policies

MNC-Cohost
Trade
FDI Inflow
Log GDP
Log GDP p/c

Economic Controls
(1)
0.109
(0.107)
0.001
(0.008)
0.003
(0.008)
-0.565
(0.791)
3.402*
(1.690)

Institutional Controls
(2)
0.231*
(0.109)

-20.299
(13.601)

0.361°
(0.195)
0.605**
(0.217)
-0.490*
(0.212)
0.618*
(0.312)
2.619*
(1.133)
0.439
(0.301)
-4.732**
(1.077)

All Controls
(3)
0.220°
(0.114)
0.0002
(0.003)
0.005
(0.007)
-0.176
(0.114)
0.770**
(0.244)
0.452*
(0.203)
0.954**
(0.266)
-0.370
(0.245)
0.031
(0.364)
1.118
(1.279)
0.554°
(0.327)
-6.687**
(2.555)

YES

NO

NO

YES
969

YES
747

Gov Right
Plurality
EU Member
Parliamentary
Veto Points
Federalism
Constant
Country Fixed
Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Note:
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YES
712
°p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01
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Table A.2: Determinants of Skill-Selective Liberalization by Target
Group of Policy Change
Target Group
Highly
Occupationally
Qualified
Skilled
(1)
MNC-Cohosting
Gov Right
Plurality
Trade
FDI Inflow
Log GDP
Log GDP p/c
EU Member
Parliamentary
Veto Points
Federalism
Constant
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Note:

(2)

Student

Investor

IntraCompany
Transfer

(3)

(4)

(5)
**

0.021
(0.018)
0.045
(0.029)
0.113**
(0.035)
-0.0004
(0.0005)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.025
(0.017)
0.079*
(0.031)
-0.076*
(0.034)
0.007
(0.049)
0.104
(0.151)
0.040
(0.041)
-0.204
(0.365)

0.010
(0.011)
0.040*
(0.018)
0.040°
(0.022)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
-0.0003
(0.001)
-0.010
(0.011)
0.035°
(0.019)
-0.013
(0.022)
0.024
(0.031)
0.100
(0.095)
0.038
(0.026)
-0.134
(0.230)

0.022
(0.014)
0.025
(0.022)
0.052°
(0.027)
-0.0003
(0.0004)
-0.0003
(0.001)
-0.025°
(0.013)
0.038
(0.024)
0.019
(0.027)
-0.041
(0.038)
0.114
(0.117)
0.030
(0.032)
0.236
(0.283)

0.031
(0.012)
0.031°
(0.019)
0.069**
(0.023)
-0.0002
(0.0003)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.026*
(0.011)
0.015
(0.020)
-0.015
(0.022)
-0.021
(0.032)
0.110
(0.097)
0.035
(0.026)
0.512*
(0.236)

-0.003
(0.008)
0.010
(0.013)
-0.011
(0.016)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0004
(0.001)
0.019*
(0.008)
-0.004
(0.014)
0.010
(0.016)
-0.053*
(0.023)
0.071
(0.070)
0.033°
(0.019)
-0.517**
(0.169)

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES
712
0.119
0.071

YES
712
0.098
0.048

YES
712
0.112
0.063
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YES
YES
712
712
0.090
0.072
0.040
0.021
°p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01
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Year
• Year the policy measure entered into force.
Description
• A short description of the policy change based on the sources obtained. Where
available in the DEMIG Policy dataset89, summaries provided are retained, but
particularly where coding draws on additional source material, these descriptions
are expanded. Personal additions and changes to the DEMIG descriptions are
noted.
Sources
• Sources identified by Demig to inform the coding of the observation as well as
additional sources obtained through personal research that provide new or
additional information. Enables individual observations to be looked up, doublechecked, and improved upon if/when new information is uncovered.
any_change
1

Skill-selective policy
change

Any change, restrictive or permissive, to a policy
that targets one or more of the five target groups
included in the definition of skill-selection.

0

No change

No change to policies targeting skilled migrants (as
defined above) is made.

high_qual
1

Highly qualified target

• A change to a policy targeting potential
migrants based on one or more of the following
criteria: the level of education they have achieved
(tertiary
or
post-secondary
vocational);
employment in one of the first three major
occupational groups as specified by the ISCO-08
classification (which correspond to ISCO skill
levels 3 and 4 and include managers,
professionals, and technicians and associate
professionals) or one of their sub-major groups

89

DEMIG. (2015). DEMIG POLICY, version 1.3, Online Edition. Oxford: International Migration
Institute, University of Oxford. www.migrationdeterminants.eu
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(e.g. a policy directed at researchers is not
targeting a specific occupation, but all the
occupations within the ISCO-08 sub-major
group, “science and engineering professionals”)90;
a minimum salary level consistent with a higher
than average income.
• A change to a policy targeting family
members of highly qualified migrants.
0

No change

No change to policies targeting highly qualified
migrants (as defined above) is made.

occu_skill
1

Occupationally skilled
target

• A change to a policy targeting potential
migrants based on their specific occupation
(either at the ISCO-08 minor group, unit group,
or occupational level)1. Occupations may be
located in any of the major ISCO-08 groups,
regardless of their corresponding skill level. Said
occupations are often chosen in response to
shortages identified by a national agency or
agreed upon by the social partners, so while
these policies sometimes refer to a specific set of
predetermined occupations, they may instead
refer to a periodically updated list.

90

The choice to distinguish between the highly qualified and the occupationally skilled using the
hierarchical structure of the ISCO-08 classification system is not arbitrary. ISCO-08 organizes
occupations based on two concepts, skill level and skill specialization. These two concepts
correspond well to the conceptual difference between highly qualified migrants and occupationally
skilled migrants that I seek to draw out in my recoding of the data. Major ISCO-08 groups are
arranged by skill level, so a policy selecting by major group indicates an intention to filter potential
migrants by the level of qualification they’ve achieved. Minor groups and unit groups are organized
solely by increasing levels of skill specialization, so policies containing criteria at these levels suggest
that skill content is of greater concern than skill level. Sub-major groups are organized on the basis
of both skill level and skill specialization, yet while sub-major groups may agglomerate occupations
based their economic sector or the role they represent in the wider production process, they are
mostly too broad to allow us to hone in on the field of specialization or the good or service produced.
For this reason, sub-major groups say more about skill level than skill content.
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• A change to a policy targeting family
members of occupationally skilled migrants.
0

No change

No change to policies targeting occupationally
skilled migrants (as defined above) is made.

student
1

Student target

0

No change

• A change to a policy targeting international
students at the level of tertiary or post-secondary
vocational education.
• A change to a policy targeting family
members of international students.
No change to policies targeting international
students (as defined above) is made.

investor
•
A change to a policy targeting potential
migrants based on a minimum sum of money they
are willing to invest in the destination country or
a minimum number of jobs they can commit to
creating.
•
A change to a policy targeting family
members of investors or entrepreneurs.

1

Investor or
entrepreneur target

0

No change

No change to policies targeting investors or
entrepreneurs (as defined above) is made.

1

Entry tied to
employment offer

A change to a policy requiring potential high-skill
migrants to have a job offer from an employer in
the destination country in order to gain entry.

0

No change

No change to policies requiring potential migrants
to have job offers.

job_tied
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job_search
1

Entry allowed for job
search

A change to a policy allowing potential high-skill
migrants to enter (or remain in) the country on a
temporary basis for the purpose of seeking a job.

0

No change

No change to policies allowing potential migrants
to seek work.

1

Criteria for entry
widened

A change to a policy expanding criteria for
potential high-skill migrants or making existing
criteria easier to meet. This could mean that a
salary threshold has been reduced, education
requirements have been lowered, more occupations
are eligible, new recognition of foreign
qualifications, etc.

-1

Criteria for entry
narrowed

A change to a policy expanding criteria for
potential high-skill migrants or making existing
criteria harder to meet.

No change

No change to criteria affecting potential high-skill
migrants.

Red tape reduced

A change to a policy allowing for faster processing
or easier entry for high-skill migrants. Often this
entails opening up a new permit with lower
administrative barriers, but sometimes it simply
exempts a category of migrant from undergoing the
same regulatory process. Can include, for example,
higher caps, lowered fees, fast-track provisions,
removal of labor market test, etc.

Red tape increased

A change to a policy creating more burdensome
processing or more diffiicult entry for high-skill
migrants.

No change

No change to red tape for potential high-skill
migrants.

criteria

0

red_tape
1

-1

0
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work_rights
1

Work
rights/permissions
expanded

A change to a policy in which rights or permissions
are extended to give high-skill migrants more
flexibility in the labor market. Permissions are
sometimes extended to allow migrants to change
occupations or to allow international students to
work part time, for example.

-1

Work
rights/permissions
contracted

A change to a policy in which rights or permissions
are contracted to give high-skill migrants less
flexibility in the labor market.

No change

No change to work permissions for high-skill
migrants.

1

Residency
rights/permissions
expanded

A change to a policy in which rights or permissions
are extended to improve access to residency status
for high-skill migrants. For example, the period of
residence allowed by the permit may be increased
or a non-renewable permit may become renewable.
(Reduced integration requirements can also be
added to this category.)

-1

Residency
rights/permissions
contracted

A change to a policy in which rights or permissions
are contracted to reduce access to residency status
for high-skill migrants.

No change

No change to residency permissions for high-skill
migrants.

0

res_rights

0
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The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publishes a yearly
report called the International Migration Outlook (prior to 2006, the title was Trends in
International Migration). This report includes a segment on each member state and
represents the best cross-national information on contemporaneous change to immigration
policies. That said, due to the limited amount of space and lack of systematic reporting
guidelines, the information is often not comprehensive. The OECD reports used to compile
the immigration policy dataset are listed below. Where additional sources were necessary
and available, those sources are listed by country below as well.
Cross-National
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI
SOPEMI

(1997) Trends in International Migration 1996. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(1998) Trends in International Migration 1998. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(1999) Trends in International Migration 1999. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2001a) Trends in International Migration 2000. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2001b) Trends in International Migration 2001. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2003a) Trends in International Migration 2002. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2003b) Trends in International Migration 2003. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2005) Trends in International Migration 2004. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2006) International Migration Outlook 2006. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2007) International Migration Outlook 2007. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2008) International Migration Outlook 2008. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2009) International Migration Outlook 2009. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2010) International Migration Outlook 2010. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2011) International Migration Outlook 2011. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2012) International Migration Outlook 2012. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2013) International Migration Outlook 2013. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2014) International Migration Outlook 2014. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2015) International Migration Outlook 2015. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2016) International Migration Outlook 2016. Paris: OECD Publishing.
(2017) International Migration Outlook 2017. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Australia

Abbott, T., Robb, A., & Morrison, S. (2014, October 14). Reforming Skilled Migration to
Improve Australia’s Competitiveness (media release). Canberra, AU: Parliament
House.
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Alston, R., Kemp, D., Reith, P., & Ruddock, P. (1999, April 29c). Providing for the Future
IT&T Skill Needs of Australia (media release). Canberra, AU: Parliament House.
Andrews, K., & Bishop, J. (2007). Important Changes to General Skilled Migration (media
release). Canberra, AU: Parliament House.

Birrell, B. (2003). Immigration Policy and the Australian Labour Market.
Economic Papers, 22(1), 36-45.
Bowen, C. (2011a, November 2). New Accreditation Scheme for 457 Visas (media release).
Canberra, AU: Parliament House.
Bowen, C. (2011b, November 8). Students to Benefit as Knight Review Changes Rolled
Out (media release). Canberra, AU: Parliament House.
Bowen, C., & Shorten B. (2012, May 25). Skilled Visa Reform Targets Investors and
Entrepreneurs (media release). Canberra, AU: Parliament House.
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Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Statistics Section.
Dutton, P., & Hunt, G. (2016, September 16). Supporting Innovation through Visas:
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Parliament House.
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release). Canberra, AU: Parliament House.
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Evans, C. (2008, December 17). Migration Program Gives Priority to Those with Skills
Most Needed (media release). Canberra, AU: Parliament House.
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release). Canberra, AU: Parliament House.
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International Education (media release). Canberra, AU: Parliament House.
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practices. Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers.
Pyne, C., & Morrison, S. (2014, May 26). More streamlined visas a boost for Australian
education sector (media release). Canberra, AU: Parliament House.
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